Late on the evening of July 10th John Blake brought David Hart to his commanding officer’s headquarters, Brigadier General William Rosecrans. Twenty two-year-old David was a Union sympathizer and son of Joseph Hart, who owned a farm at the top of Rich Mountain. David was willing to guide Union soldiers to the summit from south of the Turnpike via a little-known path placing them in the rear of Confederate Camp Garnett. Rosecrans proposed a plan to McClellan, “Now General, if you will allow me to take my brigade, I will take this guide and, by a night’s march, surprise the enemy at the gap, get possession of it, and thus hold his only line of retreat. You can then take him on the front. If he gives way, we shall have him; if he fights obstinately, I will leave a portion of the force in the gap, and with the remainder fall upon his rear. McClellan was to lead a frontal assault on Camp Garnett when he heard the sounds of battle from the Confederate rear. He reluctantly agreed to the plan if William H. Burdsall’s cavalry was used as couriers to report back to him hourly on the plan’s progress. Meanwhile, Colonel Pegram was concerned that the Federals could flank his position by taking a path on the northern side of the turnpike, so he sent two companies of troops to occupy the summit. The summit was about one and a half miles behind and 550 feet above Camp Garnett.

At 5:00 AM on the 11th Rosecrans set out with the 8th IN, 10th IN, 12th IN, 19th OH and Burdsall’s cavalry, a total force of 1917 men, with David Hart as their guide up the mountain. It was a very difficult journey in the dark and rain. When the risk-averse McClellan did not get an update he sent Sergeant David Wolcott of the 1st OH to recall Rosecrans. At 9:00 AM Union pickets tried to persuade Wolcott that he was riding in the wrong direction and heading straight for the Rebel camp, but he would not listen. Shortly thereafter his riderless horse returned. Wolcott had been shot in both legs, captured and died the following month on August 5th. Papers taken from Wolcott led to Pegram immediately sending reinforcements to the summit under Captain Julius de Lagnel, his artillery chief. The Confederates still mistakenly believed, however, that the attack was coming from the north side of the Turnpike. de Lagnel would now have a total of 310 men on the summit from Companies B, D and E of the 20th VA, Companies A and E of the 25th VA, a 6-pound cannon and two squads of cavalry from Company I of the 14th VA. Breastworks were quickly constructed facing north (see map below).

Rosecrans halted his men just south of the summit at noon. At 2:30 PM skirmishing began about a half-mile south of the Hart house. Suddenly, the Rebels realized the attack was coming from the south and jumped to the opposite side of the breastworks and turned their cannon. The 10th IN attacked but were repulsed. A second attack at around 3:00 PM with the 8th, 10th and 13 IN also failed. Pegram hearing the firing sent three more companies east toward the summit. A third attack focused on disabling the lone cannon by targeting the cannoneers and the horses. Eventually the cannon was manned only by Captain de Lagnel until he was wounded in the hip and hand and forced to hide in a thicket to avoid capture. The horses ran off with the caisson down the hill toward Camp Garnett crashing into another cannon that was on its way to the summit. With the addition of the 19th OH the Federals fixed bayonets and charged all along the line finally breaking the Rebels and sending them fleeing west to Camp Garnett and east to Beverly. The battle was over by 6:00 PM. Rosecrans then rested his men and planned to attack Camp Garnett the following morning. Rosecrans had captured the summit at a cost of 12 killed and 62 wounded. The Confederates casualties included 33 killed, 39 wounded and over 20 captured. McClellan who was to attack when he heard the sounds of a battle at the summit sat in front of Camp Garnett the whole day and did nothing.

Pegram took six companies of men to the summit (half his force) and quickly realized that he could not fight his way through Rosecrans in order to withdraw to Beverly. He left Major Nat Tyler in charge of the six companies with instructions to take the men over the mountain around Rosecrans to Beverly by any means possible, while he went back to Camp Garnett to get the rest of his force. Back at Camp Garnett the remaining force split in two and tried to make it back to General Garnett at Laurel Hill. Garnett learning of Pegram’s fate, knowing that he could not hold Laurel Hill if Rich Mountain fell, began his own retreat for Beverly. When Garnett reached Leadville (now Elkins) he was erroneously informed that the Federals already occupied Beverly and turned northward to escape across the Cheat River. At daybreak on the 12th Rosecrans and his brigade marched to Camp Garnett where they found 70 sick and wounded Confederates too weak to leave. He sent word to McClellan that he had routed Pegram and only then did McClellan ride into Camp Garnett. Rosecrans would later report, “General McClellan, contrary to agreement and military prudence, did not attack.”

One of Pegram’s columns led by the mapmaker Jedediah Hotchkiss escaped to safety while Pegram wandered around lost in the woods for two days with no food or water before finally surrendering to the first group of Federals he could find.

Once again McClellan took credit for a victory in which he was more an impediment than an asset. In his telegrams to President Lincoln, General-in-Chief Scott and Northern newspapers he understated Rosecrans’ role and even took credit for the plan of the flanking maneuver up the mountain. McClellan would be hailed by his superiors and the general public as a military genius and eventually be promoted to command the Army of the Potomac. In reality, he had panicked and sent an aide to call off Rosecrans attack, whose capture led to reinforcement of the very spot that Rosecrans was about to assault. In addition, when firing broke out McClellan did nothing, leaving Rosecrans on the summit to fight and win the battle completely on his own. Rosecrans and Rosecrans alone was responsible for the victory. McClellan had done nothing but string telegraph lines so that he could report back to his superiors claiming credit for Rosecrans’ achievements.

Pictures of Rich Mountain and Camp Garnett markers appear below with links to the historic marker database image. The road leading up to Rich Mountain and all the way to Camp Garnett is now paved!

Camp Garnett- The kiosk marker and the McClellan marker are not there currently. I could not find an artillery marker.

The shot-up McClellan marker is seen in the lower left corner of the picture below. Since I took this picture, the tablet has been removed but the marker has yet to be replaced.

Sources

Rebels at the Gate: Lee and McClellan on the Front Line of a Nation Divided by W. Hunter Lesser.

Blue and Gray Magazine August 1993 Northwestern Virginia Campaign of 1861 by Martin K. Fleming.