This post was written before the Shenandoah Valley Battlefields National Historic District’s project to update the signs in Port Republic. To date 7 new signs have been added on the Coaling and 3 signs have been replaced in town. When the project is completed I will update the posts on Port Republic.

On May 31st Stonewall Jackson had slipped between the two Union armies and arrived at Strasburg on June 1st. The rains started that day and would continue for the next week. Shields and McDowell met in Front Royal on June 1st to discuss a plan outlined in the map below. Shields expected Jackson to eventually move east out of the valley to join Lee in Richmond and felt the most likely paths were either via New Market Gap or around the southern base of Massanutten Mountain through Conrad Store and Swift Run Gap. While Frémont chased Jackson south on the Valley Pike Shields moved parallel to him in the Luray Valley. The two Union armies would be separated by Massanutten Mountain and would need to stay in close communication with each other. At some point either at New Market Gap or south of the mountain they would converge on Jackson from different directions and destroy his army. In order to exit the valley, Jackson would need to cross the South Fork of the Shenandoah River which ran at the eastern base of Massanutten Mountain. The South Fork of the Shenandoah River formed from the convergence of the South and North Rivers 60 miles south of Front Royal at Port Republic. Shields planned to destroy Miller’s Bridge at Conrad’s Store forcing Jackson to cross at New Market Gap. Shields would be there blocking both the White House Bridge four miles southwest of Luray and the Columbia Bridge eight miles further south. Jackson would be trapped with Shields at his front and Frémont in his rear. McDowell signed off on the plan with the stipulation that Shields was to keep his command compact as it moved through the Luray Valley.

Shields chose Colonel Samuel Carroll’s Fourth Brigade for the mission. They were stationed at Spanglers Crossroads 7 miles south of Front Royal. Carroll was ordered to proceed to Conrad’s Store and burn Miller’s Bridge there, turn over the defense of the river to other units coming up behind him, and proceed to Stanardsville. Carroll was to start out at 4:00 AM on the 2nd and arrive at the bridge by nightfall. Shields thought the distance to Conrads Store from Luray was 10 miles. It was actually 25 miles meaning Carroll would have to travel 45 miles in 16 hours. In addition, Shields did not know the state of the roads on the route. They were turned into a quagmire by the recent rains. Carroll’s force would consist of the 7th IN under Colonel James Gavin, companies from the 1st VA (US) under Major Benjamin Chamberlain and four guns from Battery L of the 1st OH Light Artillery commanded by Captain Lucius Robinson. Shields would head south toward Luray with a cavalry escort from the 1st RI Cavalry where he would learn firsthand how bad the roads were. When Shields arrived at Luray on the 2nd, he quickly learned that Jackson had already burned the White House and Columbia Bridges near New Market Gap. Jackson had sent Captain Samuel Coyner of the 7th VA Cavalry to burn the bridges which he did on the 2nd. Coyner then proceeded south to Conrad’s Store and burned Miller’s Bridge in the early morning hours of the 3rd as well. The three images below are of the area of the wartime Miller’s Bridge at 38.4092377, -78.6335599 from the Elkton boat launch.

The roads were so bad that Union Colonel Carroll did not arrive in Conrad’s Store until 5:00 AM on the 4th only to discover that Miller’s Bridge had been burned the day before. The two images below taken at 38.4929481, -78.6299386 are of the Shenandoah River Road the same road that Colonel Carroll was traveling on. The road is very close to the river and with the recent heavy rains was very muddy and flooded.

He set up headquarters there in the Argabright House (the home that also served as Jackson and Ewell headquarters only 4-6 weeks before).

Shields, now headquartered at Alma, hoped to find a ford to cross the river further south indicating that he did not know that there was already a bridge that would fit that purpose in Port Republic. Sometime later that day on the 4th Shields learned of the existence of the bridge over the North River and that the South River in Port Republic was easily fordable. Thus, there was a way to cross over to the west side of the river system. Colonel Joseph Thoburn in command of the remainder of Carroll’s Brigade camped 2 miles south of the Columbia Bridge was ordered to join Carroll in Conrad’s Store. Together they were to proceed to Staunton and destroy the railroad depot there to prevent Jackson from escaping to the west. On the 6th Shields changed the plan and ordered Carroll to proceed to Waynesboro, 18 miles south of Port Republic, and burn the railroad bridge, and destroy the depot, cars and tear up the railroad. Shields apparently did not know that the railroad bridge there was made of iron! Shields during all this had been waiting at Alma for his engineers to construct a pontoon bridge over the South Fork so he could better communicate with Frémont. After this was finally accomplished Shields attempted to move further south, but his wagons were stuck in the mud. Shields built his pontoon bridge on the downstream side of the modern-day Business Route 340 bridge near Alma shown below. The picture was taken from the town boat ramp.

He established flour mills in Luray to help feed his men but still had not sent the additional men he had promised Carroll to Conrad’s Store. On the 7th Carroll sent Shields a poorly worded dispatch that he was on his way to Waynesboro but that all of Jackson’s wagons were at Port Republic waiting for the river to go down in order to head to Waynesboro and that he was going to try and bag the wagon train (indicating that Carroll felt that the bridge over the North River had been destroyed). Shields responded back in the early morning hours of the 8th urging him to seize the supply train and that he was sending the rest of Carroll’s Brigade and General Erastus Tyler’s Brigade along with three artillery batteries leaving at 6:00 AM to aid him.

Nathan Kimball’s and Orris Ferry’s brigades would remain in Luray. That day Shield’s received a dispatch from Frémont that Jackson had turned off onto the Port Republic Road at Harrisonburg. Shields impression based on his dispatches was that Jackson was on the west side of the North River waiting for the river to fall so that he could cross into Port Republic and head to either Stanardsville or Waynesboro. He ordered Carroll’s guns to take position on the town side of the North River and prevent Jackson from crossing and that he would soon have reinforcements.

Carroll left Conrad’s Store on the afternoon of the 7th for Port Republic 13 miles away. He took with him his 400 men that included the 7th IN, several companies of the 1st (US) VA Cavalry, two sections of Captain Lucius Robinson’s Battery (4 guns), followed by the 84th and 110th PA. Carroll personally reconnoitered the town and noted Jackson’s wagons in the town itself and his men on the opposite side of the North River. If Carroll could prevent Jackson’s force from entering the town he could destroy the wagons. He also noted the intact covered bridge over the North River.

He knew he would need to get to the bridge quickly. As a result, he advanced with only 115 men on horseback and a rolling artillery battery. They stopped at the Yost farm a half mile east of town where two of the guns were deployed. They did not know that Stonewall Jackson himself was headquartered in Dr. George Kemper Sr.’s house right where the wagons were parked.

The only Confederates in the town were a newly recruited artillery battery from Charlottesville commanded by Captain James Carrington in the yard of Dr. Kemper’s house near the bend in the road where the wagons were parked, a single company of the 2nd VA guarded the upper ford, and a small cavalry detachment was posted at the North River Bridge and the lower ford. After easily pushing aside the Confederate pickets on the Luray Road they crossed the South River at the middle ford shown in the map below.

The middle ford was not visible to Confederates in the area, was unguarded, and fordable enough that they were able to get the remaining two cannons across it. The crossing was delayed when Major Benjamin Chamberlain of the 1st (US) VA Cavalry became ill and had to dismount behind the J.W. Palmer house. Captain Earle S. Goodrich assumed command of the cavalry. When the Union guns on the Yost farm opened fire prematurely on the bridge Jackson was alerted to the danger. He borrowed a horse, rode down Main Street and sped across the North River bridge followed by members of his staff. Three of his staff were captured including Dr. Hunter McGuire, Colonel Stapleton Crutchfield and Ned Willis. McGuire and Crutchfield managed to escape in the subsequent confusion. Carroll’s men split into two groups with the majority headed for the wagons while a smaller group led by Carroll himself rode to the bridge. How he expected to hold off Jackson’s entire army with two cannons and a group of about 50 men defies logic. Carroll for a short period of time had a tremendous opportunity to isolate Jackson’s entire army on the other side of the river by burning the bridge. He would have then had the opportunity to destroy Jackson’s entire wagon train which contained all of his reserve ammunition supply. For unclear reasons he hesitated perhaps the outdated order from the 4th to save the bridge played some role. On the other end of town Carroll’s detachment were repulsed by Captain Samuel Moore and his twenty men who were guarding the Upper Ford. At the start of the action, Moore and his men rushed to defend the wagon train. They took up position behind a stone fence at a sharp bend in the road leading to the Kemper home. As the Federals charged Moore’s men surprised them with two volleys. They regrouped for a second charge which was turned back this time with the aide of artillery. Jackson quickly rallied the 37th VA and they charged across the bridge, captured the cannon, and sent Carroll and his men fleeing back across the lower ford. A second canon was lost recrossing the South River. The 7th IN who were approaching the town on foot arrived just in time to be shelled by Jackson’s guns positioned across the river. They lost 35 men killed and wounded in the process. The fight was over by 10:00 AM.

General Tyler arrived in the early afternoon after a 14-mile march from Price’s Mill along Naked Creek. Although Naked Creek looks shallow in the images below it was swollen out of its banks with all the rain that fell in the area in early June.

Tyler had eight infantry regiments, a total of about 2600 men and 16 cannons commanded by Colonel Philip Daum. At “Lewiston” the estate of John Lewis about 3 miles east of town he met Carroll’s retreating Fourth Brigade who joined his force. Tyler was under the impression that Shields would be joining him, however, Shields was still near the Columbia Bridge 25 miles away. Shields had also previously told Carroll he would be joining him, but he never left his headquarters at Alma with his other two brigades. On the evening of the 8th, he sent Carroll a dispatch that Kimball and Ferry’s brigades would rapidly be marching to him. Kimball received no such orders until the following morning. Nathan Kimball was Shields best brigade commander and he was responsible for the only two Confederate defeats during the 1862 Valley Campaign at the First Battle of Kernstown and the Second Battle of Front Royal. Kimball assumed command early in the battle at Kernstown when Shields was wounded and taken back to Winchester. After the battle Shields tried to claim credit for the Union victory and diminish the role Kimball played by claiming that Kimball was only following orders dictated by him from his sickbed. Although there is no doubting Shields bravery under fire this assertion was completely false. In addition, Kimball and his men completed a strenuous march to Front Royal including a night march from Rectortown to reach the field in time to capture a large portion of the Confederate force there. Given Kimball and his brigades previous history if he had received the order promptly, he and his 4 regiments could have night marched to Lewiston in time to play a significant part in the battle. Shields finally left Alma late on the 8th with Ferry’s Brigade and as the battle opened outside Port Republic the following day, he was still 7-8 miles north of Conrad’s Store. He had violated the only order Major General McDowell have given him- to keep his army compact and not strung out. Tyler’s brigade would be left to fend for themselves against Jackson’s entire army on the 9th in the Battle of Port Republic (the next post). After defeating Frémont at Cross Keys Jackson would burn the bridge over the North River after crossing it giving the Federals no way to cross to the opposite side where Jackson would greatly outnumber the Union force. After the battle Shields would attempt to blame the defeat on Colonel Carroll for not following an order to burn the North River Bridge. Shields never issued such an order. He also claimed that Tyler chose a poor defensive position to fight the Battle of Port Republic, but the position was so “poor” that he managed to hold off an army three to four times his size for over 4 hours. McDowell’s leadership during the first two weeks of June was also suspect. He gave Shields free reign in the valley and left for Washington on June 4th and given the difficulties with the slowness of Union communications in the Luray Valley during this period was generally unaware of what Shields was doing in the short term. Shields was removed from field command and would resign from the army the following year. He would become the only person to serve as a U.S. Senator from three different states.

Other sites in Port Republic

Next- The Battle of Port Republic- June 9, 1862

Sources

The Luray Valley Campaign of 1862- The Road to Port Republic by Gary Ecelbarger Blue and Gray Magazine Volume XXVIII, Issue 2, 2011

Stonewall Jackson’s Valley Campaign Shenandoah 1862 by Peter Cozzens