On the western side of the battlefield at 6:00 AM Warren sent his skirmishers forward on the Confederate left and discovered the Rebels were gone. They had fallen back but where to? By this time two of Wright’s VI Corps divisions had already crossed at Jericho’s Mill. Hancock’s small detachment south of the Chesterfield bridge also saw nothing. Warren advanced further but still could not find the enemy. By 1:00 PM Warren had still not found Hill’s location. As Warren continued to move east he was moving further away from Hancock on the opposite side of the inverted V. Warren sent the 1st PA Reserves of Crawford’s division under Lieutenant Colonel W. Warren Stewart toward Ox Ford. As Stewart’s men approached Quarles Mill about halfway between the ford at Jericho’s Mill and Ox Ford they came under heavy fire from Mahone’s sharpshooters. Men from Colonel John Sanders AL brigade arrived to support the sharpshooters and both sides dug in. The Confederates circled west and blocked Stewart’s return path to the V Corps so he sent word across the river to Burnside that he was pinned down.

On the eastern side of the battlefield Hancock assured by Meade that Lee was retreating began to cross the Chesterfield bridge shortly after 8:00 AM. Unlike Warren, Hancock was having no problem finding the enemy. The 21st IN and 1st and 2nd US Sharpshooters with artillery support made it across and pushed Confederate skirmishers back past the Fox house. Birney ordered Mott’s brigade to cross next while Tyler’s division was moved up to Henagan’s Redoubt. Along the railroad Gibbon’s division was crossing on a makeshift bridge put together by Smyth’s brigade by lashing felled trees together. Once they gained a foothold on the south bank the 50th NY Engineers constructed two canvas pontoon bridges. Birney and Gibbon were across the river by 9:30 AM. Barlow was next to cross. Anderson’s Confederate artillery made it difficult to cross the Chesterfield bridge and six of Tyler’s men were killed while crossing. Hancock ordered three regiments of Miles brigade west to silence Anderson’s guns without success. He sent a request to Burnside to send a division east to aid Miles. Burnside would send Potter’s division. They reached the Chesterfield bridge in the early afternoon. The map on this side of the battlefield is shown below.

Grant had ordered Burnside to cross the North Anna River at Ox Ford between Warren and Hancock, and link up with them. He ordered Willcox’s 17th MA and 21st MA forward. Under artillery support they made it to an island in the middle of the river and awaited the signal to attack. Burnside in the meantime learned of a ford at Quarles Mill. Seeing the strength of the position in front of him Burnside felt that since he was sending Potter’s division to aid Hancock on the left, that if he sent another division to the right to Quarles Mill he could flank the Rebels out of Ox Ford. He ordered Crittenden’s division to cross at Quarles Mill and then move east along the river toward Ox Ford. Grant approved of the plan and Meade decided to augment it and ordered Warren to send the rest Crawford’s division toward Quarles Mill as well. Crawford was on his way by noon. When he arrived he found the 1st PA reserves pinned down by Mahone’s sharpshooters.

Crawford had most of his men build a horseshoe shaped fortification to protect the ford and advanced the 12th MA and the Bucktails to try and drive off the Confederates. They tried three times and failed. Crawford and his men were trapped. Crittenden’s lead brigade commanded by James Ledlie reached the mill around 2:00 PM. Ledlie’s brigade forded the river into Crawford’s earthwork. Ledlie’s men moved out an hour later with the 35th MA as skirmishers toward Ox Ford. They were aligned as shown in the map below.

They overran the Confederate skirmish line and after a mile entered a clearing. Eight hundred yards away was the western edge of the inverted V near Ox Ford. They contained traverses every 15 feet, elevated steps for shooting, and shallow trenches in the rear for loading rifles. Artillery were placed at intervals with shallow trenches connecting to ammunition storage areas in the rear. The forces were deployed as shown in the map below. Ledlie advanced to the edge of the clearing and sent Captain Anderson back to find General Crittenden and request him to send three regiments and that he would capture the Confederate position. Anderson found Crittenden at the ford who told him to relay the message that he didn’t have the regiments to send and not to charge unless he sees a sure thing and to employ the utmost caution. Anderson returned and relayed the message to a drunken Ledlie. Ledlie ignored Crittenden’s order and attacked anyway.

From the map above it is readily apparent that this was a very bad idea. Ledlie was leading his regiment right into Major General William Mahone’s entire division, behind formidable fortifications with an open field of fire and artillery. The Federals were completely routed. To make matters worse for the Federals as they fled, Mahone sent the 11th MS, as well as the 8th and 11th AL after them. Lieutenant Colonels Chandler and Weld tried to rally some of the men. Chandler leading the 57th MA was shot and killed, while Weld was wounded. The Confederates chased them all the way back to the river where they fell back to Crawford’s earthwork. On returning to the work Ledlie stated he was too “tired” to command and he was temporarily replaced by Weld. Ledlie’s brigade suffered 450 casualties to the Confederates 75. It had been raining all afternoon and the river was now too high to cross. Crawford and Crittenden’s men would be spending the night on the riverbank, see map below.

On the eastern side of the battlefield Colonel Miles advanced the 26th MI and 146th PA toward Anderson’s east side of the inverted V and were severely repulsed. Further to the east Gibbon’s division continued south as Colonel Smyth’s brigade was advanced to determine the location of the enemy in front of him. He sent the 1st DE and the 108th NY forward where they were met by skirmishers from Rodes division. Smyth sent the 14th CT forward as reinforcements and it required all three brigades to drive the skirmishers back into the woods. Smyth then brought up the 12th NJ. The 4 regiments formed a line of battle and they advanced through the woods and drove the skirmishers further back. Gibbon advanced the rest of the division to support Smyth. McKean and Owen’s brigades entrenched behind him with McIvor’s brigade in reserve. The eastern end of Smyth’s line was in the air in the open fields of the Doswell Plantation. Gibbon ordered McKeen to send the 19th ME to extend the Union left. The guide, however, directed the 19th ME to the wrong location and they wound up further south near Ewell’s entrenched line, isolated from the rest of the Federals where they would hold out for two hours.

West of the railroad Birney had bogged down running into heavy resistance near the Lowry house, while Potter’s division on Birney’s right was under fire from Lane’s guns on the eastern side of the inverted V. Rebel prisoners now confirmed that it was Anderson’s Corps in front of Potter and Birney and Ewell’s Corps in front of Gibbon. It would not be until 5:00 PM that Hancock reported back to Grant that the enemy are probably here in force. Thirty minutes later Rodes sent Ramseur to launch a fierce counterattack against Smyth’s brigade on the Doswell farm. Gibbon rushed forward reinforcements from McKeen’s, McIvor’s and Owens’ brigade to aid Smyth, while Hancock sent Brooke’s brigade from Barlow’s division south along the railroad where they ran into heavy resistance from Evander Law’s and “Tige” Anderson’s brigades. The 19th ME still isolated after two hours were driven from the field by companies A and F of the 43rd NC from Brigadier General Bryan Grimes’ brigade. The North Carolinians then headed west toward Smyth’s brigade encountering the 170th NY. Each side demanded the other surrender and in the confusion they opened fire on each other at close range. Each side threw more men into the fray until fighting was halted by darkness and a huge thunderstorm.

Everything had developed on the battlefield the way Lee and Smith had planned. All had been in place for the Confederates to land a crippling blow to Grant’s army especially on the eastern side of the battlefield where Hancock’s II Corps was isolated. Wright’s VI Corps and Warren’s II Corps were on the western side of the inverted V and would have to cross the North Anna River twice to aid Hancock. Crawford and Crittenden were pinned down at Quarles Mill and Lane’s artillery could block the Union II Corps from retreating across the Chesterfield bridge. Hancock’s only line of retreat was the recently constructed pontoon bridges near the burned railroad bridge. The problem, however, was that Lee’s dysentery had worsened. He was lying prostrate in his headquarters tent delirious with a fever, calling out “We must strike them a blow.” But there was no one to do it. Of his corps commanders Ewell was sick with dysentery himself, Anderson had been in his role less than a month, and Lee had shamed Hill the day before for his poor performance on the left versus Warren, telling him he was no Stonewall Jackson. Finally, his most dependable subordinate, James Longstreet, was not with the army after the serious wound he suffered at the battle of the Wilderness. There was no Lee, Jackson, or Longstreet to guide overall strategy and the attack never came. A sign interpreting the location of Lee’s headquarters from May 24-26 is shown below.

Sheridan had arrived back at Grant and Meade’s headquarters at the Carmel Church in the late afternoon. Around nightfall headquarters was moved to the Fontaine house on the western side of the field. Here Grant received a dispatch from Burnside that Crawford and Crittenden were trapped on the south side of the river. Burnside was planning on having the engineers construct a pontoon bridge there as soon as possible. A dispatch from Hancock stated that Gibbon had faced strong opposition moving down the railroad. Hancock then outlined what he thought the Rebel position was on his part of the battlefield. He thought they were facing a well entrenched salient as was the case at Spotsylvania Courthouse with the tip opposite Burnside at Ox Ford and the right extending south past Hanover junction. He also stated that he felt a large force if not all of Lee’s army was in his front. Grant was finally comprehending the trap he had fallen into. He immediately ordered Hancock to advance no further and entrench. Although he still did not have a clear picture of how Hill was deployed Warren would have to help determine that in the morning. He now knew that Lee was between the two wings of his army in force. He ordered Burnside to remain on the north side of the river and build the pontoon bridge at Quarles Mill and cut a road to the Chesterfield bridge. Burnside was now placed under Meade’s command, something he should have done much earlier. During the night Wright sent parts of Colonel William Penrose and Brigadier General Henry Eustis’ brigades to augment Crawford’s force.

On the morning of the 25th Warren would send out skirmishers to locate Hill and hook up his line with Crittenden and Crawford. Griffith’s brigade moved east along the railroad from Noel’s station. A half mile west of Anderson’s Tavern he found Hill’s picket line and the Confederate fortifications in the distance. Cutler’s division started out next linking up with Crittenden and Crawford on his left and the line advanced forward, see map below.

After the morning skirmishing Grant now had a clear picture of the Confederate line. The Federals were also entrenched so strongly that neither side was willing to go on the offensive. For the third time in 6 weeks the two sides were stalemated. The Yankees spent most of the rest of the day destroying the railroads. Warren’s II Corps tore up track on the Virginia Central Railroad on the Union right and Hancock’s II Corps tore up track on the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad and tore down the bridge. Lee began preparing for Grant to move east of the Pamunkey. He created a footbridge across the South Anna River and sent Rooney Lee’s Cavalry south toward Hanover Court House. Grant and Meade moved their headquarters to the north bank of the North Anna River. That evening after a council of war Grant made up his mind to once again move around Lee’s right. The position of the armies on the morning of the 26th is shown below. Grant would start withdrawing his army slowly to the north bank of the river. Casualties for the battle were for the Federals- 1973 killed wounded and missing and for the Confederates- 2017 total, 304 killed, 1513 wounded and 200 captured.

Grant’s plan on the 26th was for Wright to send his best division to accompany the supply wagons and artillery toward Hanovertown. Sheridan would screen the move by guarding the downriver fords. After dark the rest of the V and VI Corps were to follow toward Hanovertown. Hancock and Burnside would move out last. In the rain James Wilson’s cavalry division was ordered to demonstrate against Lee’s left. They crossed the North Anna at Jericho Mills and moved on to the Little River. The Confederates had destroyed the bridges over the river. Wilson’s men made a show of getting ready to cross with their pioneers cutting down trees, the men firing their carbines, and cannons firing across the river. At the same time Russell’s division of Wright’s Corps crossed to the north bank of the river and headed east. Merritt’s and Gregg’s cavalry divisions covered the fords to screen Russell’s movement toward Hanovertown. After dark Union engineers placed tree branches on the floor of the bridges and the withdrawal began in earnest. The VI Corps crossed at Jericho Mills, while the V Corps and Crittenden’s division of the IX Corps crossed at Quarles Mill. Hancock and Potter would cross next taking up the pontoons and burning the Chesterfield bridge. By 3:00 AM all of the Army of the Potomac was on the north bank of the river and heading east. Lee would head toward Ashland. Grant moved southeast assuming that the Confederate army must have been in a very weakened condition not to have attacked on the 24th. Their army wasn’t weakened on that day only Lee was. This assumption would lead Grant to make additional mistakes in the weeks to come by continuing to underestimate the tenacity of the Army of Northern Virginia.

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