On April 17 Confederate President Jefferson Davis invited private southern ship owners to apply for letters of marque and reprisal giving them the governmental authority to seize ships doing business with the north and their cargoes as “prizes of war”. The ship owner had to post a bond in order to participate. They could then get up to 20% of the value of every vessel taken or destroyed as 8% bonds of the Confederacy. The Confederate vessel Savannah owned by T. Harrison Baker was one of the first ships to apply for and receive a letter of reprisal. In a matter of weeks it was captured off Charleston and its crew taken to New York and imprisoned. Southern privateering was a problem for the Union early in the war until they could expand their Navy and armada.

Two days later Lincoln responded by issuing proclamation #81 to blockade Southern ports in South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas. Ten days later he extended it to Virginia and North Carolina when they seceded (proclamation #82).

Hostile ships attempting to leave or enter southern ports would be seized. The South was an agricultural society with less industrial capacity than the state of New York. Its economy was heavily dependent on the export of cotton and import of war materials and would be seriously damaged by an effective blockade. As the war continued and the blockade became more and more effective the Southern economy would be crippled.

The problem for the Union was establishing an “effective” blockade. Lincoln’s General-in-Chief Winfield Scott came up with a plan to blockade Southern-coastal ports, while another force moved down the Mississippi River, seized control of it dividing the South in two, and occupied New Orleans. The plan was widely ridiculed by the Northern press as the “Anaconda Plan” as shown in the newspaper cartoon below.

Perhaps one of the reasons the plan was ridiculed was because it was a “long-term” plan and few people on either side at the time felt that the war would last more than a few months. One example of this was a statement made by the first Confederate Secretary of War, Leroy Pope Walker. Walker stated “All the blood shed as a result of secession could be wiped up with a handkerchief.”

An effective Union Naval force would need to be powered by steam and coal due to the complex nature of many Southern ports. At the start of the war the Union had only a dozen warships in American waters of which only seven were steam powered. Twenty-six other ships were scattered around the world (17 steam-powered). Most of the new steam-powered ships constructed since 1855 were either not in American waters or were in dry dock for repair as the war began. In addition, these ships would need to cover 3,500 miles of coastline and 189 harbors from Virginia to Texas. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles would need to purchase as many vessels as possible and convert them to warships.

In May he divided this large span of coastline into two departments. The Atlantic Blockading Squadron would be headquartered at Fort Monroe, commanded by Commodore Silas Stringham and cover the territory from Virginia to the tip of Florida. The Gulf Blockading Squadron would be headquartered at Key West, commanded by Captain William Mervine, and cover the entire Gulf coast from the tip of Florida to Brownsville, Texas.

Welles next formed a Blockade Strategy Board on June 25 which filed seven reports from July 5 to September 19. The board consisted of Captain Samuel Francis Du Pont- superintendent of the U.S. Coastal Survey, Major John Gross Barnard of the U.S. Engineers, Commander Charles H. Davis of the U.S. Navy and Alexander Dallas Bache. One problem the board would have to address was how to refuel coal-powered steamers. For example, a ship off Charleston, South Carolina would have to return all the way to Fort Monroe at Hampton Roads near Norfolk to recoal. Steamers needed to return every two to three weeks for coal. With only two widely separated deep-water ports ships would spend almost as much time refueling as they did on blockading duty, a very inefficient practice. The same was true in the Gulf where ships off Texas would need to sail all the way to Key West to refuel. A deep-water port was needed in the middle of each of the two blockading squadrons. In addition, there was the problem of what to do about Hatteras Inlet. A group of privateers there was making life difficult for Union merchants. They were hiding behind the Outer Banks in the relatively shallow waters of Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds and coming out to strike vessels headed to the North. Cape Hatteras was in close proximity to the Gulf Stream, the main sailing route north. The North Carolina sounds also served as a back door route to Richmond via the Dismal Swamp Canal. Three battles would be fought in 1861 to address each of these issues.

Future posts in this series:

The Battle of Hatteras Inlet– August 28-29, 1861

The “Battle” of Ship Island– September 17, 1861- Gulf Blockading Squadron deep-water port

The Battle of Port Royal– November 7, 1861- Atlantic Blockading Squadron deep-water port.