On the evening of August 26th General Joseph Hooker ordered the 72nd NY to assess the situation at Bristoe Station. Captain Harmon Bliss received his orders at 10:00 PM and marched his men to Warrenton Junction in modern day Calverton (shown below). The two pictures below at Warrenton Junction were taken at 38.6332678, -77.6708179.

There they boarded a train arriving at Catlett Station at 2:00 AM. As they moved further north, they picked up two small companies of the 105th PA holding the Kettle Run bridge. As the train slowly moved forward toward the bright glow coming from Bristoe Station now only a half mile away, daylight was rapidly approaching. Captain Bliss formed his men in line of battle and moved close enough to determine that the source of the glow was from a large fire involving multiple railroad cars and that the Confederates were there in force. In the early morning light, they were spotted by Colonel Henry Forno’s Louisiana Tigers who moved forward to determine the size of the Union force. With the Rebels moving to their left and right the Federals reboarded the train and traveled in reverse back to the Kettle Run bridge. There Captain Bliss sent a dispatch back to Warrenton Junction describing what he had seen. With news of a large Rebel force directly on his supply line Pope would now need to abandon the line of the Rappahannock River and move back closer to Washington. Jackson learning that Manassas Junction was also lightly guarded moved most of his force there leaving three brigades of Ewell’s division to guard his rear. Ewell was likely chosen for this duty because he knew the terrain there (he was born nearby). This is interpreted by a Civil War Trails marker near the battlefield, and another marker at the Battlefield Heritage Park.

The reconnaissance alerted Ewell to the Federal presence. Ewell had deployed his three brigades just south of Broad Run. He positioned two brigades to the north of the railroad with Jubal Early’s brigade furthest to the north and Henry Forno’s brigade of Louisiana Tigers along the railroad. Alexander Lawton’s Brigade was south of the railroad. Forno pushed two regiments the 6th and 8th Louisiana forward across Kettle Run with orders to conduct a fighting retreat if they came into contact with Yankees and then burn the railroad bridge over the stream as they retreated. This is shown below in the map from the Blue and Gray magazine article referenced in the sources.

The pictures below were taken of Kettle Run from the bridge on Aden Road.

The picture below was taken just south of the Kettle Run bridge, facing south in the direction of where Hooker’s troops would be coming up the road.

Most of the markers in the rest of this post are on the Red Trail of the Bristoe Station Battlefield Heritage Park (shown by the thick white line). Their locations and a notation regarding the title of the marker are indicated by an (x) on an overlay of a Google map.

General Hooker’s division had just arrived in Warrenton on the 26th from Alexandria by rail. Now at 10:00 AM on the 27th he was ordered to move back along the Railroad to recapture Bristoe Station. The trains bringing them to Warrenton did not transport their artillery or horses, and there were no supply wagons, so his men would have only 40 rounds of ammunition each. Hooker advanced his three brigades and part of Brigadier General John Robinson’s brigade on foot along the railroad in 90 plus degree heat. They borrowed 2-3 batteries of artillery from Kearny’s division. Hooker would start out with about 6000 men but would lose about 1000 along the march to straggling in the severe heat. Colonel Joseph Carr’s brigade would be in the lead. As the Federals approached, the Louisianans did as instructed, as the 6th fell back the 8th LA burned the railroad bridge as they crossed Kettle Run. Ewell sent word back to Jackson that he was under attack. This is interpreted at the Battlefield Park by the marker shown below- Preparing for battle.

Lawton sent the 60th GA forward to the left of the 6th and 8th LA and the three regiments formed an advanced line about 300 yards forward awaiting Hooker, shown on the maps above. They didn’t have to wait long. Hooker’s men led by three brigades under Colonel Joseph Carr crossed Kettle Run toward them. Carr led the 6th NY and 8th NJ onto the field coming under heavy fire from Dement’s Maryland battery on their left. The 6th and 8th LA allowed the Federals to advance to within 50 yards when they opened a heavy fire. The 8th NJ took cover in a small swale in the field. The 2nd NY lost 10 men killed and 55 wounded in under 10 minutes and retreated back to the tree line. The initial part of the battle was going poorly for the Federals. Interpreted by the marker- First Contact.

The problem for the Union would be that they had just made a long hard march in the August heat, and they would be fighting with little artillery support, unlike Ewell who had plenty of time to arrange his guns. But Hooker had the advantage of numbers if he could use them effectively. Hooker personally led the 6th and 7th NJ along with McIlvain’s battery to the left to try and outflank the Confederates. With Carr pinned down in the swale there was no one to command his remaining two brigades, the 5th NJ across the railroad tracks on the Union right, and the 115th PA safe in the tree line, shown in the map below.

The 115th PA was an inexperienced group under Colonel Robert Thompson, who brought his men forward on his own. Coming under heavy fire they moved toward the railroad and mistook the 5th NJ on the other side of the tracks for the enemy. Following Carr’s brigade on to the field was Colonel Nelson Taylor’s “Excelsior Brigade”. Taylor was a veteran of the Mexican War. He quickly assessed the situation and sent three regiments on the run to Carr’s left to stabilize that flank, the 71st, 73rd and 74th NY. A terrible fire fight erupted there with Forno’s brigade, who brought up the 5th LA to help. The 71st NY lost more than 100 of the 250 men engaged. The 73rd NY lost more than half of their 100 men on the field. The 74th NY lost eight officers and more than 60 men. Taylor also observed a problem on the right flank. The 60th GA had moved forward while the 5th NJ and 115th PA were battling each other in a friendly fire incident. The 60th GA, which was hidden along the railroad, pivoted to the right and fired into Carr’s flank using the railroad embankment for cover. The fire from the 60th GA had the Federals pinned down. Taylor took his remaining two regiments, the 70th NY and the 72nd NY, and had them wheel to the right onto a knoll and fire down on the Georgians. At the same time the 5th NJ now free of their friendly fire incident began firing on the 60th GA, who were now caught in a crossfire of their own. In a few minutes nine of their men were killed, 33 wounded and two captured, and they broke for the Confederate main line. This is interpreted in the maps below and the marker- Battle Along the Railroad.

Part of the Excelsior Brigade wheeled to the right (see below), while the rest of the brigade reinforced the left flank.

The Excelsior Brigade marker

Where the Excelsior Brigade came on to the battlefield (shown below).

The fire from Forno’s Louisianans the 5th, 6th and 8th LA was dwindling as they were almost out of ammunition. They had lost 88 killed and wounded along the stream bed but had inflicted heavy losses on the Federals, who had lost 27 officers either killed or wounded. Hooker now positioned what artillery he had to attack the center of Ewell’s line. At 4:00 PM it became clear to Ewell that he would soon be flanked by Hooker and his path of retreat to Manassas cut off. With Jackson’s permission he began the move to rejoin Jackson. General Jubal Early would cover the withdrawal. Lawton left first followed by Forno’s Louisianans. The marker below interprets Forno’s Louisiana Tigers.

Below is the creek that would have been behind the “Tigers” where so many of their men were lost. On this hot August day it was competely dry.

Early was across by 6:00 PM and his engineers burned the bridge. The retreat is covered in the marker- “We Shall Bag the Whole Crowd.”

Hooker suffered more than 400 killed and wounded with the 73rd NY losing half of their men. While on the Confederate side there were about 176 casualties, Forno lost 80 men and Lawton 64. Pope left Warrenton and joined Hooker at Bristoe Station. Hooker’s men were down to only 5 rounds of ammunition per man at the battle’s end. Pope now knew that Jackson was in front of him in Manassas with 25,000 men. Although Pope’s army had made progress toward reuniting much of it was still well short of Manassas.

Jackson had been in constant communication with Lee by horseback couriers and knew that Longstreet would be through Salem on the 27th and Thoroughfare Gap on the 28th. Although Jackson did not know the exact location of Pope’s forces, he now knew from which direction they would be coming- up the Warrenton Turnpike through Gainesville directly between the path of him and Lee. Jackson would need to stock up on as many supplies as his men could carry, burn the rest, and get to a new, more favorable location as soon as possible, but where? His men would march that night toward an old, unused railroad cut on the Bull Run battlefield. It was north of the Warrenton Turnpike so that he would be beyond the left flank of any Union force marching to Manassas and if he desired, he could strike that force in their left flank as they passed by. He would be closer to Longstreet, as he would be 10 miles southeast of Thoroughfare Gap. In addition, if he needed to, he could retreat north to Aldie and then into the Shenandoah Valley. Taliaferro and the Stonewall Division left at 9:00 PM and by daybreak on the 28th were on Matthew’s Hill, north of the Warrenton Pike, on the old battlefield. A.P. Hill’s Division left around midnight but was delayed when the guide Jackson provided for the trip got them lost. Ewell would have rearguard duty, but their guide was told to follow Hill, so they too got temporarily lost. All three groups would be in place behind the old railroad cut later that day. Jackson was where he wanted to be- a few hundred yards north of the Warrenton Pike in Groveton behind the unused railroad cut. The area was heavily wooden so he would be able to see the Union passing on the Pike, but they would not be able to see him. In addition, he was in a great position to unite with Longstreet. Longstreet no longer had to depend on joining him via the Warrenton Turnpike but could travel on the road from Haymarket to Sudley, if needed. With his force in place Jackson used the 1st VA Cavalry, under Captain George Gaither, to picket the roads leading to Groveton and his position. These were the Warrenton Turnpike from the west and Lewis Lane to the south. His pickets captured a Yankee courier with a copy of McDowell’s marching orders. A.P. Hill’s men while headed toward Jackson also captured a courier with a copy of Pope’s orders. Jackson now knew that a large part of Pope’s army would be moving across his front on the Warrenton Turnpike on their way to Manassas. All he had to do was sit and wait for them to come to him.

Pope meanwhile was concentrating his force to attack Jackson in Manassas. Pope’s plan had two major flaws. First, he expected a man who had marched 50 miles in 36 hours to stay put and wait for Pope to attack him. Secondly, he did nothing to delay Lee and Longstreet’s passage through Thoroughfare Gap. The Gap was a bottleneck where a small Union force could have delayed the Rebels passage through the Bull Run Mountains giving Pope the time to fight Jackson before Longstreet could get there.

The Bristoe Station Battlefield Heritage Park interprets the two battles that occurred there on separate walking trails: the Battle of Kettle Run on August 27, 1862 (the Red Trail); and the Battle of Bristoe Station on October 14, 1863 (the Blue Trail). The markers shown above including: Confederates in Bristoe; Preparing for Battle; First Contact; Battle Along the Railroad; Deadly Day for the Excelsior Brigade; and the “Tigers” of Louisiana; and “We Shall Bag the Whole Crowd” are on the second half of the walking tour. This trail is 1 and 1/4 miles long and in addition to the battle the first half of the trail interprets the Confederate Camp Jones that was here and the cemeteries where Confederate dead were buried, most of whom died of illness in the camps. The first half of the trail is shown below.

On my last trip here the winters quarters was missing (see below).

I visited on the anniversary of the battle and there was a small camp of reenactors there.

The location of the Civil War Bristoe Station is shown below- 38.7233030, -77.5367043. These pictures were taken where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad intersects Bristoe Road. The station was in the location of the White Elephant Antiques (the building in the center).

Next- The Battle of Thoroughfare Gap- August 28, 1862

Sources

Return to Bull Rull Run The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas by John J. Hennessy

The Battles of Bristoe Station by J. Michael Miller. Blue and Gray Magazine Volume XXVI, #2, 2009.