Major General Franz Sigel was deploying his I Corps at daybreak on August 29 on Henry Hill. With Brigadier General Rufus King’s division having left the battlefield during the night Sigel did not know the exact location where Stonewall Jackson was located. He ordered Brigadier General Carl Schurz to cross the Warrenton Turnpike and attack Jackson. Schurz headed northwest where Jackson was assumed to be. Brigadier General Robert Milroy’s Independent Brigade was sent off in a more westerly direction in the center. Brigade General Robert Schenck’s two brigades marched on the left toward the Brawner Farm. Brigadier General John Reynold’s PA Reserves division was supporting Schenck’s left flank shown on the map below. Jackson’s troops were deployed behind the railroad cut. Major General A.P. Hill’s Division was on the left, Major General Richard Ewell’s Division in the center now commanded by Brigadier General Alexander Lawton, and Brigadier General William Taliaferro’s Division commanded by Brigadier General William Starke. The flanks were guarded by Brigadier General Fitzhugh Lee’s Cavalry at Sudley Ford on Jackson’s left, while Brigadier General Jubal Early guarded Jackson’s right along the Warrenton Turnpike with his brigade and Colonel Henry Forno’s Louisiana brigade. As can be seen in the map below as Sigel’s troops approached Jackson, gaps developed in his force.

The battle opened when the brigades of Colonel Wladimir Krzyzanowski’s (75th PA, 58th NY, and 54th NY) came into contact with skirmishers from Brigadier General Maxcy Gregg’s South Carolina brigade. Gregg’s brigade was about 60 yards behind the railroad cut on A.P. Hill’s left about 1,000 yards southwest of the Sudley Church. The 1st SC crossed the railroad cut and came under fire from the 58th NY and 75th PA. They were initially driven back but when supported by the 12th SC under Colonel Dixon Barnes moved forward once again.

The Confederates drove Colonel Krzyzanowski’s brigade across the Sudley Road where they contacted Schurz’s 29th NY and Captain Jacob Roemer’s artillery. Colonel Barnes’ South Carolinians fell back when they realized they were about a half-mile in advance of Gregg’s line. When Milroy in the center heard the sounds of battle on his right, he sent the 82nd OH under Colonel James Cantwell and 5th WV under Colonel John L. Zeigler toward the sound of the guns. They came in contact with the 13th SC which was moving forward to support the right flank of the 1st SC. They also came under flanking fire from Brigadier General Edward Thomas’ Georgia Brigade. As the 82nd OH were withdrawn to a safer location Colonel Cantwell was shot in the head and killed. Shortly thereafter Milroy’s two brigades fell back to the southern edge of the woods. During this time Milroy sent another of his brigades, the 2nd WV, to the left across the Groveton Sudley Road but they were easily repulsed by Brigadier General Isaac Trimble’s brigade. Three of Milroy’s brigades had been wrecked by assaults on the railroad cut and the morning was not yet over.

On the right Colonel Alexander Schimmelfennig’s brigade of Schurz’s division was stymied by Brigadier General Lawrence O’Bryan Branch of Hill’s division. At 10:00 AM General Philip Kearny (First Division of Heintzelman’s III Corps) began to arrive on the right keeping Brigadier General David Birney’s regiments in reserve. With Kearny’s arrival Schimmelfennig advanced the 8th WV, 61st OH, and 74th PA along with Kearny’s 1st NY. They broke through Branch’s line but in the process came under heavy flanking fire from both sides of the breakthrough, and a counterattack by the 1st and 12th SC. The Union attack on the right stalled and only skirmishing occurred there over the next several hours. Sigel’s attack had failed. Unknown to Pope, at this time, was that Longstreet had begun arriving on the battlefield and by noon had two divisions in place on Jackson’s right flank, shown in the map below.

At 10:00 AM Pope issued an order for McDowell and Porter to proceed to Gainesville. Pope’s anticipated plan was that while attacks were being launched on Jackson by Sigel and Heintzelman, to keep him in place, that Porter would be attacking Jackson’s right and rear. The problem was that Longstreet was now blocking Porter’s path as shown in the map above. The only way for Porter to get to Jackson’s right and rear would be for him to launch an assault against Longstreet.

Union troops continued to arrive on the battlefield in the late morning and early afternoon. Sigel was the senior officer on the field. When Hooker’s division of Heintzelman’s Corps arrived, he sent the 1st MA under Brigadier General Cuvier Grover to support Milroy, Colonel Joseph Carr’s brigade to support artillery on Matthew’s Hill, and part of Carr’s brigade (6th and 7th NJ) to relieve Schurtz. Sigel was dividing up divisions and sending brigades as reinforcements to different parts of the battlefield without respect to the command structure which would result in problems in upcoming parts of the battle. When Brigadier General Isaac Stevens’ division arrived, he sent his three brigades to three different parts of the battlefield. Sigel had wrecked the combat structure and effectiveness of two divisions before they had fired a shot. Pope finally arrived on the field in the early afternoon and relieved Sigel.

He then ordered Hooker and his division to launch a frontal assault on Jackson’s center. Hooker seeing the futility of such an assault asked Pope to join him in reconnoitering the position from a nearby hill. Hooker pointed out to Pope that even if he should break through Jackson’s line that the reserves and artillery behind the position would quickly drive him out. Unbeknownst to Hooker a similar situation had already occurred on the Federal right during the morning. Hooker proposed that while his men attacked the center that Pope order Major General Philip Kearny to attack the Confederate left flank. Pope agreed and sent orders to Kearny to do so. The overall map of the battlefield at the time is shown below.

The inset of Hooker’s attack in the map above is shown below.

At 2:00 P M Hooker began to move his division forward. Unfortunately, Kearny would be slow to get his men into position and what Hooker had feared (his men attacking on their own) would come to pass. Carr’s brigade moved forward (7th NJ, 115th PA, 6th NJ, 5th NJ, 8th NJ) through the railroad cut until they reached Hill’s South Carolinian and Georgian troops in a ravine and were driven back. Kearny received Pope’s order to “send a pretty strong force diagonally to the front to relieve the center in the woods from pressure.” Between 2:00 and 3:00 PM Kearny ordered Colonel John C. Robinson with his brigade and Colonel Orlando Poe’s 3rd MI forward to turn the Rebels left flank. Grover received his order to advance at 3:00 PM. At 3:15 Grover moved forward headed toward Milroy’s right. After meeting with Milroy he moved further to the right forming a double line of battle with three regiments in front (1st MA, 2nd NH, 11th MA) and two in the rear (16 MA, 26th PA). He instructed his men to fire one volley and then charge using their bayonets. Grover’s men overran Brigadier General Charles Field’s Virginia brigade and Colonel Edward Thomas’s Georgia brigade as the 2nd NH surged ahead. Confederate artillery began firing on Grover’s left flank. Grover veered to the right and attacked Gregg’s 13th SC. The pressure of Grover’s attack allowed Carr’s men to penetrate a gap in the Rebel line between Thomas and Gregg. General A. P. Hill realigned his artillery in such a way as to pin down the two regiments in Grover’s second line from moving beyond the railroad cut. The 49th GA formed a third line and attacked Grover’s right, while Jackson advanced Colonel Henry Forno’s brigade against Grover’s left. They pushed Grover back to his starting position, the breach was sealed and Grover had lost 500 of his 1500 men.

In a brief lull in the action Hill sent a courier to Jackson letting him he was running low on ammunition, his troops were weary, and he was concerned about his ability to survive another attack. Jackson told the courier to let Hill know that if they attack again he must beat them. Jackson then rode toward Hill to see things for himself. Along the way he met Hill coming to him to relay the situation in person. Jackson congratulated Hill on his men’s performance but told him that he must beat the enemy back. As they were talking the roar of cannons emerged again along Hill’s line, another attack was coming. Union Colonel James Nagle’s Brigade of Major General Jessie Reno’s IX Corps was moving into line on the right of Grover to launch the next in of a series of piecemeal attacks shown in the map below.

Nagle’s attack is shown in a close up of the inset below.

Nagle advanced with the 6th NH and 2nd MD in advance followed by the 48th PA and came under heavy fire from Forno’s brigade. Nagle had some success on his left. As the Rebels retreated across Milroy’s front he had the 3rd WV charge them only to be rapidly driven back by Brigadier General William Starke leading Colonel Bradley Johnson’s brigade on the left and Colonel Leroy Stafford’s brigade on the right. Starke’s men shattered the 3rd WV and got behind Colonel Benjamin Christ’s IX Corps brigade and Nagle’s 6th NH who retreated. They then flanked Nagle’s 48th PA and the 2nd MD and they broke as well. As Nagle was falling back he was also attacked by Brigadier General Dorsey Pender’s brigade resulting in 183 of his men missing or captured. Hooker was advancing Brigadier General Nelson Taylor’s Excelsior brigade to relieve Carr when Nagle’s men retreated right through their ranks. Taylor and Carr were being attacked from the front and their left and couldn’t fire back because of Union troops retreating toward them. Having driven the Federals back, Starke decided to withdraw beyond the railroad cut. Without Starke to support him Pender also withdrew.

Brigadier General John Robinson’s brigade from Kearny’s division had moved into place near the Sudley Church. After he was in position Taylor’s brigade collapsed exposing his left. It was now about 5:00 PM and Hooker’s attack, without timely support from Kearny, had failed, see map below.

Kearny’s attack shown in the inset above is shown below.

In protecting Robinson’s brigade Kearny would now launch the final disjointed attack of the day. In three previous actions on this day the Union penetrated Confederate lines under Schimmelfennig, Grover and then Nagle only to be driven back by the Confederates when the breakthrough wasn’t adequately supported. Kearny would now launch the fourth and final such assault of the day, too late to be of any significant help to General Hooker.

Kearny rode his horse to the top of the railroad cut and directed the 105th PA, the 3rd MI and 20th IN to cross the railroad cut, wheel to the left and attack. Kearny then rode up to Colonel Alexander Hays of the 63rd PA telling him that he wanted his men to drive the Confederates out of the woods that were annoying Hooker. By this time though Hooker’s assault was for all intents and purposes over. Kearny directed them into position. He then rode into the ranks of Nagle and Taylor’s men waving his sword in the air in his only arm (he had lost the other one in the Mexican War) and a number of them joined his ranks, a large group of men from the 48th PA joined the 3rd MI. Robinson’s three regiments (105th PA, 3rd MI, 20th IN) crossed the unfinished railroad and wheeled to the left (now forming perpendicular to the railroad cut) and started to roll up Hill’s left flank. The 3rd MI and 105th PA broke the 1st SC Rifles and mortally wounded their Colonel J. Foster Marshall and their Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Ledbetter. The 1st MI lost 140 of their 250 men in the process. Gregg’s South Carolinians were being driven back. Kearney’s men continued forward now causing Thomas’ Georgia brigade to also fall back. Hill threw in Field’s brigade without effect. Pender failed to halt the advance. As seen in the inset map above Birney and Robinson were forcing a massive Rebel retreat. Union Major General Isaac Stevens then threw in Colonel Daniel Leisure’s small brigade on the left.

Hill hurriedly sent a courier back for reinforcements. The courier found General Jubal Early who quickly put his large brigade in motion. Along the way he picked up the 8th LA from Henry Forno’s brigade on his left and Alexander Lawton’s 13th GA on his right. Early drove David Birney’s brigade back and Kearny had no additional troops at his disposal. Robinson’s attack also faltered and Kearny’s division was driven back close to where their assault began by Early.

The final action of the day occurred in a different part of the battlefield. Longstreet had completed the deployment of his command in the early afternoon. Lee then suggested that Longstreet attack Pope’s left flank but Longstreet wanted to reconnoiter the area before attacking. After studying the ground Longstreet returned to Lee’s headquarters on Stuart’s Hill. Longstreet wanted to wait before attacking, as he was explaining his reasoning to Lee, Major General Jeb Stuart arrived to report that a large Union force was moving up the Manassas-Gainesville Road toward Longstreet’s right flank. That force was the V Corps of Fitz John Porter. Lee would have to put his plans for an offensive on hold. At 6:00 PM Pope told McDowell that Jackson’s troops were falling back and ordered him to send Brigadier General John Hatch’s division up the Warrenton Turnpike after Jackson. Although Hill’s Division had fallen back initially in response to Kearny’s attack, Jackson was not retreating, yet another example of Pope’s best case scenario thinking. McDowell complied and unknowingly sent Hatch straight toward Longstreet. Hatch advanced with Brigadier General Abner Doubleday’s brigade in the lead followed by Colonel Timothy Sullivan’s brigade. They were led by the 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters as skirmishers and supported by Captain George Gerrish’s Battery A, 1st NH Light Artillery and Lieutenant Colonel Judson Kilpatrick’s 2nd NY Cavalry. At the same time Longstreet was launching a reconnaissance in force westward down the same road under Brigadier General John Bell Hood. Hood’s Texas Brigade was to the right of the Pike with Colonel Evander Law’s brigade on the left. Brigadier General Nathan “Shanks” Evans Independent brigade was on the left behind Law. Hood saw Gerrish’s Battery moving into place and ordered Law to charge it. The ensuing battle is shown on the map below and in the inset.

Law’s men routed Hatch’s skirmishers and the Battery. As Doubleday’s troops stopped to fire on Law, Sullivan continued to march through Doubleday’s lines leading to confusion in the Union ranks. Hood then attacked and sent them fleeing. As if this weren’t bad enough Kilpatrick then decided to charge the Confederates passing through Law’s men toward Evans’ brigade. Evans’ men fired on the Union Cavalry sending them fleeing back toward Law who also opened fire on them. The only thing that saved the Federal force from complete annihilation was that it was now dark and they escaped back to their lines. McDowell returned to Pope’s headquarters and incredibly described the engagement as “the finishing strokes of the day, which we could now safely claim as ours.” McDowell also relayed to him a message from John Buford that Longstreet had marched to reinforce Jackson through Thoroughfare Gap. Somehow Pope concluded from all this that Longstreet had not taken up a position on Jackson’s right south of the Warrenton Turnpike but that he was behind Jackson and vulnerable to a flanking attack from Gainesville.

This part of the battle is interpreted at the National Park Service battlefield driving tour stop #6- the Unfinished Railroad. This stop is a loop walking tour with a small extension off the end- when you come to the Gregg’s Brigade sign it is time to head back. Pictures from a recent visit appear below.

The Unfinished Railroad kiosk was not present on my last visit it used to be located in the parking lot for the stop (38.8256071, -77.5486513).

Another new marker- Federal Breakthrough

The Second Brigade 1st Division III Corps marker below

If you keep going straight here down to the Sudley Church site you will come to another marker for Gregg’s Brigade at the church parking lot which is shown below. That marker is best observed at Driving Tour stop #5 for Sudley Church.

Second Brigade 1st Division IX Corps

Two more pictures of the cut nearing the end of the loop trail

Across the street from the Railroad cut parking lot is the Unfinished Railroad marker and the path that takes one down to the Deep Cut driving tour stop #7 which we will cover in one of the Day 3 posts about Porter’s attack.

Next- Second Manassas, Day 3 (August 30, 1862)- Part 1- Porter’s Attack

Source

Second Manassas Thoroughfare Gap to Kearny’s Attack August 28-29, 1862 Blue and Gray Magazine Volume XXIX #2, 2012.

Return to Bull Rull Run The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas by John J. Hennessy