On May 25th General George McClellan continued to advance his Union army up the peninsula. He ordered Keyes to send Brigadier General Silas Casey’s division to Seven Pines at the intersection of the Williamsburg and Nine Mile Roads, shown on the map below. On May 28th Casey was instructed to move forward another three quarters of a mile on the Williamsburg Road where they cleared the woods and built a redoubt for a battery of six guns. Brigadier General Palmer’s brigade was positioned on the left, Brigadier General Henry Wessells’ brigade in the center, and Brigadier General Henry Naglee’s brigade on the right. The White Oak Swamp protected the Union left but the right flank was in the “air” with no natural protection.

A second line of defense manned by Brigadier General Darius Couch’s division was established back at the intersection of Nine Mile Road and the Williamsburg Road near the location of the current National Cemetery. A third line was in Couch’s rear. Confederate General D.H. Hill was scouting the area. Samuel Garland’s brigade while moving east on the Williamsburg Road discovered that Keyes’ division was isolated five miles forward of Heintzelman’s division with no other Union forces south of the Chickahominy River. To make matters worse for the Federals a severe thunderstorm struck the area on the evening of May 30th causing the river level to rise dramatically leaving Keyes even more isolated.

As Johnston was retreating toward Richmond he was looking for an opportunity to attack McClellan. That opportunity had finally presented itself with two Federal corps isolated on the south side of the swollen Chickahominy River, right where most of Johnston’s army was located. Johnston devised an excellent plan on paper to attack Keyes, shown on the map below.

D.H. Hill was to move down the Williamsburg Road toward Casey. Longstreet with most of his division and Smith would advance on Nine Mile Road attacking the Federal right. Huger marching east on the Charles City Road would attack the Federals left flank. Keyes would be overwhelmed simultaneously on three fronts before reinforcements could arrive. The attack was to begin at 8:00 AM the next morning, May 31st. Longstreet would command in the field. Johnston issued verbal orders to Longstreet and Huger but those issued to Huger did not make it clear at all what exactly was expected of him. Longstreet’s actions on the 31st would suggest that either the plan was not clearly conveyed or that he did not understand it. The next morning D.H. Hill was on the Williamsburg Road with 3 of his 4 divisions. His fourth under Robert Rodes was on the Charles City Road. When Huger reached Rodes, Rodes was expected to join Hill on the Williamsburg Road. A cannon was to be fired at 9:00 AM to signal the start of the advance. But when 9:00 AM came and went without a cannon being fired Johnston sent a courier to find Longstreet.

The officer returned with news that Longstreet was nowhere to be found on Nine Mile Road. Mistakenly, Longstreet was moving his men to the Williamsburg Road to support Hill’s attack. To get there Longstreet would need cross the swollen Gillies Creek. Because of where Huger was camped his force would also need to cross Gillies Creek to get to the Charles City Road. To make matters worse no on had told Huger that Longstreet was commanding in the field. Their arrival at the creek at the same time created a huge bottleneck. Hill was growing impatient and at 11:00 AM he sent Rodes an order to leave the Charles City Road and join him. By 1:00 PM Hill could wait no longer and began to advance. Robert Rodes on the Federal left was able to turn Casey’s redoubt driving the Federals back to their second line at the Seven Pines crossroads losing 8 field guns in the process. In the interim Longstreet and Huger had finally become untangled and Huger was moving down the Charles City Road along with 3 of Longstreet’s brigades. Longstreet sent two of his brigades under Brigadier General Richard Anderson and Colonel James Kemper to the Williamsburg Road to support Hill’s attack. The arrival of Brigadier General Philip Kearny’s troops from Heintzelman’s Corps and Brigadier General John Peck’s brigade of Couch’s division checked Rodes’ advance on the Federal left.

On my last trip this marker was missing.

On the Union right flank Micah Jenkins was advancing with 5 brigades along with Richard Anderson’s brigade and the Federal right collapsed forcing them back to their third line of defense two miles beyond Seven Pines. The 37th NY was instrumental in protecting the line of retreat.

The area of the former third line marker is shown below

North of the railroad tracks the Union narrowly averted a disaster that could have ended the battle. At 4:00 PM realizing that Longstreet was not on the Nine Mile Road, Johnston ordered Brigadier General Chase Whiting to take Gustavus Smith’s division and along with the commands of Colonel Evander Law, Brigadier Generals John Bell Hood and Johnston Pettigrew to attack the Union right. As they advanced they cut off four regiments of Brigadier General John Abercrombie’s brigade. Division commander Couch was with them and they were cut off from the rest of the IV Corps. They pulled back a half mile closer to the Grapevine Bridge near the Adams house. McClellan hearing the noise of the fighting ordered General Sumner to cross the river and assist Casey, see the map below.

Sumner’s engineers advised him that it was not possible to cross the Chickahominy River, the bridges wouldn’t hold. Sumner ignored them and Brigadier General John Sedgwick’s division began to cross. The going was difficult in mud and high water. Brigadier General Willis Gorman crossed first followed by those of Napoleon Dana and William Burns. Lieutenant Edmund Kirby set up his batteries and began to unleash a devastating fire. Wade Hampton was wounded, and Johnston Pettigrew was wounded and captured. The Confederates charged Kirby’s batteries but were repelled each time. Sedgwick counterattacked and drove the them from the field. The Union position south of the river was saved. As the sun was setting General Johnston rode to the railroad tracks to observe the battle. He turned and was riding back up the Nine Mile Road when he was struck in the right shoulder by a bullet and then hit by a shell fragment in the chest. He was taken to the Crenshaw house in Richmond where he would recover from his wounds.

The map below shows each armies position at the start and end of the day.

When Jefferson Davis spoke to General Gustavus Smith, the next in the line of command, about his plans for the next day he apparently was not happy with the answer. While he and Lee rode back to Richmond Davis informed Lee he would be appointed commander of the army in the morning. Lee would ride out to the battlefield the next day but would let Smith command the field. The battle would be centered at the point where the Nine Mile Road crossed the Richmond and York River Railroad, shown on the map below. On the Union side Brigadier General Israel Richardson’s division had arrived.

At 6:30 AM the Rebel attack began across the whole line and was repulsed. The second attack along the railroad tracks by Pickett, and Mahone was more disjointed than the first. A Union bayonet charge pushed the Confederates back but they reorganized and counterattacked but could not dislodge the Federals. At 2:00 PM the Confederates withdrew. Casualties were severe on both sides the Confederates lost 6,134 men (980 killed, 4,749 wounded and 405 captured), the Union lost 5,031 men (790 killed, 3,594 wounded, and 647 captured).

The next two pictures were taken at 37.5303241, -77.3127876 where Hanover Road ends at Nine Mile Road looking up Hanover Road.

The next two pictures were taken at 37.5302619, -77.3128603 where the railroad tracks cross the intersection.

There were many things notable about the battle. McClellan had made a major error leaving Keyes division so isolated on the south side of the Chickahominy River. He was saved from disaster by the actions of two of his other Corps commanders Sumner and Heintzelman. McClellan unjustly blamed Casey for failing to stop the initial Confederate attack. The decision to place Casey in a vulnerable position with his flank in the air was McClellan’s for which he took no responsibility. On the Confederate side the poor communication between Johnston and Longstreet lost the Rebels the opportunity to seize victory on the first day of the battle. Had Longstreet attacked down the Nine Mile Road he would have been able to flank a significant part of the IV Corps. Instead his march to the Williamsburg Road completely blocked Huger’s path to the Charles City Road leaving Hill’s division on their own. Longstreet blamed Huger as did Johnston. Neither took any responsibility for their own roles in the process. Regarding his wounding Johnston purportedly said, “The shot that struck me down was the best ever fired for the Confederacy because I possessed in no degree the confidence of the Confederacy, and now the man that succeeds me does have it and will be able to succeed where I never could.” Johnston’s wounding resulted in Robert E. Lee assuming command of Confederate forces in Virginia which would have an enormous impact on the war. A series of bloody battles called “The Seven Days” was about to occur around Richmond.

Source

To Hell or Richmond The 1862 Peninsula Campaign by Doug Crenshaw and Drew A. Gruber