General Robert E. Lee would assume command of Confederate forces near Richmond on June 1st. He had been serving as Davis’ chief military adviser prior to that point and was helping guide overall strategy. Lee had first sent 17,000 men under Ewell and then an additional 8,000 men under Lawton and Whiting to Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley to wreak havoc with Union forces there and raise concern in Washington that Jackson might threaten the city from the west. Jackson’s activities had so concerned Lincoln that he would not allow McDowell’s 30,000-40,000 men in Fredericksburg to join McClellan outside Richmond. Lee would keep McClellan from adding McDowell’s men to Federal forces already on the peninsula while moving units from North and South Carolina to Richmond. The moving of Confederate forces to the valley also convinced McClellan that Lee’s army was much larger than his own. According to McClellan why else would Lee send men to another military theater with his army right in front of Lee’s.
Lee, like Johnston before him, had recognized the key weakness in McClellan’s logistical organization. His supply base at White House landing was on the north side of the Chickahominy River. As a result the Army of the Potomac was split in two on the north and south side of the river. General Fitz John Porter’s V Corps of 30,000 men was alone on the north side. On the 11th General Lee met with his cavalry commander, J.E.B. Stuart, at the Dabbs house and ask him to reconnoiter the Union army. Stuart with 1200 men would ride completely around the Army of the Potomac. In the process Stuart discovered that the right part of Porter’s corps was not only alone on the north side of the river but was “in the air” (it was not up against a natural barrier such as a river or swamp) and vulnerable to attack. Stuart had ridden completely around Porter’s right flank! His ride covered 100 miles in 72 hours with only one fatality. Lee devised a risky plan which he conveyed in person to Generals Jackson, D.H. Hill, A.P. Hill and Longstreet at the Dabbs house on the 23rd.
The key to the plan was that Jackson would move his entire army from the Shenandoah Valley to Ashland and from there they would march around Porter’s right flank getting behind the Union V Corps. Longstreet and both Hill’s would take what amounted to two-thirds of the Confederate army north of the Chickahominy and attack Porter from the west. Lee would be sending 55,000 men across the the river to attack Porter. Only Huger and Magruder’s men (29,000 men) would be left behind earthworks to defend Richmond against the bulk of Union forces (76,000 men). Lee’s goal in attacking Porter from the front and rear with a larger force was to destroy not only the V Corps but also McClellan’s supply line and base forcing him to either flee back down the peninsula or toward the James River. The risk was that if McClellan decided to make a dash toward Richmond during Lee’s assault he would vastly outnumber the Confederate forces protecting the city under Huger and Magruder and capture Richmond. For Lee, knowing McClellan’s conservative nature, it was a risk he was willing to take. Ironically, two days after the meeting at the Dabbs house, McClellan would do exactly what Lee had feared, he decided to move toward Richmond south of the Chickahominy River.
General Lee established his first field headquarters as new commander of the Army of Northern Virginia at the Dabbs House on June 1, 1862, shown below. This would be his headquarters until June 26th. On June 23, Lee assembled his top subordinates here for the first time. They included Generals J.E.B. Stuart, A.P. Hill, D.H. Hill, James Longstreet, and Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson. This “Dabbs House Meeting” established the plan for the Seven Days’ Battles. There is a small museum at the Dabbs House which also interprets the 1864 Battle of New Market Heights.
The Dabbs House Museum
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