After returning from the front at Oak Grove Lee decided that he would move forward with his plan to attack Porter’s V Corps across the Chickahominy River in Mechanicsville. His three divisions south of the river would move into position later that evening. Now the success or failure of his plan would depend on the timely arrival of Jackson from the Shenandoah Valley. The plan is shown below from a sign located in the Chickahominy Bluff Richmond National Battlefield Park.

The problem was that Jackson was behind schedule. By nightfall on the 24th most of his army was near Ashland but to remain on schedule he should have been six miles southeast of Ashland at Slash Church. The next day was spent closing up the ranks at Ashland. He was on the road at 3:00 AM on the 26th. He would not make Mechanicsville by 8:00 AM.

McCall’s Pennsylvania Reserve Division was waiting for him on the eastern side of Beaver Dam Creek in a strong natural position concealed by thick brush. It would not be until 5:00 PM that Jackson would reach Hadley’s Corner about 3 miles from Porter’s right flank. It was here that Jackson rather than continuing his march around Porter’s right flank went into bivouac. The reasons for this are unclear. Whether it was because Lee’s orders were vague as to Jackson’s role that day and he thought was only to play a supporting role to D.H. Hill or he was suffering from severe sleep deprivation this was the first example of Jackson’s uncharacteristically poor performance in the Seven Days Battles. Jackson did not send scouts out to look for Hill and neither did Hill look for Jackson. The coordination between the Rebel divisions was severely lacking and in addition Lee did not have a staff structure to aid in that process. In the late afternoon A. P. Hill decided on his own that he could wait no longer and started his men across the Meadow Bridges. As he turned toward Mechanicsville Generals John Reynolds and Truman Seymour’s brigades fell back and joined McCall behind Beaver Dam Creek. As Lee watched from across the river he order D.H. Hill to cross the river to support A. P. Hill. The Confederates advanced along a two-mile long front on the Federal position as shown in the map below from a sign at the Beaver Dam Creek Battlefield Park (entrance- 37.5985653, -77.3598520). The Confederates would have to cross an open field, a swamp, and a part of the mill pond from Ellerson’s Mill to attack a concealed Union position on the other side of the steep banks of Beaver Dam Creek.

A. P. Hill sent Dorsey Pender’s brigade to try and turn the Union left flank without success. Brigadier General Roswell Ridley’s brigade was ordered to support Pender and in the process lost 335 of their 514 men. Confederate General E. Porter Alexander said regarding the failed assault that a more hopeless charge was never entered upon. The Confederates only managed to get 11,000 men engaged against 14,000 from Porter’s V Corps.
The metal signs below are outside the battlefield park.



There is a Freeman monument just behind the battlefield on Old Cold Harbor Road.


The pictures shown below are from the Beaver Dam Creek Battlefield Park. The land preserved by the park is only a small part of the southern end of the two-mile long battlefield.
















Next- Gaines’ Mill
Source
Richmond Shall Not Be Given Up The Seven Days’ Battles June 25- July 1, 1862 by Doug Crenshaw