During the night the remainder of the Union Army had fallen back to Malvern Hill and Fitz John Porter established a strong line there. McClellan inspected the line early in the morning on July 1st and then promptly departed to look for a suitable place for his supply depot on the James River. Once again, he left no one in charge. Malvern Hill is a field that slowly rises in height. It was an ideal area to place artillery as it was relatively flat with only a small swale on the Confederate right for an attacking force to hide. It was about 900 yards wide, and Porter could place 35-40 guns on its crest. It was also in range of Federal gunboats now on the James River.

The infantry divisions of Darius Couch and George Morell, a total of 17,500 men were protecting the guns. The left flank of the field dropped off sharply and was known as Malvern Cliffs, which would be where George Sykes division was placed. The Union right flank was the weakest part of the line but was heavily guarded by men from Heintzelman, Sumner and Franklin’s Corps with McCall’s division who were engaged the day before at Glendale in reserve. Generals Lee, Longstreet, Jackson, and D.H. Hill met at the site of the marker below near Glendale. General D.H. Hill had been talking to a chaplain in his division from the area who described the ground around Malvern Hill to him. Hill told Longstreet and Lee that “if General McClellan is here in strength, we had better leave him alone”. General Lee angered by the lost opportunities the day before was not going to do that.

Lee ordered Jackson to proceed down the Willis Church Road and assume position on the left at the Poindexter Farm. D.H. Hill was to form on Jackson’s right in the area of the Willis Church Parsonage. Magruder and Huger would be on D.H. Hill’s right. Longstreet and A.P. Hill’s men who were heavily engaged the day before would be in reserve. Magruder would be late getting into position. He was given a guide and ordered to follow the Quaker Road to the battlefield. However, there was more than one “Quaker Road” in the area and Magruder’s guide led him down the wrong road. He doubled back but would arrive to the battlefield late. The forces would position as shown by a map on one of the signs on the battlefield.

The images below were taken from the Methodist Parsonage where D.H. Hill’s men were aligned.

Longstreet when he arrived on the field noted an elevated position on the right side of the Confederate line. If Jackson could find a similar position on the Confederate left, then they could bring a converging point of fire upon the Union guns at the top of the hill. Brigadier General Louis Armistead’s brigade was close to the front and if the artillery barrage had its desired effect Armistead was to charge as the signal to start a general assault across the whole line. The Confederate army allocated their cannons at the brigade level with only a small reserve of 14 batteries under the command of Brigadier General William Pendleton. This created two problems. The first was due to the incompetence of their commander. Pendleton did not get many of his guns into position because he could not find General Lee to get orders. The second was a consequence of the fact that the Rebels allocated their cannon at the brigade level. As a result, their guns came into action in a piecemeal fashion especially on their right. As each individual brigade brought their guns into service the entire Union line could focus on that group and destroy them. On the left Stonewall Jackson, a former artillery instructor, placed the guns himself but his results were no more effective. D.H. Hill described the Confederate cannon fire as farcical. By 3:00 PM it was obvious that the cannonade had been ineffective, and Lee and Longstreet rode out together to look for ways to turn the Union right flank. Magruder had arrived on the battlefield and saw several of Armistead’s regiments pushing back some Union sharpshooters. Whiting on the left saw some of Sumner’s troops moving back and thought they were retreating but there were only trying to avoid some of the Confederate cannon fire. Both of these events were misinterpreted, and Lee launched a general assault all along the line with the order “the enemy is getting off. Press forward your whole line and follow up on Armistead’s successes.” There were no successes and now the Confederates would launch an all-out attack across an open field against a well-protected wall of cannons with a clear field of fire and concealed members of Berdan’s sharpshooters. Taking the position would be a tall task.

Next- The Battle of Malvern Hill and the Battlefield Terrain Walking Tour

Sources

Richmond Shall Not Be Given Up The Seven Days’ Battles July 25- July 1, 1862 by Doug Crenshaw.

To the Gates of Richmond The Peninsula Campaign by Stephen W. Sears.