Brigadier General Charles S. Winder deployed his men and moved toward the ridge of Bowers Hill. The 5th VA swept aside the Union skirmishers on the knoll (two companies of the 29th PA). The 27th VA seized an empty hill to the left as the 2nd VA advanced between the 5th and 27th VA. The 33rd VA stayed in reserve while the 4th VA advanced east of the Valley Pike. General Winder had secured the base of the ridge and called up a section of Poague’s battery. As Poague was placing his battery he observed Union Colonel Gordon sequentially extending his line to the west and up Bowers Hill, see map below. As the 2nd MA reached the top of the hill Poague’s guns opened on them, but they were able to take cover behind a stone wall. Cochran’s NY Battery commanded by Lieutenant James Peabody returned fire with seven guns, six of them located on knolls of Bowers Hill. Winder deployed 14 more guns on his side of the battlefield. Three right flanking companies of the 2nd MA were experienced sharpshooters and began picking off Confederate artillerists. By 5:30 AM two of them were killed and 20 more wounded by a combination of shot and shell. Poague’s guns could no longer remain in position.

On the east side of the pike Lieutenant Crosby’s Battery on Camp Hill was engaged in an artillery duel with Confederate guns on Bowles Hill near the junction of the Front Royal and Millwood Pikes a mile to the southeast. The Confederates on this side of the pike were led by General Ewell. The Union Brigade commander here was Colonel Dudley Donnelly. An overview of the battlefield is shown on the sign below.

Donnelly commanded the 5th CT (Lieutenant Colonel George Chapman), the 6th PA (Colonel Joseph Knipe) and the 28th NY. A low-lying fog obscured Ewell’s view of the Federals. But he could hear the sounds of the cannons on the other side of the pike signaling that the battle was underway. Ewell rode to the front and ordered General Trimble’s 21st NC (300 men) forward commanded by Colonel Wiliam Kirkland (see map below). Ewell brought artillery with him- two guns under 18-year-old Lieutenant Joseph Latimer and a section of Courtney’s battery. As the North Carolinians reached the top of a hill north of Abraham’s Creek, they contacted the 46th PA and elements of the 28th NY and 5th CT. Kirkland decided to charge not realizing he was running into a trap. As they arrived near the Union line eight companies of the 8th CT rose out of the fog on the side of the road and fired a devasting volley into their right flank. Colonel Rufus Pepper tried to rally the right flank and was killed. He would be the highest-ranking officer on either side to die at Front Royal or Winchester. Five company officers of the 21st NC were killed or wounded and the heavily outnumbered regiment fled to the rear. In only 20 minutes 18 of Kirkland’s men were killed and 78 wounded. On this side of the battlefield Ewell had about 2000 men and the Federals about 1700 and he had just taken close to 100 casualties.

Ewell next sent the 21st GA forward under Colonel John Mercer. The outnumbered Georgians were luckier than the North Carolinians and managed to escape with 18 casualties as they too were subjected to flanking fire by the 28th NY from behind a stone wall. It was now 7:30 AM and the Federals had taken advantage of a good defensive position to thwart two attempts by Ewell to punch through their lines. Across the Valley pike to the west Jackson also was stymied despite deploying three brigades. He had extended his line to the west with the addition of Colonels John Campbell and Fulkerson’s brigades and made no progress against the high ground on Bowers Hill. He had 3,000 men on the field across from 2,100 Federals. Both sides continued to extend their lines to the west but neither side had really gained any ground as Banks’ wagons continued to roll toward Martinsburg. To this point Jackson and Ewell had deployed only about 5,000 men. Jackson had lost about 200 men several of them critical line officers and after three hours of fighting had accomplished little. At 7:30 AM Jackson rode to join General Charles Winder to discuss the situation. Winder informed Jackson that he thought the Union right flank was vulnerable. Jackson responded “Very well. I will send you Taylor’s Brigade.” Taylor’s Brigade was the largest in Jackson’s army with about 2,500 men.

General Jackson rode back to meet with Taylor personally. As his column moved behind the Stonewall Brigade to the west, he was met by General Winder who provided him with instructions on how to reach the westernmost flank. Colonel Gordon seeing the movement of Fulkerson’s Brigade readjusted his lines further to the right moving the 446 men of the 27th IN from the area of the Valley pike to the far right. As the Hoosier’s crested the hill they observed a group of Confederates in their front and moving to their right. Gordon moved the 29th PA behind his lines and to the right of the 27th IN, shown in the map below. Jackson was massing his forces on the Federal right where now he would have a significant manpower advantage.

As this was going on General Alpheus Williams was about to make a tactical error. He rode to the east side of the pike to check on the situation there with Colonel Donnelly. Donnelly told him that he faced nine Confederate regiments on this side of the field when in reality Ewell currently had only five. Williams decided to reinforce him with the over 800 men of the 10th ME who had just arrived, they could have been better used on the right. The Maine troops were not part of Williams’ brigade, and he did not consult Banks in the process. Ewell took advantage of the foggy conditions to realign his men at the suggestion of General Trimble. Instead of trying to punch through the Union center he would move troops around the Federal left and right flanks.

By 8:00 AM Colonel Gordon’s right wrapped north and faced west. The direction that Taylor would be approaching from. As Taylor’s Louisiana Brigade was moving into a double line about 1,000 yards long, they came under heavy fire from the 27th IN (Colonel Silas Colgrove) and 29th PA (Colonel John Murphy). Taylor ordered his men to charge. Two thousand Rebels would charge a Union line of about 900 men. The 8th and 9th LA were on the right and the 6th LA, Wheat’s Battalion and the 10th VA on the left. The 7th LA was held in reserve. As the Louisianans were charging the Lieutenant Colonel of the 27th IN, Abishya Morrison, ordered his men to the rear. The 27th’s IN’s Colonel Colgrove witnessed this and ran after the 8 companies of men and tried to halt them. Taylor quickly seized on the moment and ordered all of his men forward on the double quick. Seeing that his shortened line was overlapped on both ends, Union Colonel Murphy ordered a withdrawal. When question by Colonel Colgrove, Lieutenant Colonel Morrison said that he withdrew the 27th IN under orders from Colonel Gordon that were relayed through his aide-de-camp Lieutenant Henry Scott. Both Gordon and Scott denied that any such order was given. What actually happened is unclear. General Hatch summed up the performance of the Union right in one simple sentence, “Our troops did not do very well.” The whole right flank collapsed. Finally, the wave rolled back to the last two regiments to the right of the Valley Pike, the 2nd MA and 3rd WI, and they pulled back toward Winchester. Williams rode to the right, located a squadron of the 1st MI Cavalry (about 200 men) under Major Town, and ordered them to charge the advancing Rebels. The Michiganders rode to the top of Bowers Hill. The Louisianans fired a volley at the squadron and Town realizing the folly of charging over 2,000 men withdrew. Taylor captured Bowers Hill by 8:15 AM and in the process his men fired only one volley at a small squadron of MI Cavalry. Witnessing the scene on the hill General Charles Winder ordered the Stonewall Brigade forward from the south. Banks sent an aide to Donelly on the left of the Valley Pike ordering him to retreat immediately.

Union soldiers fled through town toward the Martinsburg Pike while being fired upon by Confederate soldiers as well as citizens of the town. Colonel John Murphy of the 29th PA was captured as was Major Wilder Dwight of the 2nd MA whose men had fought so valiantly as the rearguard delaying Jackson’s pursuit into Winchester. Jedediah Hotchkiss, riding ahead of Jackson, passed through the northern section of town onto the Martinsburg Pike and discovered the rear of the retreating Union army. He returned to inform Jackson that the Federals were escaping to the north and the General ordered the whole army to press on to the Potomac. As Jackson rode north on the Martinsburg Pike to the intersection of Milburn Lane and Old Charlestown Lane in Stephenson, he quickly realized that his tired infantry would be unable to catch the Federals, and he would need cavalry. At 9:00 AM Jackson sent his top aide Lieutenant Alexander “Sandie” Pendleton back to Winchester to find General Steuart and order him to join Jackson as rapidly as possible on the Martinsburg Pike. Pendleton found Steuart’s men one and a half miles east of town on the Berryville Turnpike. However, Lieutenant Colonel Flournoy refused to follow the order unless it came from Steuart himself who was not in the same location as his men. Pendleton tracked down Steuart, but he refused to follow the directive unless it was approved by his immediate commanding officer, General Ewell! Pendleton found Ewell 2 miles away and had him write out his consent. He then returned to Steuart but it would be 11:00 AM before they returned to Jackson, a costly waste of time.

Banks continued north on the Martinsburg Pike. His force was diminished by two groups of Federals fleeing on alternate routes north toward the Potomac- Colonel Donnelly with the 5th CT and 28th NY took the road to Dam No. 4 but the water was too high there, and he moved three miles upstream and crossed at Jameson’s Ferry. The main body headed toward Martinsburg and from there to a Potomac River crossing at Williamsport. Jackson’s pursuit was also delayed by the large number of Union prisoners and fleeing African Americans they had to watch over. In addition, Banks left behind about 750 of his sick and wounded in a large hospital in Winchester. The Confederates captured over 1,000 men. Banks arrived in Martinsburg at 2:30 PM where he wired the War Department that he was headed toward the Potomac. He had 20 more miles to go. Banks remained in Martinsburg to protect the road the wagon trains were on until 5:00 PM and then headed toward Williamsport where he crossed the Potomac on the morning of the 26th. They made the 35-mile trip from Winchester to Williamsport in 12 hours. Lincoln and Stanton spent the rest of the day coordinating the movements of reinforcements to Harpers Ferry, as well as Frémont‘s Mountain Department and McDowell’s Department of the Rappahannock back into the valley. More than 40,000 troops would be sent west to deal with Jackson that would be unavailable for McClellan’s assault on Richmond.

Lincoln then wired McClelland convinced that Jackson’s offensive was not a mere decoy to divert Union soldiers from Richmond and that he needed to either move on Richmond immediately or return to Washington. McClellan responded that the move was an attempt to prevent him from being reinforced and he would move on Richmond soon. McClellan felt that the response to Jackson was an overreaction. Banks had crossed the Potomac with more than 80% of his supply wagons and over 75% of his men. Jackson was congratulated by Lee in a telegram stating that it would be ideal if Jackson could cross the Potomac and demonstrate on Washington. Jackson’s army, however, was in no condition to do so. Little did he known that Frémont was headed east and McDowell west to trap him in the northern part of the valley and with superior numbers destroy his army. His foot sore men would have to march quickly before the Union pincer movement cut them off.

Union casualties at the First Battle of Winchester were 62 killed, 243 wounded and 1,714 missing or captured for a total of 2,019. Confederate casualties were 68 killed, 329 wounded and 3 missing or captured for a total of 400. In addition, the Confederates confiscated a huge amount of Federal property including quartermaster supplies worth over $125,000, over 9,000 stands of small arms, half a million rounds of ammunition, and a little over 100 wagons containing 34,000 pounds of commissary supplies. Jackson’s army would come to call General Banks “Commissary Banks” for all the supplies they captured.

Little remains with regard to the interpretation of the first Battle of Winchester. Many of the sites have been lost to development except for the signs below, in addition to the one’s shown in the body of the text above, in the city.

Even though the major sites where the battle took place have been lost to development one can still visit the areas of Camp Hill and Bowers Hills shown on the map below from the Winchester’s Three Battles Book in the sources.

1- Jackson Headquarters- 415 North Braddock Street

2- Camp Hill- Sacred Heart Cemetery 39.1744210, -78.1661342

3- Old Mill Town- 39.1656942, -78.1814994

4- Bowers Hill- 39.1730431, -78.1814994

5- Taylor’s Attack Site- 38.1797277, -78.1821911

6- Museum of the Shenandoah Valley- 901 Amherst Ave

The two signs below are located in the parking lot of the James R. Wilkinson Winchester Battlefield Visitor Center that primarily interprets the Third Battle of Winchester.

Next- The Pursuit of Stonewall Jackson

Sources

Three Days in the Shenandoah Stonewall Jackson at Front Royal and Winchester by Gary Ecelbarger

Stonewall Jackson’s Valley Campaign Shenandoah 1862 by Peter Cozzens

The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion Chapter 24 pages 536-645

Winchester’s Three Battles A Civil War Driving Tour Through Virginia’s Most War-Torn Town by Brandon H. Beck