The Battle of the Wilderness- The Forces Move into Play, May 4-5, 1862

Grant and Meade planned to cross the Rapidan at Germanna and Ely’s Ford to minimize the delay in crossing the river. If Lee moved behind Mine Run, Grant could flank him to the south. If he fell back toward Richmond, Grant could attack him with superior numbers in the open. Lee, however, would choose neither of those two options. As was his modus operandi he would not wait for his opponent to decide where the battle would be fought but would seize the initiative. He moved Richard Ewell’s Corps down the Orange Turnpike and A.P. Hill’s Corps down the parallel Orange Plank Road and attack the Federals in an impenetrable forest called “The Wilderness” (map below). The Wilderness was a 70 square mile second-growth forest. The original first growth was cleared in order to fuel the iron furnaces that were plentiful in the area and provide the planking for roads. What regrew was a tangled mass of vines, bushes and small trees that was extremely difficult to navigate through. With limited visibility this would nullify Grant’s greatest strength, his numerical advantage. It also would make the deployment of artillery and the organized alignment of large bodies of men difficult. Lee would need to move quickly to get to the Wilderness before the Army of the Potomac could make their way out of it and Grant’s two wings could consolidate. Lee would command a total force of 52,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry and 224 cannon. Grant would lead 105,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry and 274 cannon.

**Map May 4th**– **Hal Jespersen CWMaps.com**

Brigadier General James Wilson’s 3rd Indiana Cavalry crossed Germanna Ford at 3:00 AM on May 4th driving off a small Confederate force. By 5:30 AM Federal engineers had completed construction of two 220-foot-long pontoon bridges. The first was a wooden pontoon bridge built where the westbound lane of Route 3 spans the river. The second was just downstream and made of canvas pontoons, see map below.

**Blue and Gray Magazine Volume XII Issue 4, April 1995**

**Union troops crossing Germanna Ford- photo by Timothy O’Sullivan Link**

Shown below are modern day images of the area of the pontoon bridges. Pictures taken looking east (downstream) from the Route 3 bridge.

Warren’s V Corps crossed first from 7:00 AM to 1:00 PM followed by John Sedgwick’s VI Corps between 1:00 PM and 6:00 PM. Grant crossed Germanna Ford in the early afternoon. Burnside’s IX Corps would not cross until the following day, since they were serving as the reserve. The crossing was slow given that the opposite bank of the river was steep. This would be James Wilson’s first field command and having someone so inexperienced command the vanguard of the assault would turn out to be a monumental mistake. Grant’s cavalry was commanded by General Philip Sheridan and divided into three divisions. The other two divisions with much more senior commanders (Alfred Torbert and David McMurtrie Gregg) would have been better choices. In addition, of the three cavalry divisions Wilson’s with 3,500 men was the smallest. Wilson was to screen the movements of the army and act as an advanced warning system, neither of which he performed well in the coming days. After crossing the ford, he passed the Wilderness Tavern where the Orange Turnpike intersected the Germanna Plank Road. After sending a scouting party down the turnpike he made the critical error of withdrawing them once Warren reached the intersection. He left the turnpike completely unguarded. Warren had no idea how close the Confederates were to the rear of his column. When he reached Parker’s Store on the Orange Plank Road Wilson assigned Colonel John Hammond’s 5th NY Cavalry to guard the road and headed off south toward the Catharpin Road. At Parker’s Store Hammond would come under attack from A.P. Hill’s Corps and battle them for several hours with no support. Wilson ran into Confederate Cavalry commanded by Brigadier General Thomas Rosser. After a skirmish he initially withdrew to Todd’s Tavern and then Chancellorsville where he would provide no information to the Union high command regarding the disposition of Confederate forces for the remainder of the battle.

After crossing, the V and VI Corps halted for the night. To the east the II Corps under Major General Winfield Scott Hancock was crossing at Ely’s Ford. General David McMurtry Gregg’s Cavalry Division reached the ford around 2:00 AM followed by Francis C. Barlow’s division. Federal engineers here would build two pontoon bridges similar to those constructed at Germanna Ford. Hancock’s Corps crossed and would bivouac around the Chancellorsville crossroads on the night of May 4th.

**Picture taken from the Ely’s Ford Road Bridge looking east (downstream)**

**Hancock’s II Corps would have crossed the ford and been coming down the road toward the camera**

**Wartime Wilderness Tavern dependency from the NPS**

Warren’s V Corps was on the road early on the morning of May 5th down the Germanna Plank Road. They passed through its intersection with the Orange Turnpike, near where the Wilderness Tavern was located. A map of the intersection (from Blue and Gray Magazine- see sources) and what remains of the Tavern are shown below. They then moved on the wartime Parker’s Store Road that led to Parker’s Store on the Orange Plank Road (ran parallel to the Orange Turnpike). The wartime road to Parker’s Store, not shown on the map, came off the Orange Turnpike just west of the Wilderness Run and went past Ellwood on its way to the Orange Plank Road.

If one faces the ruins looking west, the Wilderness Tavern would have been behind you in the median between the north and south bound lanes of modern-day Route 3.

**Ruins of part of the Wilderness Tavern complex**

**The ruins of the “dependency” probably the store of the tavern complex**

**This gravel road adjacent to the Wilderness Taven and heading west was part of the wartime Orange Turnpike**

Warren’s rear guard commanded by Brigadier General Charles Griffin was preparing to join the column when their pickets spotted some horseman in gray coming over the horizon on the Orange Turnpike. Using a spy glass, they could see the enemy moving into formation on both sides of the road. What he saw was the Second Corps of Lee’s army commanded by Lieutenant General Richard Ewell. When informed, Warren was shocked, the Confederates were supposed to be miles away (an issue created by Wilson’s failure to leave cavalry to picket the Orange Turnpike). Warren established his headquarters at Ellwood and sent word back to Grant and Meade at their headquarters. Grant’s orders were to attack immediately. The battle would soon be underway.