On the morning of May 5th the Confederates were advancing on three separate roads, Lieutenant General Richard Ewell on the Orange Turnpike, Lieutenant General A.P. Hill on the Orange Plank Road, and Lieutenant General James Longstreet on the Catharpin Road. Lee had hoped not to bring on a general engagement until all his Corps were up. As can be seen on the map below Ewell was significantly ahead of Hill and Lee ordered him to delay until Hill was on his right flank. Ewell halted his column, and his men began to dig in at the western end of Saunders Field. Some of the fortifications along the west end of Saunders Field are shown below from Driving Tour Stop #4.

At 5:00 AM Major General Gouverneur Warren’s V Corps began its march south toward Parker’s Store on the Orange Plank Road. Brigadier General Samuel Crawford’s division was in the lead, followed by Brigadier Generals James Wadsworth’s and John Robinson’s divisions. Warren’s last division commanded by Brigadier General Charles Griffin remained along the Orange Turnpike to protect the column’s right flank. They were about two miles west of the Wilderness Tavern along the eastern edge of Saunders Field when they saw a cloud of dust on the other side of the field along the turnpike which they mistook for Wilson’s cavalry. At this point Griffin received orders to rejoin the main column and was about to do so when the 1st MI were alerted by one of their men that the approaching column was Confederate infantry. General Griffin sent the 18th MA and 83rd PA forward about 8:00 AM on a reconnaissance to determine the strength of the Confederate force. Major General George Meade ordered Warren to halt his column, and to attack immediately with his entire Corps.

Warren ordered Griffin to establish a line across the Orange Turnpike. Wadsworth and Crawford were to form on his left and General Horatio Wright’s division of Sedgwick’s VI Corps on his right. Wright was to angle his men toward Saunders Field across the Culpeper Mine Road. However, Wright’s men were slow in getting up and Griffin was hesitant to attack with his right flank unprotected. Warren reiterated his order and Griffin moved forward around 1:00 PM, see map below. Ayers brigade was on the right. In his first line the 140th NY were along the Orange Turnpike, with rest of the line extending north to the wood line. Ayers 2nd line was made up of the 146th NY, and the 91st and 155th PA. General Joseph Bartlett’s brigade was to the left of the Orange Turnpike. South of Saunders Field in the woods on Bartlett’s left was Wadsworth’s division with General Lysander Cutler on the far left. Across the field was General Edward “Allegheny” Johnson of Ewell’s Corps aligned as shown in the map below. The problem for Griffin north of the Orange Turnpike can easily be seen from that map. When Wright’s division failed to get up to support Griffin’s right flank Confederate Generals Walker and Stafford had no Union soldiers in front of them and as a result moved to the northern edge of Saunders’ field. This forced Griffin’s force north of the turnpike to veer further to the north leaving a large hole in Ayers’ front line.

The images below of Saunders Field were taken from the north side of the Orange Turnpike first looking directly east and then west.

The next images are of the south side of the field looking sequentially from west to east. One can see how uneven the terrain is with several hills and a large swale that moves from southeast to northwest.

Two guns from Battery D of the 1st NY Artillery under Lieutenant W.H. Shelton on the south side of the turnpike fired across the road to try and prevent the Confederates from exploiting the gap, while Ayers 2nd line was sent forward (146th NY, and the 91st and 155th PA) to close it. The artillerymen were in a gully and could not see that most of their shells were landing within the lines of the 140th NY and not the Confederates. Ayers gave the order for his men to fall back but it didn’t reach the 140th and 146th NY. These two regiments were surrounded and had to fight their way out. Colonel David T. Jenkins of the 146th NY was killed. The 140th NY suffered 23 killed, 118 wounded and 113 missing from a total force of 529. Initially on the south side of the Orange Turnpike things went well for the Federals. Bartlett’s brigade was able to turn the right flank of Johnson’s division. Brigadier General John “Rum” Jones’ brigade broke and fled to the rear and Jones was killed. As Bartlett’s men rushed forward they were met by fire from their right from General Robert Rodes’ brigade, who had been behind and to the left of Jones across the Orange Turnpike (see map above), and were driven back. Griffin’s division now was falling back on both sides of the turnpike. The Confederates gained control of the two guns from the NY battery but had to abandon them under counter fire from the Federals. The Confederates recaptured them after darkness fell.

After the fighting ceased a very angry General Griffin went back to headquarters and sought out General Meade to vociferously complain about the lack of support on his right flank, lambasting Generals Wright and Warren. A member of Grant’s staff, General John Rawlins, witnessed the “discussion” and considered it so mutinous he wanted Griffin placed under arrest. When Grant asked Meade why he didn’t arrest this General Gregg, Meade calmly replied “It’s Griffin, not Gregg, and it’s only his way of talking.” Grant let it go, probably realizing he still had much to learn about this strange new army. Warren had been caught by surprise due to the incompetence of Wilson’s leadership of his cavalry division, but despite the fact that Wright did not support Griffin’s right the battle along the Orange Turnpike was stalemated for the time being.

To the south of Saunders Field at Higgerson’s Farm another battle was raging involving Brigadier General Wadsworth’s division of the V Corps, shown in the map below. Cutler’s brigade was on the right, with Colonel Roy Stone’s brigade in the center and General James Rice’s brigade to the left. They would be facing Major General Robert Rodes’ division of Ewell’s Corps with Brigadier General George Doles on the left and Brigadier General Junius Daniel on the right. The 19th IN of Cutler’s brigade (the Iron Brigade) stopped to reform on the right, in a clearing color bearer Sergeant Abram Buckles unfurled the unit’s colors initiating a charge that turned Doles right flank, an act for which he would be awarded the Medal of Honor. Stone’s brigade had to pass through a particularly difficult area along the southern edge of Wilderness Run which was very swampy. Because they were further behind than the rest of Wadsworth brigade a gap developed in the center. Gordon exploited that gap and was now directly between Cutler on his left and Rice on his right, as shown in the map below.

Higgerson’s Farm is west on Hill Ewell Drive (auto tour stop #5), the images below were shot with my back to the road from north to south.

Rather than fall back, Gordon decided to charge north and south at the same time, while also sending the 31st and 38th GA forward to attack Stone. He sent the 26th GA north to join Doles attack on the Iron Brigade and the 13th, 60th and 61st GA south to join Daniel in an attack on Rice. After halting the Federal advance they fell back to their original line. Wadsworth’s men fell back to Ellwood in disarray. On the way back a company of the 61st GA under Major James Van Valkenburg encountered the 7th PA Reserves (272 men) in the southwest corner of Higgerson’s Farm who had become separated from the main Union line. Valkenburg tricked the Federals into surrendering by shouting towards the woods asking General Gordon to bring up the rest of the brigade. Thinking they were facing superior numbers the Pennsylvanians surrendered. The 7th PA reserves were part of Crawford’s division of Warren’s V Corps that earlier in the day were at the head of the column headed to Parker’s store, see map below.

On the southern end of the battlefield, just before 8:00 AM, as Crawford’s men were crossing the Chewning Farm they heard gunfire coming from the direction of Parker’s Store a mile away on the Orange Plank Road. They arrived to find the 5th NY Cavalry heavily involved in a fire fight with Brigadier General William Kirkland’s brigade, the lead element of Major General A.P. Hills Corps. The NY Cavalry had been left there by their commander James Wilson before he moved on with the rest of his men west along the Catharpin Road. The 13th PA Reserves, a group of marksmen known as the “Bucktails”, equipped with 7-shot Spencer carbines were sent forward to aid the cavalry. On the road behind Kirkland was the rest of Major General Henry Heth’s division followed by Major General Cadmus Wilcox’s division. The Federals were hopelessly outnumbered. To fully comprehend the gravity of the problem the Confederate advance along the Orange Plank Road represented for the Army of the Potomac, one needs to understand the war-tine road system in the area, shown on the map below. A. P. Hill was headed toward Parker’s Store on the Orange Plank Road (red arrow). The road between the Wilderness Tavern and Todd’s Tavern is the Brock Road, the Brock Road runs southeast past Todd’s tavern to Spotsylvania Courthouse. The blue circle is the critical intersection of the Brock Road with the Orange Plank Road which is 3.5 miles east of Parker’s Store. Todd’s Tavern was 4.5 miles south of the intersection. The V Corps was north of the intersection and the II Corps south of it at Todd’s Tavern. If Hill could get to that intersection first he could cut off the II Corps from the rest of the Union Army. So the havoc that Wilson’s inexperience would wreak this day was not yet complete. He provided no reconnaissance information to Union headquarters on the 5th, the job of cavalry. A crisis was developing along the Orange Plank Road and if was not dealt with quickly Hancock’s II Corps would be cut off.

The Bucktails with their rapid firing rifles were able to halt Kirkland’s brigade. It was at this point that General Crawford received an order from Warren ordering him to pull back and take position on Wadsworth’s left for a possible assault on the Confederate line. At the time he issued the order Warren had just become aware of Ewell advancing on the Orange Turnpike. He and Union headquarters were completely unaware of Hill’s movement down the Orange Plank Road. Crawford notified Warren of the situation and withdrew the Bucktails back to the Chewning Farm. He received 2 more orders from Warren to move to the left of Wadsworth. Crawford uncomfortable with leaving the Chewning Farm sent the 2nd, 6th, 7th and 11th Reserves to join Wadsworth, however, by the time they arrived the Griffin-Wadsworth assault on Saunders Field Higginson’s Farm had been repulsed. Crawford pulled back to the Chewning Farm with the other half of his brigade. Instead of deciding to move all of his brigade to support Wadsworth or all of his brigade to Parkers Store to block Hill, Crawford’s decision not only failed to fully aid Wadsworth’s cause but opened the path for Hill to the Brock Road intersection.

Looking west up the hill at Chewning Farm (auto tour stop #6).

Looking east down the hill at Chewning Farm

By 10:30 AM Meade was aware of his predicament along the Orange Plank Road and the need to protect the Brock Road intersection. Hancock was ordered to head for the intersection, but at Todd’s Tavern he was a mile further away from it than Hill. Three of Brigadier General George Getty’s four divisions from Sedgwick’s VI Corps were sent toward the intersection. Getty and his staff arrived ahead of his men at 12:15 PM in time to see the 5th NY Cavalry fleeing down the Orange Plank Road toward them. Getty could see Hill’s men in the distance and the order was sent back for his men to join him at the double quick. Union Brigadier General Frank Wheaton’s brigade arrived with the Confederates advanced skirmishers only about 30 yards from the intersection, the Federals had won the race, but they needed to delay Heth’s Confederates until Hancock’s Corps could get up. Getty was ordered to attack, and he sent his three brigades forward against Henry Heth’s four brigades with Hancock funneling his II Corps units into position as they arrived, see map below. The Vermont brigade positioned south of the Orange Plank Road suffered heavy casualties (1,269). One of the first brigades of Hancock’s Corps to arrive was commanded by Brigadier General Alexander Hays where they were placed north of the Plank Road. They too suffered heavy casualties (1390), including their commander who was killed.

Lee sent in Cadmus Wilcox’s division from the area of the Chewning Farm to bolster Heth despite the fact that Wadsworth’s division which had now regrouped after breaking earlier in the battle was moving from Ellwood toward the farm. Around 7:30 PM Brigadier Francis Barlow’s division succeeded in turning Hill’s right flank. Wilcox sent Brigadier General James Lanes’ brigade to hold the line. Lee sent his last reserve the 5th Alabama Battalion of only 125 men to strike Wadsworth’s right flank, which incredibly surprised and halted the Federals.

The fighting along the Orange Turnpike picked up again later in the afternoon, as shown in the map above, with neither side gaining any real advantage. The Confederates, however lost Brigadier General Leroy Stafford, who was mortally wounded, and Brigadier General John Pegram who was wounded. As the day ended Lee knew that Longstreet would be up during the night and he planned to go on the offensive the following day. He had used the terrain to his advantage. The thick secondary growth forest of the Wilderness had stymied the Federal manpower advantage as maneuverability and visibility were difficult. The same factors had reduced the effectiveness of superior Union artillery. Grant’s aides felt that the General was disappointed by the lack of aggressiveness and initiative of the Army of the Potomac. Later in the evening when Grant learned that a reporter was heading back to Washington that evening, he asked him to convey a message to the President that the army was not turning back.

Next- The Battle of the Wilderness- May 6, 1864 (Day 2)

Sources

The Battle of the Wilderness, May 5-6, 1864 by Gordon C. Rhea

No Turning Back, Part 1, The Battle of the Wilderness May 5, 1864 by Gregory A. Mertz Blue and Gray Magazine Volume XII, Issue 4, 1995.

Hell Itself The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-7, 1864 by Chris Mackowski