A Lot of Maneuvering in the Rain and Mud with Very Little Fighting- May 13-17

Samuel Carroll

As the day dawned on the morning of the 13th the Federals awoke to find that the Confederates had disappeared from the Mule Shoe. General Samuel Carroll’s brigade and the 2nd US Sharpshooters were sent forward to locate them. As they advanced through the mud to the reserve line of earthworks they met Confederate skirmishers. General Carroll was shot in the left arm and command fell to Colonel Thomas Smyth. Advancing toward the McCoull farm the 140th PA came across two cannons, raising the total of cannons captured to 22 in the past 24 hours. As they reached the McCoull house they could now see for the first time Lee’s new line of earthworks on the crest beyond the Harrison house. Grant initially thought that the Confederates there were covering the retreat of Lee’s army. However, this intricate new earthwork at the base of the former Mule Shoe Salient was the strongest line made to date in the eastern theater. It sat on high ground overlooking an open field to the north with almost 30 cannon in place. Lee’s defensive line now stretched from the Po River on his left across the crest of Laurel Hill to the new line at the base of the former Mule Shoe salient. It then curled southeast to the Fredericksburg Road and beyond Spotsylvania Court House, shown on the map below. There still was a small salient in the line known as Heth’s Salient, named after General Henry Heth whose men occupied it, but it was well protected on high ground overlooking a marsh. By midmorning it was clear that Lee had moved back to a stronger position and wasn’t going anywhere.

Map from Blue and Gray Magazine Volume XXVII #6, 2011
Romeyn Ayers

Grant’s attacks on Laurel Hill on the Confederate left and the Mule Shoe in the center had failed. His next plan involved shifting his army to the east for an attack on the Confederate right. Moving his army from the Brock Road toward the Fredericksburg Road had several advantages. It would place him closer to the Telegraph Road, the main road to Richmond, and allow him to shorten and secure his supply line to Fredericksburg. He would move the V and VI Corps around the back of the army to Burnside’s left to the Fredericksburg Road, then the V Corps would move west down the road attacking Spotsylvania Court House supported by the VI Corps. Hancock would now be on the Union right and Wright on the left. They were ordered to move out at 4:00 AM on the 14th. The continuing rain and muddy roads slowed Warren as the V Corps moved past the Landrum house, forded the Ni River, and marched past the Stevens house and Harris farm toward the Fredericksburg Road in the dark.. The march bogged down when it began to rain heavily. At 6:30 AM, on the morning of the 14th only 2500 men from Warren’s Corps were in position. The rest of his corps and Wright’s Corps were strung out along the way. Warren noticed that Myer’s Hill, three quarters of a mile to the southeast of his position near the Fredericksburg Road, was held by only a token Confederate force. Warren felt that the hill was an excellent spot for artillery to bombard the town. He ordered Brigadier General Romeyn Ayers to take the hill, see map below.

Map from Blue and Gray Magazine Volume XXVII #6, 2011
John Chambliss

Ayers sent the 91st PA and 140th NY there where they encountered Confederate cavalry from Brigadier General John Chambliss’ brigade (9th VA Cavalry). They easily pushed the cavalry back and captured the hill. Brigadier General Emory Upton from the VI Corps had also noticed the strategic value of Myers Hill and went directly to Grant to get permission to take it. By the time Upton got there at 10:00 AM with his 800 men Ayers had already taken the hill. Upton expecting a counterattack from Early’s Third Corps quickly set about entrenching and placing lookouts on the roof of the Myers house. He also called for reinforcements and received the 2nd and 10th NJ bringing his total force to 1200 men. Upton was correct, to the south Jubal Early now commanding the Third Corps witnessed the action and launched a counterattack sending Brigadier General Ambrose Wright’s five GA regiments, as well as four regiments from Brigadier General Nathaniel Harris and the members of Chambliss’s Cavalry that were originally on the hill. As they advanced they were spotted by Upton’s lookouts on the Myers’ house roof. Upton sent the 96th PA and two companies of the 2nd PA toward them. The Confederates easily brushed them aside and drove Upton’s men off the hill.

Map from Blue and Gray Magazine Volume XXVII #6, 2011

Meade and several staff members were on their way to Myers Hill when Upton’s men fleeing the assault ran past them. Meade was nearly captured by the Confederates chasing them. Infuriated, Meade ordered the VI Corps’ commander Horatio Wright to use his entire Corps and the entire V Corps to retake the hill if needed. With the aid of artillery General Ayers retook Myers Hill. The Federals now controlled Fredericksburg Road.

Joseph Kershaw

May 15th brought more rain and Lee remained unsure as to what the previous day’s actions represented. In order to determine where the Federal’s right flank was located he sent Brigadier General Joseph Kershaw and Brigadier General Thomas Rosser’s Laurel Brigade of cavalry on a reconnaissance in force around the Union right. Kershaw caught the tail end of Hancock’s II Corps, David Birney’s division, on the Landrum Farm as they were leaving to move behind the Union line to relocate to the Federal left toward Fredericksburg Road. A sharp fight ensued, which Kershaw broke off at 1:00 PM after accomplishing his mission. He knew the VI Corps was gone and that the II Corps on the Landrum Farm was the Union’s right flank.

Edward Ferrero

Rosser’s cavalry moved north around the Union right to Todd’s Tavern and then east on the Catharpin Road. Just east of the Catharpin Road’s intersection with the Piney Branch Road near the Ni River they encountered the 2nd OH Cavalry. Several of the Yankees were bathing in the river and the 2nd OH fled north toward the Aldrich farm at the intersection of the Orange Plank and Catharpin Roads. In this area, behind Federal lines, were located Union hospitals and supply wagons under the guard of Brigadier General Edward Ferrero. Here a division of US Colored Troops (USCT) was guarding a wagon train. Brigadier General Edward Ferrero organized the men. Ferrero commanded a division of USCTs attached to the IX Corps, which had never seen combat. As the 11th and 35th VA Cavalry advanced, Ferrero deployed the 23rd and 30th USCT across the Plank Road to meet them.

The four images below were taken just north of the intersection of the Catharpin Road with the Orange Plank Road. With my back to the intersection at 38.2866176, -77.6160093 they move from west to east. Part of the battle occurred in these fields.

Rosser’s men dismounted but after a few volleys were fired and it became clear they were up against an entire division, they withdrew. This was the first time USCTs were in combat against the Army of Northern Virginia and they emerged victorious. These two reconnaissances told Lee that Grant was concentrating his forces for a move against his right flank along the Fredericksburg Road. The action involving the USCTs is interpreted along the Catharpin Road in two locations.

38.2753889, -77.6251667
38.2753889, -77.6251667
38.2824722, -77.6211944

Rosser’s men would have chased the 2nd OH Cavalry across this field near the above sign, pictures taken at 38.2820789, -77.6213955.

On May 16th, as it continued to rain, Grant readjusted his plan for the assault on the Confederate right. Rather than move down the Fredericksburg Road he decided instead to attack down the Massaponax Church Road a mile and a half further south. It would be once again led by Hancock’s II Corps supported by Wright’s VI Corps. Burnside’s IX Corps would support the breakthrough with Warren serving as a reserve. He also asked for more reinforcements from Washington. The sun finally returned from vacation on May 17th giving the men in the trenches on both sides a chance to dry out. A reconnaissance carried out by the 3rd and 10th VT showed that Lee had readjusted his men to bolster his right.
Grant needed a new plan. He would now move the II and VI Corps behind the army back to the Federal right after dark on the 17th and attack Lee’s new line south of the former Mule Shoe Salient at first light on May 18th.

Next- The Killing Fields of the Mule Shoe Part 3- May 18, 1864