Grant would move Hancock and Wright’s Corps behind the Union line on the evening of the 17th and attack on the Union right, as shown in the map below. The area of Lee’s line he had chosen to attack was manned by the Confederate Second Corps of Richard Ewell who were well rested having not seen action since the 13th with plenty of time to strengthen their works, whereas Hancock and Wright’s men had spent much of that same time marching back and forth behind Union lines in rain and mud. Ewell’s line was protected by abatis, log reinforced walls, multiple traverses, and battery placements. Grant’s men would be attacking the strongest field fortification made in the eastern theatre up to this point. Behind that line would be two divisions, a total of about 8,000 men. The division on the right would be commanded by Major General John Gordon, while Major General Robert Rodes commanded the left, both excellent division commanders.

Hancock aligned two of his own divisions and one from Wright’s VI Corps for the attack, the others were still on the road. The VI Corps was slow to get into position and as a result only one of its divisions, commanded by Brigadier General Thomas Neill, was in place on the right. The II Corps was on their left from the area of Doles’s Salient to the Bloody Angle. Burnside’s IX Corps lined up across from Heth’s Salient and were ordered to hold the Confederates there in place. Warren was asked only to provide artillery support, shown on the map below.

Neill aligned his men with each of his four brigades stacked behind the other (Frank Wheaton, Oliver Edwards, Daniel Bidwell, then Lewis Grant). To Neill’s right was one brigade from Rickett’s division. To Neill’s left as shown in the map below was Gibbon’s Second Division of the II Corps with Francis Barlow’s First Division to Gibbon’s left. The two II Corps divisions were aligned two brigades wide and two brigades deep. Birney’s Third Division of the II Corps was at the Landrum farm as a reserve.

The battle opened with a massive Federal artillery bombardment, the largest in the east since the third day at Gettysburg. Fifty guns from the V Corps and 48 guns from the IX Corps opened fire at 4:00 AM. The Federals advanced to McCoull’s Farm where they met Confederate skirmishers. When they got within 300 yards of the Confederate line, Long’s 29 guns opened with canister from Lee’s new line. The field the Federals had to cross is shown below. The images were taken at stop #4 on the driving tour (Harrison’s House). It dips down before moving uphill to where the copse of trees is located in the second picture (the area of the Harrison House) before leveling out. Lee new line and guns were located in the open just slightly behind where the modern-day tree line is located.

On the right the 93rd and 102nd PA followed the western leg of the Mule Shoe and got separated from the rest of the division. Trying to realign they passed across the front of the enemy guns and suffered heavy losses. The Confederate works on this part of the battlefield were simply too strong.

At Heth’s Salient Burnside only sent half of his men forward (First Division- Major General Thomas Crittenden, Second Division- Major General Robert Potter). They faced Brigadier General Joseph Davis’ brigade from Heth’s Division and Brigadier General Alfred Scales Brigade from Cadmus Wilcox’s division. Unfortunately, Crittenden’s first brigade was led by an incompetent political appointee, Brigadier General James Ledlie. Unaware of a curve in the Confederate line Ledlie led his men into an open field where Davis’ brigade could fire across their flank completely routing them. Burnside’s advance completely fell apart. Both assaults were called off by 9:00 AM with over 1500 Union casualties compared to only about 250 for the Confederates. Also on this morning Grant got more bad news, Breckinride had defeated Sigel at New Market and Beauregard repulsed Butler at Drewry’s Bluff. Grant immediately drafted orders to remove Sigel.

After multiple maneuvers and marches by Grant had failed he was now ready to move once again around Lee’s right this time toward the North Anna River. As he withdrew his men from the battlefield he had Wright’s Corps head from the extreme right to the extreme left. Hancock was moved to the Harris Farm area, see map below.

On the evening of the 18th Lee called a council of war. He was getting reports that Grant was moving his army away from the day’s battlefield toward the Fredericksburg Road. Normally, Lee would rely on Stuart’s Cavalry to provide him with reliable reconnaissance of Federal troop movements but Stuart was dead having been killed at Yellow Tavern on the 13th in a battle with Sheridan’s Cavalry. He would be forced to use his infantry for that purpose. Ewell being on the far left of Lee’s line and was the logical choice to locate the Union right flank. However, Lee had lost confidence in his Second Corps commander. Reluctantly, he would use Ewell’s Corps for the reconnaissance the next day.

Next- Battle of Spotsylvania Court House Driving Tour- Stop 3