A Reconnaissance in Force Goes Wrong- The Battle of Harris Farm- May 19, 1864

Robert O. Tyler

Grant viewed the Confederate position as impregnable and as he had done in the Wilderness now planned to move further south around Lee’s right flank. Wright’s VI Corps would move behind the Union lines toward the Massaponax Church Road as the first step in that process. Lee, however, had a plan of his own which was to send Ewell Corps around the Union right in a wide arc in a reconnaissance in force. On the afternoon of the 19th Major General Robert Rodes led a column of 6000 men and six cannon. Ewell left the rest of his guns behind to defend his line, which would be held by Kershaw’s Division called up from its reserve position south of town. Rodes’ men marched north up the Brock Road and then northeast on Gordon Road. After crossing the Ni River they passed the Armstrong and Steven’s farms. They arrived in the area of the Harris, Peyton and Alsop farms, which was now the right flank of the Army of the Potomac where part of the II and V Corps were located protecting the Fredericksburg Road, the new Union supply route. Many of the men here were recent arrivals from Washington. They were from heavy artillery units that had been assigned to the infantry, most had no previous combat experience. Grant was stripping the defenses in Washington in order to replace the men lost in the campaign so far. The heavy artillery units were under the command of Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler.

Stephen Ramseur

Tyler and Colonel Howard Kitching who commanded the First Brigade of the Artillery Reserve placed the 4th NY HA on the crest of a hill between the Harris and Alsop farms. Rodes moved Ramseur’s brigade of about 600 men forward where they encountered the 4th NY HA. The green Federals were having trouble against the battle hardened Confederate veterans. The 1st MA HA joined the fight to the right of the 1st MA HA. Together the two units numbered about 2000 men. Even though they were artillerists Ramseur was outnumbered by more than 3:1. Ewell then sent forward Gordon’s division to the left of Rodes. Two of Gordon’s brigades made it to the Fredericksburg Road and plundered Union wagons. Federal reinforcements arrived from the north as the 1st ME Heavy Artillery was moved south down the Fredericksburg Road to reinforce the Army of the Potomac. Grant and Meade were at their headquarters 1.5 miles southeast on the Anderson farm where they heard the battle raging. They sent reinforcements from the II, V, and VI Corps to deal with the threat in their rear. Birney’s brigade arrived and bolstered the right flank. Additional Federal regiments arrived down the Fredericksburg Road including the 1st, 4th, 7th and 8th MD. Ewell far behind enemy lines on a reconnaissance mission had brought on a general engagement, see the map below.

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Lee, aware of Ewell’s predicament tried to send Jubal Early’s Third Corps to help but Hancock blocked the way. Ewell managed to hold his own until darkness fell when he was able to extricate himself. This debacle only strengthened Lee’s resolve to get rid of Ewell. He had suffered 1,000 casualties, 15% of his force, on a reconnaissance mission, men Lee could ill afford to lose. A few days later Ewell became ill and was sent to Richmond to recuperate and Jubal Early would become the permanent commander of the Second Corps. Grant’s plan to move around Lee’s right would have to wait another day.

The battle here is interpreted at the Harris farm site shown below.

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Next- Grant Moves South and Timothy O’Sullivan