After the death of Jeb Stuart at Yellow Tavern rather than name a successor General Lee chose to have each of his three cavalry division commanders (Major Generals Fitzhugh Lee, Wade Hampton and William H.F. “Rooney” Lee) report directly to him. The reason for this is unclear. Fitzhugh Lee who was closest to Stuart of the three would have been a logical choice but of the three Wade Hampton was the senior officer. So in order to not ruffle any feathers Lee chose no one. This would make for an awkward situation in battles such as Haw’s Shop when all three generals had troops on the field at the same time.
On May 28th Meade directed Sheridan to conduct a demonstration toward Mechanicsville to locate the Army of Northern Virginia. Most of Sheridan’s Cavalry was tied up protecting the Union infantry. Torbert’s division guarded the river crossings and Wilson’s division was serving as rear guard. This left only Gregg’s division to carry out Meade’s order, a total of about 3,500 men. Accordingly at 8:00 AM Sheridan ordered Brigadier General David McMurtry Gregg to move his cavalry division to Haw’s Shop in preparation for a reconnaissance. Henry Davies brigade led the advance headed by Major Henry Avery’s 360-man 10th NY Cavalry. Haw’s Shop was a key intersection where 5 roads met, two of them headed toward Richmond. At Haw’s Shop Gregg’s men turned west on Atlee Station Road. Salem Church is located at the Haw’s Shop intersection (modern day Studley). During the battle it would serve as a field hospital and General George Custer’s headquarters.
General Lee would order his cavalry to conduct a similar mission that same day. The cavalry contingent included: Wade Hampton would lead the brigades of Thomas Rosser (Hampton), the 4th and 5th SC (Hampton); Brigadier General Williams Wickham (reported to Fitzhugh Lee); and Rooney Lee’s division. A total of about 4500 men. At 8:00 AM they left Atlee’s Station toward Haw’s Shop and were moving east on the very same road (Atlee Station Road) as Gregg’s men. Wickham’s brigade was in the lead.
Avery ordered Captain Martin Blynn of the 10th NY to scout west with his squad. Blynn halted in the woods near Enon Church and aligned his men into a line perpendicular to the road. He then ordered Lieutenant Truman White to proceed west with Company D. After a half mile White posted a picket line under Sergeant Alfred Edson, and continued west with the rest of his company. The 2nd VA Cavalry, at the head of Hampton’s column, was headed straight for them, commanded by Colonel Thomas T. Munford. Munford had ordered Lieutenant Robert Wilson to scout ahead with the regiment’s 1st Squadron, a total of about 20 men. The New Yorkers upon seeing the advancing Confederates fell back to the picket line. When Lieutenant Wilson’s 1st squadron charged, Lieutenant Truman’s Company D fell back once more to Enon Church. When the rest of the 2nd VA joined the charge the 10th NY raced back to the Haw House where Davies was headquartered. The 1st PA Cavalry under Colonel John Taylor was just arriving there and Davies ordered them to attack the 2nd VA driving Munford’s men back into the woods past the Enon Church where they erected barricades and waited for the rest of Wickham’s brigade to come up. Davies deployed his men near the church, as shown in the map below. When Hampton and Fitz Lee came up they deployed the rest of Wickham’s brigade and Thomas Rosser’s 7th VA, as shown below. The fighting continued for several hours.
Davies advanced the 6th OH to the north of the road between the 10th NY and 4th PA. Here they charged through the woods toward Colonel Thomas Marshall’s 7th VA. Captain Délos Northway of the 6th OH was shot in the head at the front his squadron and killed. Action became so heavy around the Haw House that the Federals moved their field hospital there back to the Salem Church after an unexploded artillery shell landed under one of their operating tables. Around 11:00 AM Fitz Lee ordered the 4th SC to the Confederate right to aid Wickham. When the crisis there was over Hampton moved the South Carolinians back. For many of them this was their first time in combat. Gregg advanced the 1st NJ Cavalry and sent a dispatch back to Sheridan for additional men. Fitz Lee moved the 4th SC (Colonel William Stokes) and Hampton the 5th SC (Colonel John Dunovant) back into line, as shown on the map below. Colonel John Kester shifted a few battalions of his 1st NJ to the right to counter Dunovant. The 1st PA reinforced by a few companies of the 1st NJ temporarily broke through Wickham’s line but Fitz Lee plugged the gap with the 20th GA.
Between 3-4:00 PM reinforcements from both sides arrived. Colonel Chambliss’s brigade from Rooney Lee’s division was ordered to the left. With most of the Federal infantry across the Pamunkey, Torbert’s three brigades were now free and were ordered to Haw’s Shop. Merritt’s Reserve Brigade was sent to Gregg’s right. Devin sent the 17th PA to Gregg’s right and kept the rest of his men at Haw’s Shop as a reserve, shown on the map below.
Torbert’s last brigade arrived under Custer and attacked Wickham’s division on the left, shown below. Dismounted cavalry from the 6th PA charged Chambliss’s skirmish line and drove them back. Confederate artillery under McGregor stalled the Federal advance. Lieutenant Edward Williston’s Battery D, 2nd United States Artillery, countered and both sides engaged in an artillery duel on the north side of the battlefield. It was at this time that a critical error was made that completely turned the tide of the battle. Rooney Lee mistook the dismounted 6th PA and their supporting guns for infantry, and requested permission to withdraw his men which Hampton granted. This resulted in a domino effect when Merritt’s Reserve Brigade attacked Rosser’s now exposed left flank driving him off, which exposed Wickham’s left flank driving his men off as well. Custer seeing the Confederate withdrawal charged and drove off the 20th GA, 4th SC and 3rd VA on the far Confederate right, capturing several South Carolinians.
Custer’s and some of Gregg’s men chased the Confederates west down the road. As the Confederates withdrew from the battlefield General Lee had sent Breckinridge’s division east on the Atlee Station Road to reinforce Hampton but they arrived too late and helped cover the cavalry’s withdrawal.
Casualty estimates vary between about 350-390 for each side. For the Confederates the majority came from the newer regiments the 4th and 5th SC and the 20th GA with the exception of Wickham’s brigade. The 4th South Carolina lost 127 of its 300 men. The 5th SC suffered 31 casualties. The 20th Georgia Battalion lost a little over 80 men including 5 officers (colonel, major, captain, 2 lieutenants). Wickham reported 12 killed, 64 wounded, and 10 missing. For the Federals Gregg’s division, which did most of the fighting, lost 30 officers and 220 men. Custer division lost 6 officers and 109 men. Very heavy losses considering that they entered the fray so late in its course. Among notables killed were Lieutenant Colonel John M. Millen, commander of the 20th GA, and Private John Huff of the 5th MI, the man thought to have killed Jeb Stuart at Yellow Tavern.
The battle is interpreted at the Enon Church by a Civil War Trails sign and two monuments.
One odd aspect of the battle was that Wright’s and Hancock’s Corps were close by but were never engaged in the battle. Wright’s VI Corps crossed at Nelson’s Bridge and quickly began to entrench along Crump’s Creek. Its northern end was on the Pamunkey River and its southern end on Dr. Pollard’s farm. Neill held the upper portion of the line, Russell formed on Neill’s left, Ricketts’s division was camped on Dr. Pollard’s farm. Hancock’s II Corps marched behind Wright’s entrenchments and aligned to Wright’s left. Gibbon’s division was on the Pollard farm, as was Rickett’s to his left. Barlow aligned on Gibbon’s left, and Birney’s division furthest south carried the line to the area of the Salem Church. These men were only about a mile from Enon Church. Years later Sheridan in his memoirs would claim that Meade refused to send him reinforcements but this seems unlikely given that there is no record of him ever requesting them. Another illustration of how the poor relationship between Meade and Sheridan manifested itself on the battlefield.
Next- The Road to Totopotomoy Creek- Part 3