As the sun came up on May 30th General Robert E. Lee, for the most part, felt good about his position on the south bank of Totopotomoy Creek. He had his corps in excellent position to block a Federal advance along the road from Hanover Court House, the Atlee Station Road, the Shady Grove Road and the Old Church Road, shown on the map above. His left flank was well covered by Fitzhugh Lee’s and Gilbert Wright’s cavalry. He did, however, have concerns about his right flank. Grant had slipped by his right flank three times in the month of May and Lee was worried he might try it again. As can be seen in the map, only five miles southeast of Early’s position was another major intersection at Old Cold Harbor where five roads converged. If the Federals gained that intersection they would have access to roads that led to Richmond and to make matters worse for Lee, Sheridan’s cavalry camped at Old Church were only 4 miles away from the intersection with nothing in their path. Matthew Butler’s SC cavalry along with a brigade of South Carolinians under Brigadier General Martin Gary were responsible for guarding the right flank. Lee was on the lookout for any activity in that sector suggesting a move toward Old Cold Harbor. This would be a logical move if Grant were concerned with capturing Richmond, which he was not. Grant’s pattern had been the same all month. He would fight Lee’s army wherever he found them until it became obvious that their fortifications were impregnable. Then he would move on to a different location hoping that Lee would come out from behind his defenses and go on the offensive, which with a few minor exceptions Lee had not done. Grant and Meade would spend most of the day on the 30th moving their forces into a line that fronted Lee’s on Totopotomoy Creek and probing for weaknesses.

Wright’s VI Corps on the right was ordered to move south from Hanover Court House and connect with Hancock’s right flank. Hancock’s II Corps in the center was to finish moving up on the Atlee Station Road and probe Breckinridge’s line across Totopotomoy Creek. Warren’s V Corps was to cross Totopotomoy Creek and move west along Shady Grove Road toward Hundley’s Corner. Burnside’s IX Corps was to occupy and fill the gap between Hancock and Warren. The Army of the Potomac would then form a continuous five-mile line across Lee’s front, shown on the map above. Sheridan’s cavalry was stationed in the army’s rear near Old Church guarding the supply lines and was to protect Smith’s XVIII Corps as they arrived. In the center, under Hancock, Birney and Barlow were already in place with Birney furthest north. Hancock’s final division under Gibbon reached Polly Hundley’s Corner near sunrise. Gibbon would take up position to Barlow’s left the furthest south of Hancock’s three divisions.

Most of the action during the day in the center consisted of skirmishing, sharpshooter activity and a long range artillery duel with neither side accomplishing anything of real significance. Burnside was to connect with Hancock’s left flank and extend his corps south to link up with Warren. This would prove a challenge because the area Burnside’s men would be traversing on the south side of Totopotomoy Creek was swampy and thick with vegetation. In addition, since both ends of those two lines were in motion for a good part of the day, keeping up with them was difficult. Griffin’s division of Warren’s V Corps was already across Totopotomoy Creek. At 7:00 AM Warren ordered Griffin to send a brigade west along Shady Grove Road toward Hundley’s Corner until they found the enemy. Griffin selected Sweitzer’s brigade for the task. Colonel William Tilton’s 22nd MA was in the lead followed by the 4th MI. The going was slow as they ran into heavy resistance from skirmishers from Pegram’s Brigade. So much so that they were relieved later in the morning by the 32nd MA and 62nd PA with Ayer’s and Bartlett’s brigades following. Warren had been interrogating prisoners and knew that he was facing the Confederate Second Corps. At 11:00 AM he ordered Griffin to halt his division since there was still no sign of Burnside on his right. Warren was very concerned about his left where he had seen no evidence of Sheridan’s Cavalry.

Wright had a significant logistical problem reuniting the two parts of his widely separated corps, as can be seen from a section of Jespersen’s map. He would have Russell’s men move alongside the Virginia Central Railroad through Peake’s Station where they would deviate onto the Mechanicsville Road. Ricketts’s and Neill’s brigades would march as shown on the map. Wright hoped to have his men united along Totopotomoy Creek in a line facing south before sunset. Brigadier General Emory Upton’s 95th and 96th PA were at the head of Russell’s column and encountered heavy resistance from Major General Fitzhugh Lee’s Cavalry as well as A.P. Hill’s skirmishers and were forced to move back. Ricketts was now in Russell’s vicinity at Cash’s Corner and when supply wagons came up Wright decided to stop his men for lunch while formulating his next steps. Wright’s men were able to break through the cavalry screen and around 5:00 PM Ricketts’ lead elements merged with the right flank of Birney’s line, Russell’s men aligned to their right, and Neill’s brigade on the far right.

The Battle of Bethesda Church

As all this was happening Lee received intelligence from a trusted source, a scout named S. Franklin Stringfellow, who was observing activities beyond the Confederate far right flank near Old Church. He stated that Federal cavalry were there and were moving south toward Cold Harbor and concluded that he believed Grant was concentrating a large force on his left and contemplating a move in that direction. This was partly true, Sheridan was at Old Church but he was not moving toward Cold Harbor and Grant was not massing his troops to the left or contemplating a move toward Cold Harbor. However, this was the maneuver that Lee feared the most and that he was anticipating. General Lee decided to go on the offensive. His intelligence had told him that Warren’s corps, moving west on Shady Grove Road, was isolated from the rest of the Army of the Potomac on the south side of Totopotomoy Creek. If he could attack them before they were reinforced he could destroy the corps. Time was of the essence and Lee would have to attack before Warren could be reinforced. Lee sent dispatches to Early and Anderson describing his thought process and inquiring of Early as to the feasibility. Early described his situation and proposed advancing Rodes’ division as a probe east along Old Church Road to determine the size of the force he faced. If he had to, he could move his remaining two divisions (Ramseur and Gordon) up in support which would required Anderson to slot into his place along Shady Grove Road.

Meanwhile, Warren remained irritated with the lack of cavalry support he was getting from Sheridan along the Old Church Road. When Sheridan sent him only three squadrons from the 17th PA Cavalry, Warren decided to take matters into his own hands. He ordered Crawford to send a brigade to clear the Old Church Road and at 2:30 PM Colonel Martin Hardin’s brigade started south joining the road at Bethesda Church. Crawford also sent the 6th and 15th NY Heavy Artillery commanded by Colonel G. Howard Kitching toward Bethesda Church and halted them facing west near Hardin’s brigade on Old Church Road. In the meantime, Griffin was still slowly advancing on Shady Grove Road, followed by Cutler, see map below. Around 2:00 PM Early sent Rodes’s division toward the Old Church Road on trails that were cut from Shady Grove Road. Ramseur’s division was behind him with Gordon’s division held in reserve. Anderson was to attack Warren’s column on Shady Grove Road holding Griffin and Cutler in place while Rodes and Ramseur moved around Warren’s left flank, attacking him from two directions simultaneously. By 3:00 PM Hardin’s brigade had reached the Old Church Road and started to entrench. Major W. Ross Hartshorne led parts of the 1st and 13th PA Reserves to reconnoiter west along the Old Church Road. As they advanced they were attacked by Rodes’s Confederates under Brigadier General Bryan Grimes, see maps below. Overwhelmed the Pennsylvanians fell back.

The North Carolinians continued forward to the intersection at the Tinsley’s Farm where they flanked and routed the rest of Hardin’s smaller force sending them streaming back toward Shady Grove Road and the Bowles Farm. Kitching’s men, already positioned on the road to Bethesda Church were ordered forward to support Hardin. Fisher, further north at the Bowles farm was ordered to follow. Rodes division headed north from Bethesda Church with Ramseur to his left. Captain Thomas’ four-gun Confederate battery moved into position near the church and fired on the fleeing Federals. As Kitching advanced, Hardin’s men rushed past him headed in the opposite direction with Rodes close behind. Most of Kitching’s men followed Hardin’s with the exception of one battalion who fought a delaying action as Warren prepared his lines along the Shady Grove Road. Fortunately for Warren as Rodes’ and Ramseur’s divisions rapidly advanced their lines became intermingled and disorganized requiring a halt to the chase while they were reorganized for the coming assault to the north.

This delay gave Warren a chance to organize his men as shown in the map below. As can been seen, he organized his line in such a way that as the Confederates advanced they would encounter fire not only from Hardin and Fisher in their front but also enfilading fire from Kitching and Lockwood to their right. They would also face fire in both directions from artillery as well. It was a brilliant defensive formation. Early ordered Ramseur to send a brigade forward to test the strength of the position. Pegram’s 500-man brigade was sent forward under Colonel Edward Willis. Around 6:00 PM when Willis’ men were about 200 yards from the Federals they came under massive fire from two directions by Federal infantry and artillery. Colonel Willis was mortally wounded. Lieutenant Tucker Randolph, his staff officer, and the commanders of the 15th and 52nd VA were killed (Colonel J. B. Terrill and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Watkins). As the line officers were cut down there were very left to give orders. To make matters worse for Early his plan depended on the simultaneous attack by Anderson on Warren moving east along Shady Grove Road. Anderson sent Pickett’s division forward but when he came up against Griffin’s entrenchments, Pickett abandoned the attempt. Anderson sent Field’s division behind Pickett but they arrived too late. By 7:30 PM Early had withdrawn his men. When Warren came under attack Meade had ordered a series of assaults all across the line, which he now called off. Early had suffered heavy losses. Pegram’s brigade suffered 270 casualties from a total of only 500 men. Four of its colonels were dead or wounded, while two-thirds of the men in the 49th VA were casualties.

The Battle of Matadequin Creek

Sheridan was at Old Church because it was an important intersection to protect for his missions of guarding the Federal supply depot and Smith’s XVIII Corps’ landing, both of which were at the White House on the Pamunkey River. A road from Old Church ran southeast twelve miles to the White House. A second road ran west to Bethesda Church then on to Mechanicsville beyond Warren’s left flank. Finally a third road, Bottoms Bridge Road, ran south. After a mile and a half it intersected with the road that ran west to Old Cold Harbor. As Warren continued to protest to headquarters that his left flank was unguarded Sheridan finally ordered Torbert to cover the roads off Warren’s left flank. Torbert assigned Colonel Thomas Devin’s brigade already camped near Old Church the task. Warren’s request was for cavalry to patrol the Old Church Road, but somehow the message got lost in translation and Devin thought he was to picket the Cold Harbor Road. He placed a reserve at Matadequin Creek on the Bottoms Bridge Road and advanced a squadron of 17th PA Cavalry south three-quarters of a mile to where Bottoms Bridge Road intersected Cold Harbor Road at the Barker farm, see map above.

Lee had asked his cavalry commander Mathew Butler to reconnoiter toward Cold Harbor to determine if indeed the Federals were attempting to turn his flank. Butler headed there with the 4th SC Cavalry commanded by Colonel Rutledge, the 5th SC Cavalry led by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Jeffords, and Martin Gary’s brigade, a total of 2,000 men. Butler passed through Old Cold Harbor and neared the Barker farm sometime between 1:00 and 2:00 P.M. His skirmishers easily pushed back the squadron of the 17th PA to Matadequin Creek. Devin advanced an additional two squadrons of the 17th PA forward under Major Coe Durland. Durland’s countercharge drove Butler’s skirmishers back south through the intersection. Devin assumed he was facing a small force until about an hour later Butler’s entire 2,000 men raced across the fields of the Barker farm. Devin rapidly advanced the 6th and 9th NY from Old Church to Matadequin Creek. The New Yorkers dismounted in a line behind the creek facing south, the 6th NY to the right of the 17th PA west of the road and the 9th New York to the 17th PA’s left on the other side of the road. Butler deployed the 4th SC west of the road facing north and the 5th South Carolina east of the road. Torbert rode up and assessing the situation ordered the rest of the division to the creek. Merritt’s Reserve Brigade arrived first along with Williston’s artillery battery.

The 2nd US Regulars advancing with the 6th NY Cavalry pushed back the 4th SC. The Charleston Light Dragoons advanced to halt the breakthrough. On the east side of the road the 9th NY drove Rebel skirmishers back until they encountered Jeffords’s 5th SC behind fence rails on the south bank. The 9th New York, commanded by Colonel William Sackett, tried to force a crossing over the creek but failed. Merritt ordered Captain Charles L. Leiper’s 6th PA Cavalry to try and outflank the 5th SC. They crossed the creek but couldn’t push the South Carolinians back. Leiper was severely wounded, and Lieutenant Stephen Martin killed. Then Custer and his four Michigan regiments arrived. They dismounted with Alger’s 5th MI to the right of the road, Magoffin’s 1st MI and Walker’s 7th MI to the left, and Kidd’s 6th MI in reserve. The 5th MI moved around the Confederates left while the 1st and 7th MI moved forward. Flanked on their left Rutledge’s 4th SC retreated south. As Magoffin’s and Walker’s men advanced across the creek, the 4th South Carolina broke. The Charleston Light Dragoons now flanked on the left by Magoffin and Walker broke as well. Lieutenant Nowell, commanding the Dragoons, was captured. His 28-man unit suffered 50% casualties. East of the road the ravines provided Jeffords’s 5th SC excellent protection until the 4th SC crumbled on the west side of the road and they too retreated. The 7th SC, which had been in reserve south of the creek, counterattacked but were no match for the Wolverine’s carbines. The Battle of Matadequin Creek was over and Confederate cavalry were driven off the battlefield once again. Butler informed Lee that he thought he faced only cavalry and not infantry but that information came at a high price. Butler had lost a total of 188 men (4th SC- 52, 5th SC- 16, 7th SC- 82, 20th GA Battalion, who came up late- 38). The area of the battle is shown on the satellite image below.

At the end of the day the Army of Northern Virginia had suffered two defeats along its right flank. Grant now had control of the Shady Grove Road and Old Church Road. In addition, Lee learned that Grant would soon be reinforced with a large contingent of men from Major General Benjamin Butler on Bermuda Hundred. Lee’s line was already six miles long and overextended with Hill’s division to the north near the Virginia Central Railroad extending south to Early’s division at the Old Church Road. Lee was very uneasy that he could not cover the important intersection at Old Cold Harbor. Grant could potentially station his new reinforcements there to protect it without having to move any of his men that were currently in front of Lee’s lines. Lee desperately needed reinforcements and late in the evening Confederate President Jefferson Davis authorized the transfer of Hoke’s division from just south of Richmond to join Lee. If Lee could get those reinforcements to Old Cold Harbor and control the roads there he could block Grant’s path to Richmond. The question now was could he get them there before Grant and Meade arrived in force. That story will continue in the Battle of Cold Harbor Series.

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