On August 24th Lee, Jackson, Longstreet and Stuart met here in a field. A table was set up with four chairs out of earshot of anyone and the four discussed the next stage of the campaign.

The meeting was held in this field just behind the marker above.

Lee would split his army. Jackson with his 24,000 men would move around Pope’s right flank to his rear and cut his supply line along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. A marker in Gainesville summarizes the move around Pope’s Army.

Longstreet would hold the Rappahannock line and after Jackson accomplished his mission Longstreet and Lee would rush to join him. Jackson sketched out the plan for the maneuver with his boot in the dirt. It was a risky plan from many standpoints. Lee would divide his army into two in front of Pope. He could not be sure how, when or where McClellan would join Pope. Both halves of his army would be passing through Thoroughfare Gap in the Bull Run Mountains and if the Union could block the Gap before Longstreet could get through Longstreet would be unable to rejoin Jackson. Jackson consulted with his chief engineer Captain James Boswell on the best route, and they chose the path outlined below. The column would proceed through Amissville, cross the Rappahannock River at Hinson’s Mill Ford and move north to Orleans and Salem (now Marshall). At Salem they would turn northeast through Thoroughfare Gap to Gainesville and the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.

At 6:00 PM Longstreet’s men began replacing Jackson’s soldiers along the Rappahannock. Captain Boswell would lead Jackson’s troops on the march. At 3 AM on the 25th the bugles sounded in Jackson’s camp in Jeffersonton. General Ewell’s division would lead the advance, followed by Hill and Taliaferro. They marched northwest to Amissville and then turned north marked by the marker below.

They crossed the Rappahannock River at Hinson’s Ford. The ford is at the end of Hinson Ford Road on private property.

From the ford they moved north through Fauquier County. They passed through Orleans and the head of the column reached the outskirts of Salem (Marshall) at dusk.

They had traveled 25 miles. Hill’s Division reached Salem by 11:00 PM with Taliaferro close behind. By midnight Jackson was now 12 miles north of Pope’s right flank (Waterloo Bridge). The map below from Blue and Gray magazine shows the relative positions of forces on the 25th.

Halleck whose job was to facilitate the joining of Pope’s and McClellan’s armies was failing in terms of providing accurate information to Pope on where McClellan’s Corps were located in real time. At 8:45 AM one of Sigel’s staff officers, Colonel John Clark, stood on a hill near Waterloo Bridge observing the Confederates with his glass when he noted a large body of Confederates moving to the northwest on the opposite bank of the river. Sigel relayed this message to Pope, which he in turn forwarded to Halleck. Strangely, however, Pope failed to react to this movement and instead extended his left flank. He had concluded erroneously that the Rebels were retreating into the Shenandoah Valley.

On the morning of the 26th with Ewell again in the lead Jackson’s men headed east toward The Plains and Thoroughfare Gap.

The Gap now was the main impediment to Jackson’s ability to get behind Pope. It could be defended by a small force and seriously delay Jackson, but there were no Federals there. Jackson passed through the gap by noon and had reached Gainesville around 4 PM.

Jackson had covered 50 miles in 32 hours and were within 5 miles of the railroad. Early in the morning Lee sent Stuart’s Cavalry to join Jackson while Longstreet continued to shell Union forces across from Waterloo Bridge and Fauquier White Sulphur Springs. That afternoon Lee and Longstreet met to try and map out the best path to join with Jackson. Longstreet felt that the best route would be to follow the path that Jackson had taken rather than try and force a crossing at Waterloo Bridge, which was guarded by Irvin McDowell’s Division. Lee would leave R.H. Anderson’s Division behind at the bridge along with Stephen D. Lee’s artillery battalion. Word began to reach Pope’s headquarters that Jackson had passed through Thoroughfare Gap but still he did not react. Pope for unclear reasons wanted to protect the line of the Rappahannock River until his and McClellan’s armies combined, but this made no sense if Jackson was now between Pope on the Rappahannock and Washington, D.C. At Gainesville Jackson now decided to turn south and cut the Orange and Alexandria Railroad at Bristoe Station rather than Manassas Junction since it would likely be less well defended. Stuart and his cavalry joined Jackson at Gainesville. Munford’s 2nd VA Cavalry and Henry Forno’s brigade easily overwhelmed the small force at Bristoe Station and quickly destroyed a quarter mile of track causing two trains to derail before word spread back to Warrenton (covered in the next post). While at Bristoe Station Jackson learned that huge stores of supplies were present at Manassas Junction and were guarded by only 115 men of the 105th PA infantry under Captain Samuel Craig. Jackson sent General Isaac Trimble and the 21st NC and 21st GA and Stuart’s Cavalry up the tracks to Manassas Junction. In a night attack Trimble overwhelmed the small Union force. The map below illustrates the positions of the armies on August 26th.

By 8:00 PM Pope received word that there was trouble on the railroad from the Union telegraph operator in Manassas. The Confederates had initially forgotten to cut the telegraph wires. An hour later McDowell sent word that local citizens had reported a large Rebel force had passed through Thoroughfare Gap earlier in the day. By midnight Pope finally realized he had a serious problem when communications along the railroad were cut. Pope decided to abandon the line of the Rappahannock River and concentrate his forces near Gainesville. Though things seemed dire for Pope his position was actually better than it appeared as shown on the map from August 26th above. If Pope could concentrate his forces fast enough and get behind Jackson at Gainesville, he would be between Lee and Jackson. If he could then hold Lee and Longstreet at Thoroughfare Gap, he could attack Jackson with a force nearly twice his size. Once Jackson was defeated, he could then turn on Lee and Longstreet again with a force that would be nearly double their size.

Early on the morning of the 27th Jackson headed for the Union supply base at Manassas Junction to reinforce Trimble with Hill’s and Taliaferro’s divisions and lay claim to the supplies. He left Ewell at Bristoe Station with three brigades to protect his rear from an eastward Union advance along the railroad from Warrenton. They plundered the base for several hours until the revelry was disrupted by the firing of two large cannons from Colonel Gustav Waagner’s 2nd NY Heavy Artillery.

The tablet below interprets the wartime Manassas Junction.

A tablet in Manassas interprets “Jackson’s Raid.”

Next- The Jeffersonton Baptist Church

Sources

Return to Bull Rull Run The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas by John J. Hennessy.

From Cedar Mountain to Antietam by Eric Stackpole.