At the conclusion of the Bristoe Station Campaign George Meade had withdrawn to Centreville, Virginia and in the process prevented Lee from getting between the Army of the Potomac and Washington, D.C. Although Meade felt he had outmaneuvered Lee in the process, the Lincoln administration looked at the situation differently. Lee had pushed Meade out of Culpeper County, caused him to give up 40 miles of track along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and nearly gotten behind him. Realizing Meade’s defensive position was too strong for a frontal attack, Lee retreated back along the railroad and establish a defensive line on the south side of the Rappahannock River in Culpeper County.

There on November 7th Meade would defeat Lee at Rappahannock Station and Kelly’s Ford forcing Lee back into Orange County (see two previous posts). The two armies were now on opposite sides of the Rapidan River right back where they started in early October. On November 11th Meade sent Brigadier General David Russell to the War Department with seven stands of captured Confederate colors. Secretary of War Stanton refused to see him. General-in-Chief Henry Halleck messaged Meade that something urgent needed to be done. Lee expected Meade to attack along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and positioned his forces accordingly along the Rapidan River with the Second Corps to the south of where the railroad crossed the river (Rapidan Station) and the Third Corps to the North. Meade planned to turn Lee’s right flank by crossing the Rapidan downstream at several lightly guarded fords and get behind Lee’s army.

Meade divided his army into three columns. Major General Gouverneur Warren’s II Corps would cross at Germanna Ford advance to the Orange Turnpike and proceed west to Robinson’s Tavern (mislabeled Robertson’s Tavern on the map) at Locust Grove. The V Corps (Major General George Sykes) and I Corps (Major General John Newton) would travel the furthest downstream and cross at Culpeper Mine Ford. They would advance along the Orange Plank Road to Parker’s Store. At that point Sykes would continue west to New Hope Church, while Newton would head north to Robinson’s Tavern. The III (Major General William “Blinky” French) and VI (Major General John Sedgwick) Corps would cross at Jacob’s Ford. After a delay caused by a downpour on the 23rd the three columns would move out on Thanksgiving Day, Thursday November 26th (see the map below).

Sykes reached Culpeper Mine Ford at 10:30 AM and was across by noon, at 3:00 PM he bivouacked at the Wilderness Tavern. Newton followed but was behind schedule. Warren and the II Corps arrived at Germanna Ford at 9:30 AM. New roads had to be cut and the crossing began around 1:30 PM. The Cavalry crossed and chased out Confederate pickets and advanced two and a half miles toward the Orange Turnpike to screen the advance. Two brigades waded the ford to the opposite bank and occupied the deserted Rebel earthworks.

Germanna Ford- 38.3784489, -77.7863701

Germanna Ford Earthworks- easily visible at the Germanna Community College- 38.3757527, -77.7799543.

French’s III Corps had the shortest distance to travel to get to Jacob’s Ford and they took the longest time to get there. Brigadier General Henry Prince commanded the lead division. He arrived at Jacob’s Ford around noon. Prince took time reconnoitering the area and there was an additional delay in constructing the pontoon bridge because the river was wider than anticipated due to the recent rain and they did not have enough pontoons. Finally, they were across the river by 5:00 PM. The artillery could not cross here because the far bank was too steep and muddy and was forced to cross at Germanna Ford. Meade’s intention was for all three wings to meet in the area of the Robinson Tavern (shown below) by sundown. However, muddy roads and a shortage of pontoon boats at Germanna and Jacob’s Fords slowed the advance and as the sun set Meade’s Army of the Potomac sat in three fragmented pieces on the south side of the Rapidan River.

Robinson’s Tavern- The tavern complex sat on the northeast corner of the intersection where the gas station and strip mall are today. The tavern was often misnamed as Robertson’s Tavern on Union maps. It was moved 250 yards to the north but has been extensively remodeled. The original tavern well sits along the edge of the parking lot.

While Meade was crossing downstream he assigned George Armstrong Custer the task of keeping the Confederates occupied at Morton’s and Raccoon’s Fords. He established batteries on the Culpeper County side of the fords and shelled both areas. Custer also feinted crossings at four other points along the river and believed that the ruse was working. He lit multiple fires along the river to simulate the appearance that large numbers of Union troops were camped there. However, when morning came the Confederates were gone. Lee had received intelligence on the 25th that the Federal Army was about to move. Shown below is Raccoon Ford looking from the Orange County side toward Culpeper County.

Shown below is the high ridge (Rebels Ridge) on the Orange County side of Raccoon Ford.

As the fog cleared on November 26th, from the signal station atop Clark’s Mountain, Meade’s movement toward Germanna Ford could clearly be seen.

Confederate Major General Jubal Early (commanding the Second Corps in place of the ill Richard Ewell who was in Richmond having problems with his amputated stump) had realized that Custer’s action was just a ruse and began moving his troops to the right at the suggestion of Lee, posting his own decoy force at the fords. He moved Major General “Allegheny” Johnson along the Raccoon Ford Road toward Locust Grove putting him on a collision course with French’s III Corps crossing at Jacob’s Ford. Confederate Cavalry reported to Lee the Federal crossings at Jacob’s, Germanna and Culpeper Mine Fords. Because of the dense forestation in the area (The Wilderness) visibility in the area was limited and Lee was unsure if Meade was trying to turn his right flank or was heading toward Richmond. He instructed Early to form a line perpendicular to the river and for A.P. Hill to move east on the Orange Plank Road and to align on Early’s right. Lee would be traveling with A.P. Hill during the campaign. Meade’s attempt to get a jump on Lee was evaporating. Early would be rapidly moving down both the Orange Turnpike (headed straight for Warren’s II Corps) and the Raccoon Ford Road (headed straight for French’s III Corps) itching for a fight. He had been embarrassed in the Battle of Rappahannock Station and was looking to redeem himself.

Sources

The Great Battle Never Fought- The Mine Run Campaign- November 26- December 2, 1863 by Chris Mackowski

The Campaign That History Forgot by Dr. Jay Luvaas and Colonel Wilbur S. Nye Civil War Times Illustrated November 1969