Meade arose before dawn on the 27th, ate breakfast, crossed Germanna Ford with his staff and rode to join Warren’s II Corps. Around 11:00 AM they heard gunfire ahead of them in the general direction of Robinson’s Tavern at Locust Grove. Early and Warren were about to collide in a battle of Hays versus Hays. Brigadier General Harry’s Hays division was at the head of Early’s column. Ahead of them on a ridge, where the tavern was located, was a large concentration of Warren’s II Corps occupying the high ground. Hays deployed on the right side of the Orange Turnpike and Major General Robert Rodes division formed left of the road. Early did not like his position within a dense forest, with a road running down the center, where he could see little of the Federal force beyond the high ground. Warren had placed a battery in the road on the ridge to control the Orange Turnpike and there was no good place for Early to deploy his own artillery. Major General Edward “Allegheny” Johnson arrived ahead of his own division that was moving down the Raccoon Ford Road to confer with Early. While talking with Rodes he received word that his division was under attack near Paynes Farm to the north and he left to rejoin his men. On the Union side Warren’s lead division under Brigadier General Alexander Hays had pushed forward and controlled the high ground before Early could get there. Brigadier General Alexander Webb’s division deployed to Hay’s right and Brigadier General John Caldwell’s division moved into position on Hay’s left.

Meade wanted Warren to wait until the army was concentrated before moving forward. At 11:00 AM Warren knew that Sykes’ V Corps was moving up on his left along the Orange Plank Road. Meanwhile, French was waiting for Warren to attack and in his dispatches seemed to be unaware of exactly where he was located. Fighting today would be along three fronts as the Union Army attempted to concentrate: in the center at Robinson’s Tavern- the intended point of concentration along the Orange Turnpike; to the south at New Hope Church along the Orange Plank Road; and to the north at Paynes Farm (the red star on the map below) on the road between Jacob’s Ford and Robinson’s Tavern.

In the center at Robinson’s tavern skirmishing was very heavy all along Warren’s line involving the divisions of the two Hays’. The Confederates made an attempt to turn the Federal right but were pushed back. Warren advanced forward as a feint just before dark to drive the Rebels back. Early was waiting for darkness to withdraw his forces to the west bank of Mine Run in his rear. A position which he felt was more defensible.

To the south Sykes started out at 7:00 AM. He arrived at Parker’s Store by 9:00 AM and New Hope Church (shown below) by 3:00 PM. It had taken him eight hours to travel eight and a half miles. The V Corps was in the lead followed by the I Corps. They were joined by Brigadier General David Gregg’s cavalry. There was a small wagon train between the two Corps which was attacked by Confederate Brigadier General Thomas Rosser’s brigade slowing the march. In addition, Jeb Stuart’s cavalry battled lead elements of Sykes’ V Corps all along the route. At New Hope Church Union Cavalry finally reached open ground where they could deploy.

At 2:00 PM the Union cavalry clashed with lead elements of Major General Henry Heth’s infantry division of A.P. Hill’s Third Corps. Heth’s men occupied the high ground to the west of the church but they could not drive off the cavalry because the Federals were armed with breech-loading rifles. When Heth arrived on the scene he noted that his rightmost brigade, Kirkland’s Brigade, commanded by Colonel Thomas Singletary, had lined up improperly and was a half-mile to the rear. Heth found him to be drunk and placed him under arrest. As Heth was remedying the problem it gave Sykes enough time to get his V Corps infantry on the scene. Meade ordered Sykes and Newton to hold their positions. He did not want to bring on an engagement until he knew what was keeping French and the III Corps.

French had crossed Jacob’s Ford on the 26th. Jacob’s Ford is on private property and not accessible to the public. Prior to the start of the campaign Meade met with all of his Corps commanders and discussed his concern that Lee could potentially send troops down the Raccoon Ford Road and create a problem for the III and VI Corps as they marched from Jacob’s Ford to Robinson’s Tavern. Meade cautioned French that when he reached a fork in the road at the Widow Morris’ house on the road from the ford he was to turn left at the fork away from the line of march of Rebel troops on the Raccoon Ford Road. Inexplicably, on the morning of the November 27th when French’s lead division commanded by Henry Prince reached the Widow Morris house Prince was confused about which road to take. He halted his command and sent cavalry patrols down each fork wasting two hours. By this time French had come up and was camped only 300 yards away from Prince but they communicated by courier rather than in person? French sent a message to Meade’s chief of staff Andrew Humphreys that he was almost in position awaiting Warren when in reality he was miles away.

The road to Jacob’s Ford is the modern-day Woodville Road. It is the gravel road moving away from the camera toward the location of the ford in the center of the picture below.

The pictures below were taken at 38.3510621, -77.8253322 standing in the road at the intersection of Russell Road (route 685) which goes off to the left (the route the III Corps was supposed to take), and the Indiantown Road (route 603) the route which the III Corps actually took. The modern-day house in the second picture below stands on the site of the old Widow Morris house.

Prince unsure of what to do requested orders from French but heard nothing back for two hours. After much confusion Prince proceeded down the wrong road. Moving down modern-day Indiantown Road he would run into Johnson’s Confederates near its junction with Raccoon Ford Road resulting in the Battle of Payne’s Farm. The Battle that resulted here is interpreted by a nine stop walking trail. The parking lot is located at 38.3315468, -77.8269432. The text below the map on each individual stop was taken from the corresponding marker. The interpretation at the site is excellent.

Stop 1- Parking lot, the two markers below are no longer in front of the Zion Church. Overview of the campaign from the marker- Eager to strike Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia before winter, Union General George Gordon Meade planned a flanking movement across the Rapidan River late in 1863. Meade intended to force the Southerners to abandon their strong defensive position along the upper Rapidan. Success depended on the timely movement of the different portions of his army and their juncture at Locust Grove, south of the river. The Mine Run Campaign began on November 26, 1863. Rain, bad roads, and an inadequate knowledge of the terrain hindered Meade’s movements. After long delays and before the Union forces could assemble at Locust Grove, elements of the Union and Confederate armies clashed here at Payne’s Farm on November 27. By the next day, Confederate forces had established a seemingly impregnable line of defenses behind Mine Run, a tributary of the Rapidan. Meade ordered his army back across the Rapidan River and into winter camp. After more than 1,900 combined casualties, both armies returned to the positions they occupied before the Mine Run Campaign.

Overview of the Battle of Payne’s Farm from the marker below- On the morning of November 27, 1863, Union General George G. Meade expected the Union Third Army Corps under General William H. French to break camp early and march directly to Locust Grove to join the rest of Meade’s command. After a lengthy delay in determining the correct route, French’s leading division under General Henry Prince advanced. It encountered elements of Confederate General Edward Johnson’s division, which was then marching down the Raccoon Ford Road. The battle erupted and spilled into the woods and fields beyond the road. More troops joined the fight until ultimately 16,000 men were engaged. The aggressive Johnson launched a series of uncoordinated assaults against his numerically superior foe. His attacks eventually stalled in bloody stalemate as darkness brought a close to the action. Resulting in more than 1,400 casualties, the Battle of Payne’s Farm was the only significant action of the campaign. Johnson’s command suffered heavy casualties but gave the Confederates more time to reunite and establish a strong position along Mine Run.

Stop 2- Walking Trail- 1.5 miles long

Stop 3- Unexpected Encounter- From the marker- The Battle of Payne’s Farm began at the intersection beyond the trees in front of you on the afternoon of November 27, 1863, as men of the Union III Corps met portions of Confederate General Edward Johnson’s division. Even though pickets on both sides had encountered each other throughout the morning, neither side recognized the other as anything more than a small scouting party. That afternoon, as Johnson’s column was passing the intersection, however, Federal skirmishers in these woods fired upon the surprised Confederates on the Raccoon Ford Road to your left. General George H. Steuart, bringing up the Confederate rear, halted his brigade and quickly formed a line of battle in the road. On arriving and surveying the scene, Johnson ordered the rest of his division to countermarch to the scene of the action (Johnson’s line stretched over 2 miles- three of his 4 brigades were already past the intersection). It is unclear whether Johnson knew the full strength of the force he was facing (the combined III and VI Corps was over 30,000 men), but it seemed to make no difference to him. In the woods and fields adjoining this intersection, one Confederate division confronted a Union army corps three times its size.

The intersection today- 38.3347109, -77.8306303

The pictures below were taken between Stops 3 and 4.

Stop 4- Stalemate at the Crossroads- Union General Henry Prince’s Second Division, III Corps, marched in advance of the Federal army on the day of battle. Uncertain of which roads to take and encountering Confederates in force near the intersection, Prince halted, allowing his enemy precious time to concentrate near the battlefield. Prince advanced two brigades into a clearing of several acres on both sides of the road to your right front. At the same time, Confederate General George H. Steuart spread his brigade out along the Raccoon Ford Road and attacked. The fight seesawed back and forth as charge met countercharge. The dense underbrush made the advance far more difficult, and despite his numerically superior force, Prince was unable to exploit his advantage. Calling for reinforcements, Prince adopted a defensive position near the clearing and waited. For their part, Steuart’s men had exhausted their ammunition and were in no position to resume the offensive. His 1st and 3rd North Carolina regiments lost more men killed and wounded than any other Confederate units during the Mine Run Campaign.

During this time the 37th VA at the far left of Johnson’s line became temporarily separated from the 3rd NC on their right (gap of 200 yards). Titus Williams the unit’s commander formed his unit into a single line in order to make it appear that his force was larger than it actually was. His ruse was effective.

Stop 5- Baptism of Fire- While Union General Henry Prince’s division held the ground on either side of the road to Jacob’s Mill, General Joseph B. Carr aligned his division on Prince’s left flank in support. He was ordered to make a connection, if possible, with the II Corps near Locust Grove (showing how confused French was about his location- Robinson’s Tavern at Locust Grove was over 2 miles away). Nicknamed “General French’s Pets” by the rest of the corps, Carr’s division had seen little action. For several of the regiments, this would be their baptism of fire. The three brigades of Carr’s division entered the conflict just as the Confederates were making a concerted effort to turn Prince’s left flank. After some initial confusion, the untested troops advanced through this difficult terrain, scaled the ridge in front of you, and drove the Confederate skirmishers back. The Federals took up positions behind a fence at the edge of a large field atop the rise. In this engagement, the three regiments of General William H. Morris’s brigade suffered the highest regimental losses in the Union army during the Mine Run Campaign. The green troops performed admirably and, in a matter of minutes, became veterans.

Stop 6- The Worm Fence- Exhilarated by their first taste of battle, the men of Union General Joseph B. Carr’s division advanced to this position and pushed back the strong Confederate skirmish line on top of this rise. With the arrival of Colonel J. Warren Keifer’s brigade, the Federals assembled a formidable line in the woods along the worm fence. From this position, they beat back two Confederate assaults. When Carr’s men were almost out of ammunition, elements of General David B. Birney’s division advanced and held the line until the battle’s end. The third brigade of Carr’s division under the command of Colonel Benjamin F. Smith became greatly disorganized while moving through the tangled brush and timbers and into the low ground of a miry creek, known as Russell’s Run, several hundred yards to your left. The fire of Confederate skirmishers convinced Smith that he was outflanked. He pulled his men back to a position of safety and, with the exception of a single regiment, did not engage the Southerners. As you can see from the map below as Johnson countermarched his three brigades that were past the junction of Jacobs Ford Road and Raccoon Ford Road back to the battle, he used Brigadier General James “Stonewall Jim” Walker’s Brigade to extend his line. He would then use the remaining two brigades to try and wrap around the left side of the Union line. He would add sequentially to his right first Brigadier General Leroy Stafford’s men and then Brigadier General John “Rum” Jones’ troops. French would try and stop him by extending his left.

The pictures below were taken at the fence and on the way to the 7th stop.

Stop 7- The Stonewall Brigade- After countermarching to the scene of the action, the famed Stonewall Brigade under General James A. Walker formed a line of battle along the Raccoon Ford Road behind you. The 2nd Virginia Infantry advanced in a strong skirmish line and moved to your left, threatening the flank of Union General Henry Prince’s division. Union General Joseph B. Carr’s division drove back the Virginians as well as other Confederate skirmishers. In the fighting, Lieutenant Colonel Raleigh Colston, 2nd Virginia Infantry, was mortally wounded. When Confederate General Edward Johnson’s entire force had assembled and he ordered it forward, the Stonewall Brigade advanced through this area and into the open ground beyond, where it suffered heavily from flanking fire. The brigade wisely fell back and occupied this position at the edge of the woods. However, Private Alexander T. Barclay, 4th Virginia Infantry, seized the regimental flag, walked calmly out into the open field, and planted the flag well in front of the rest of the line. Remaining in that position for some time, the brave soldier slowly faced about and returned unscathed to the safety of the woods despite the many shots fired at him.

The pictures below were taken on the way to stop #8. When the 2nd VA of Walker’s brigade advanced into the open field in front of the woods they were advancing across the front of Union forces and came under a heavy cross fire.

Stop 8- The Confederate Wheel- The battle reached its climax in the fields before you as Generals George H. Steuart’s and James A. Walker’s Confederate brigades advanced through the woods to your left. To support them, Confederate General Edward Johnson ordered Generals Leroy Stafford’s and John M. Jones’s brigades to make a wide-wheeling movement from the Raccoon Ford Road into the Payne Farm lane, on which you are standing. From here, the Southerners attacked the Union position in the woods across the field in front of you. Instead of a coordinated effort between the two brigades, however, Stafford’s Louisianans made the initial attack unsupported, suffering heavy casualties. When Jones’s Virginians arrived soon after, they also attacked with the same result. Jones was wounded in the head and taken out of the action. The Confederates retreated to this lane until darkness ended the fighting. After dark, the Confederates fell back to the Raccoon Ford Road and eventually to a position behind the stream called Mine Run.

Even though the Union had a vast manpower advantage only the III Corps was actually engaged. The VI Corps was bottlenecked along the Jacobs Ford Road and never saw any action. Johnson’s bold attack completely prevented the III and VI Corps from uniting with the rest of the Union Army on the November 27th giving Lee valuable time to establish a strongly fortified line on the west bank of Mine Run. John Haley of the 17th MA summed up the battle best when he stated “There should have been no fight here, we never should have been on this road (Jacob’s Ford Road now Indiantown Road). If French had moved rapidly as instructed and turned left at the Widow Morris’ house the III and VI Corps could have united with the other two wings of the Army of the Potomac at Robinson’s Tavern. This error would have a dramatic impact on the situation in the coming days.

The farm lane

The field

Stop 9- A Fruitless Campaign- A few days after the Battle of Payne’s Farm, Union and Confederate forces were poised to fight on a larger scale west of Locust Grove. Both sides planned assaults, but Confederate General Robert E. Lee posted his troops in such a strong position along Mine Run that Union General George G. Meade decided to withdraw. This robbed Lee of his opportunity to strike his adversary’s left flank. Both sides returned close to their former positions across the Rapidan River and made camp for the winter. Although the battle here was relatively small, the soldiers who fought at Payne’s Farm did not view this as an unimportant engagement. They wrote of a fight equal in ferocity with better-known eastern battles like Antietam, Chancellorsville, and the Wilderness. Dwarfed in total losses by Gettysburg and dimmed in retrospect by the apparent uselessness of the entire movement, Mine Run remains a little-known campaign. This very obscurity, however, contributed significantly to the almost unparalleled preservation of this battlefield.

The strategic significance of the Battle of Payne’s Farm was that a single Confederate division of only about 4,200 men was able to hold at bay two Union Corps (III and VI), a total of about 32,000 men, and prevent their junction with the rest of the Union Army. The resulting delay of about 24 hours gave Lee enough time to establish a strongly entrenched line behind Mine Run. The Mine Run Campaign would be the first use of extensive earthen fortifications in the Civil War.

Sources

The Great Battle Never Fought- The Mine Run Campaign- November 26- December 2, 1863 by Chris Mackowski

The Campaign That History Forgot by Dr. Jay Luvaas and Colonel Wilbur S. Nye Civil War Times Illustrated November 1969