From McDowell to Front Royal

By May 17th Jackson’s force was back in the Shenandoah Valley. Frémont in Franklin already 60 miles from his supply base in New Creek did not pursue him. While Jackson was gone a skirmish alerted Banks to the fact that General Ewell’s Division was in the Page (Luray) Valley. General Richard Ewell had occupied Jackson’s camps while he was gone. The day before the Battle of McDowell on May 8th Union Colonel Robert Foster headed south on a reconnaissance from Honeyville with six companies of the 13th IN. Two and a half miles south they encountered a detachment of Louisiana infantry from Brigadier General Richard Taylor’s brigade and a company of the 6th VA on Summerville Heights. The Federals pushed the Confederates back to Dogtown. The images below were taken at 38.5106089, -78.6230567, the area of Dogtown.

Foster broke off the pursuit and rested his horses near the ruins of the Red Bridge where he was joined by Company B of the 1st VT Cavalry under Captain George Conger. The group headed back to Honeyville, but the Vermonters fell behind in the process. Taylor now reinforced with several additional companies at Dogwood caught and attacked the 1st VT near Summerville Heights. Foster and his men rode back to aid Conger and a 30-minute fight ensued. The Rebels attempted to drive the Federals into the South Fork of the Shenandoah River. Foster’s men managed to escape the trap but several of Conger’s force leaped into the river to do so. While some made it to safety about 30 were captured. Interrogation of a few of the captured Rebel prisoners enabled Banks to learn that Ewell’s Division was now in the Valley. This action is interpreted at the Civil War Trails sign shown below.

Banks, hoping to get a transfer to a more active theater of the war, wired the War Department that Stonewall Jackson had left the Valley. The War Department, however, responded by transferring Shields’ Division to Major General Irvin McDowell’s Department of the Rappahannock near Fredericksburg at Falmouth. This reduced the strength of Banks’ Army of the Shenandoah to two brigades under Brigadier General Alpheus Williams (4500 infantry) and 1500 cavalry. Even though these men had been enlisted for little more than a year they were the most inexperienced group of veterans in the Shields’ Army. Not one of them had fired a gun in battle. Banks moved his force north from New Market to Strasburg arriving there on the 13th.

Jackson was back in the Shenandoah Valley on the 17th, along with “Allegheny” Johnson’s Army of the Northwest, with a total of about 6000 infantry. His army had been hit hard by desertion in the first half of May as a result of several grueling marches with little food and rest. General Lee approved Jackson’s request to join forces with Ewell stating, “Whatever movements you make against Banks do it speedily, and if successful drive him back toward the Potomac, and create the impression, as far as practicable, that you design threatening that line.” General Ewell who was still unclear as to what his role would be had finally had enough of being kept in the dark and decided to ride 50 miles overnight to talk to Jackson. On March 18th they met in Mount Solon to discuss strategy. The plan they developed was to consolidate their forces somewhere between New Market and Mt. Jackson on the Valley Pike. Ewell would cross Massanutten Mountain at New Market Gap with most of his force except for Richard Taylor’s Louisiana Brigade who would enter the valley by marching around the southern tip of Massanutten Mountain to Jackson’s rear. Their combined force would then march on Banks at Strasburg. On March 19th at 3:00 AM Jackson had his force on the road to Harrisonburg. They would have to cross the North River at Bridgewater on the way.

**The North River at Bridgewater 38.3798889, -78.9795278- Link**

The plan would change on the 20th when as Ewell was heading towards New Market Gap in the Page/Luray Valley with Trimble’s Brigade already at New Market, he received an order to rejoin General Johnston’s force outside the Fredericksburg/Richmond area. On receipt of the order Ewell decided once again to find Jackson and discuss the situation with him. They met that day at Tenth Legion on the Valley Pike between Harrisonburg and New Market. There they agreed that both their forces could help Johnston more by attacking Banks and driving him to the Potomac River, which would likely result in Shields’ Division being recalled back to the valley (they had left for Falmouth on the 12th), but they needed permission to do so. Jackson asked Lee to intercede and later that day they received a telegram from Lee and a dispatch from Johnston with their approval with the condition that they move as quickly as possible. The following day they formulated a new plan, shown in the map below. Ewell had intelligence from Colonel Munford that there was a small Union force at Front Royal. Ewell recalled Trimble back across New Market Gap while Jackson marched north and crossed into the Page/Luray Valley across the same gap. Their forces now combined would attack the Federals at Front Royal. From there they would move toward Banks’ rear forcing him to retreat to the Potomac to preserve his supply and communication lines. Jackson sent Jed Hotchkiss to Signal Knob outside Strasburg to determine the size and disposition of Banks’ force.

This new plan took advantage of the natural terrain of the valley in that their movement on the other side of Massanutten Mountain would be shielded from Banks in Strasburg on the opposite side of the mountain. In addition, the previous failure of Ashby’s Cavalry to burn two bridges over the South Fork of the Shenandoah River in the Page (Luray) Valley would now be an advantage in that Jackson could cross the river via White House Bridge and join Ewell for a move on Front Royal.

Shown below is the view from the top of New Market Gap looking back toward New Market in the valley.

**At the top of New Market Gap looking west into the Shenandoah Valley** **with the** **Alleghenies in the distance**

At this point Banks at Strasburg was still unaware that Jackson had returned to the Shenandoah Valley. Jackson and his men would then need to march the 30 miles from New Market Gap to Front Royal as quickly as possible. On the 21st after leaving two companies of Ashby’s Cavalry behind on the Valley Pike to guard against any movement south by Banks they crossed through the gap, joined Ewell, and headed to Hamburg camping there that night. Jackson set up his headquarters at the Mauck Meeting House, 25 miles from Front Royal.

On the 22nd the Confederates continued their march toward Front Royal with a combined force of 14,000-16,000 men more than twice the number of troops Banks had available to him. The men marched so quickly that Jackson decided to halt the column by noon at Berryville, 9 miles from Front Royal, to avoid the afternoon heat. There was also another reason for slowing the march. Jackson had detached his cartographer, Jedediah Hotchkiss, and his chief engineer, Lieutenant James Boswell, on reconnaissance missions four days prior and they still had not rejoined the column. Jackson was not familiar with this area of the valley, and he needed their help in determining the best approach to Front Royal, as well as the roads north of the town leading to Strasburg and Winchester. Ewell’s Division was in the lead with men from Maryland, Louisiana, North and South Carolina, Mississippi and Alabama. They were followed by Jackson’s Division who were disgruntled over the rapidity of their marches over the last several weeks. In the first three weeks of May they had marched over 200 miles. The Stonewall Brigade started the month with 3,681 men and 20 days later they were down to less than 1,600, a more than 50% desertion rate!

In the meantime, Banks’ requests for reinforcements continued to be ignored. He was so frustrated that he sent his adjutant, Major R. Morris Copeland, to the capital to appeal to Stanton personally. The Secretary of War denied the request because he did not think Jackson was a threat to Banks’ army! Copeland kept pressing the Secretary and finally Stanton agreed to send Brigadier General James Cooper’s Baltimore-based brigade to join Banks, but they would not arrive before the battle. Banks’ force was spread out from Strasburg to Buckton Station on the Manassas Gap Railroad 5 miles to the east, where two companies of infantry were stationed. Seven miles further east at Front Royal Colonel John Kenly commanded nine companies of the 1st MD, two companies of the 29th PA, a pioneer company to repair bridges, and two 10-pounder Parrott rifles but no cavalry (a total of only 975 men). In addition, the Marylanders were armed with old smoothbore rifles. His two cannons were on the crest of Richardson’s Hill, where his main force was located, north of town and 300 yards south of the junction of the North and South Forks of the Shenandoah River. He stationed three groups of pickets with the furthest about 1.5 miles south of town. The pickets did not take the job seriously and spent their time fishing, swimming and sleeping while on duty. Security was so poor that in the early morning hours of the 23rd, Confederate Lieutenant Walter Buck of the 7th VA Cavalry was able to easily sneak into town, reconnoiter the area, and report back to Colonel Ashby a detailed description of Union defenses, which were passed on to Jackson by 7:30 AM.

On the morning of the 23rd the men were marching by 4:30 AM. General Jackson moved the 2,500-man Louisiana brigade from 4th in the position of march to the front. By 6:30 AM they were within 5 miles of Front Royal. Around 8:00 AM Jackson once again halted the troops. Having received intelligence from Lieutenant Buck that a small Union Maryland Regiment was guarding the town Jackson sent a courier to bring up the 1st MD of Ewell’s Division in order to give them the honor of leading the attack. The 1st MD under Colonel Bradley Johnson was on the verge of mutiny over a dispute regarding their length of service and the feeling that they were tricked into reenlisting. The Confederate Conscription Act extended the one-year enlistments of eligible male residents of the Confederate States of America to three years. The problem was that Maryland was a border state and not a Confederate state and the law should not have applied to them. Half of the men threw down their arms and refused to serve. Only after an impassioned plea to their devotion to Maryland and the threat that Johnson would tell Jackson that they refused to face the enemy was he able to persuade them to move to the front. What Jackson did not know was that although the Marylanders were in Ewell’s Division they had been moved to the back of the column 11 miles to the rear. It would take them three hours to reach the front. Jackson may also have been delaying hoping that his mapmaker and engineer might rejoin him. There was still no sign of Hotchkiss or Boswell, and he would need to turn to local citizens to direct him to an alternate road to Front Royal. Jackson was concerned about continuing forward on the Luray Road because he thought it restricted his ability to deploy his troops and was too open to view and that he would not be able to maintain the element of surprise.

The column continued a short distance north to Asbury Chapel. Here Jackson found Isaac King, a militia colonel, sitting on a fence outside the chapel. King informed him that Lieutenant Samuel Simpson (Company E, 7th VA Cavalry) in his army was from the area and knew the local roads well. Simpson was summoned and told Jackson that a road just south of the church, Snake Road (Rocky Lane) went northeast to an intersection with Gooney Manor Road (Browntown Road). Simpson had grown up near Gooney Manor Road. This aspect of the march is interpreted by a Civil War Trails sign at Asbury Chapel.

At Spangler’s Crossroads Jackson sent two detachments of cavalry toward separate points on the Manassas Gap Railroad between Front Royal and Strasburg to destroy communications with Banks’ main force at Strasburg. Spangler’s Crossroads is shown below at 38.8544277, -78.277039.

Both groups would cross the South Fork of the Shenandoah River at McCoy’s Ford (see map below). Colonel Turner Ashby’s detachment would head to Buckton Station while the second detachment from Ewell’s Division under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Flournoy struck the railroad between Buckton Station and Fort Royal.

The main column turned onto Snake Road and marched about a mile east reaching the Gooney Manor (Browntown) Road about 1:00 PM, three and a half miles from Front Royal. It was a hard uphill climb. A half mile down the road Lieutenant Boswell rejoined the column and Jackson ordered him to sketch the roads between Front Royal and Winchester, a further indication that Jackson was not anticipating much resistance in Front Royal.

A mile and a half from town the 1st MD captured Union pickets from their home state learning for the first time that they were facing fellow Marylanders that they considered to be traitors. At 1:30 PM Jackson began deploying his force with three regiments (7th, 8th and 9th LA) placed in a field west of the road. Taylor’s men would not be heard from again for another two hours. The 1st MD were in the lead followed by Robedeau Wheat’s “Louisiana Tigers” and the 6th LA. As the Confederates advanced to the top of a hill closer to town a woman ran out to meet them. She was 18-year-old Belle Boyd who was staying with relatives in Front Royal. Henry Kid Douglas rode out to meet her and she asked him to tell Jackson “Tell him to charge right down and he will catch them all”. She confirmed what Jackson already knew that the town was defended by a small Union force. At the end of the day after the battle he wrote her a letter of thanks.

The site referred to in the sign above is at 38.9042778, -78.2006111 at the end of Browntown Road..

**Looking down the hill on Browntown Road.**

Here at the top of a hill near the Prospect Hill Cemetery Jackson and his men got a good look at the town, interpreted in the Civil War Trails sign below. This area was devoid of trees at the time of the battle. The view today is much more limited. Jackson’s Chief of Artillery, Colonel Stapleton Crutchfield, was going to place an artillery battery here, but his smoothbore cannons did not have the range to reach Richardson’s Hill 1.75 miles away. Lieutenant Simpson led Crutchfield’s guns on a concealed path to the western end of town atop a ridge near where Randolph Macon Academy sits today.