At 2:00 PM the Confederates rapidly descended the hill into the center of town. The initial attack force was made up of about 600 men from Johnson’s 1st MD and Major Chatham Roberdeau Wheat’s 1st Special Battalion of Louisiana troops. Wheat’s men also known as the “Louisiana Tigers” were a rowdy group of dockworkers known for their toughness. Company F of the Union 1st MD under the command of Captain Robert Reynolds had taken up a position on the third floor of the southernmost of three large hospital buildings across the street from the courthouse. It took the Confederates only a few minutes to seize the hospital. They controlled the town within 15 minutes quickly overrunning Captain Reynolds’ small company who surrendered around 2:15 PM. The Confederates route to the courthouse is shown in the map below.

Pictures from Court House Square

There were two Civil War Trails signs right next to each other in town near the Visitor Center that summarized the battle shown below. Only the first one remains.

The main Union defense line was about 2000 yards further north on Richardson Hill just south of the junction of the North and South Forks of the Shenandoah River. Colonel Kenly hoped to hold out as long as he could to prevent the Confederates from flanking Banks who was 12 miles to the west in Strasburg. Colonel Kenly dispatched a courier to Strasburg to notify Banks of the attack. Union artillerist Lieutenant Charles Atwell’s two Parrott guns opened fire on the Confederates as they moved from the courthouse area toward Richardson’s Hill. His shells landed in the area of “Bel Air” the estate of William Buck, which sat on a knoll on the northeast corner of town. William Buck was the uncle of Lieutenant Walter Buck, the spy who had snuck into Front Royal earlier in the day. Even though Kenly at this time had only about 700 infantry and 38 artillerists on the hill he still outnumbered the 450 Confederates coming toward him because for some reason the two battalions of Marylanders and the Louisianians were the only men sent forward, as seen in the map below (F- Belle Boyd House, 12- Bel Air).

The small Confederate force continued to move north to the base of Richardson’s Hill shown on the map below. The Marylanders were exhausted having marched 16 miles in 6 hours in 80-degree heat. To their left Wheat’s battalion crossed the Front Royal Winchester Turnpike to a small knoll upon which the estate “Rose Hill” stood about 300 yards from Richardson’s Hill.

Kenly would hold his position for more than 2 hours. A little after 3:30 PM about a hundred soldiers of the 5th NY Cavalry (companies B and D) arrived under Major Phillip Vought. As they arrived Lieutenant Colonel Parham sent two messengers to General Banks at Strasburg requesting reinforcements. The New Yorkers charged down the hill but were repulsed by the Rebels (shown on the map below). By 4:00 PM no additional Confederates had been put into the battle. With still no sign of Taylor’s 2500-man detachment Ewell sent the 6th LA forward. Jackson’s artillery performed even worse. In May he appointed a former student of his at VMI, Lieutenant Colonel Stapleton Crutchfield, as his chief of artillery. He would have 48 guns at his disposal. Crutchfield was located on a dominating hill, where Randolph Macon Academy is located, less than a mile southwest of the two Union Parrott rifles on Richardson’s Hill. But as cannon were brought up Crutchfield refused to use them because they were not rifled resulting in a long delay in getting only one cannon into position by 3:30 PM.

It would take him another hour to get two more operational. As a result, the Union guns had free reign over the battlefield for the entire afternoon! Crutchfield was derided after the battle as “a descendant of the man who invented sleep” for the role he played in the battle. Jackson was so angry at the lack of infantry and artillery support that at one point he shouted, “bring up every rifled gun and every brigade of the army.” General Jackson sent a courier back to General Winder to bring up the Stonewall Brigade immediately. The cavalryman sent back to deliver the message fled before completing his task. The 6th LA under Colonel Isaac Seymour, the next unit in line was sent forward around 4:00 PM and with their addition the size of the Confederate force engaged more than doubled.

During the afternoon Ashby’s Cavalry was busy along the Manassas Gap Railroad west of Front Royal. Ashby led several companies of the 7th VA in an attack at Buckton Station, shown in the map below. His orders were to cut the telegraph lines, destroy railbeds, the depot, and the Passage Creek bridge. Only 150 Union infantry were at the station, Company B of the 27th IN and Company G of the 3rd WI commanded by Captain Edward Hubbard. Ashby would attack them with 200 cavalrymen from 5 companies (A, B, E, F and G) of the 7th VA Cavalry at 4:00 PM. Approaching from the west Ashby and a guide from the area, Sergeant Jenkins of Company E, first reconnoitered the area on their own. Sergeant Jenkins family owned the home next to the depot. Ashby attacked at 4:00 PM from the south. After his first charge the Federals reformed behind the railroad embankment. During Ashby’s second charge they were able to gain control of the depot, burn it, and cut the telegraph lines. Confederate Captains George Sheetz of Company F and John Fletcher of Company A were killed. Despite a third charge the Confederates were unable to dislodge the stubborn westerners and were unable to destroy the railbeds or the bridge. Ashby broke off the attack and headed back toward Front Royal. Union casualties were 1 killed, 9 wounded and 6 captured. Hubbard wrote a note around 5:00 PM to Banks describing the episode and requesting reinforcements. One of his men forded the river and walked six miles to deliver it to Union headquarters in Strasburg arriving around 7:00 PM. Images from the Buckton Station battlefield are shown below.

The second cavalry detachment was led by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Flournoy. He commanded his own 6th VA and four companies of the 2nd VA. He completed his mission to destroy track and cut the telegraph wires to the east of Ashby, halfway between Buckton Station and Front Royal by 3:30 PM. He and his men then headed east to Front Royal where they would play a pivotal role in the battle.

As Union Colonel Kenly stood atop Richardson’s Hill at 4:15 PM he could see two problems. Confederate Cavalry was moving on his position from the west, and nearly 2,000 new Confederate infantry were deploying on his front, shown on the map below. Taylor’s men had finally reached the field with the 8th LA at the front. Kenly ordered his men to retreat. They would need to first cross the South Fork and then the North Fork of the Shenandoah River, one thousand yards away.

Kenly crossed most of his men and artillery via two bridges 1,000 yards apart over the South Fork. Seven Union Marylanders were captured before they could cross the railroad bridge. The Confederate pursuit was slowed when the “Louisiana Tigers” stopped to plunder the Federal camp. Kenly’s 2 cannons were moved to the top of Guard Hill, along the North Fork which was at a higher elevation than Richardson’s Hill, by 5:00 PM. The Federals failed to burn the bridges, and the Confederates easily crossed the South Fork to the peninsula between the forks. Colonel Kenly sent Captain Mapes’ pioneer company to burn the recently constructed Pike Bridge over the North Fork of the River. The North Fork seen from the Route 522 bridge

The timber was green and difficult to ignite. Kenly sent Sargeant William Taylor from Guard Hill who was able to set the bridge ablaze. Taylor was shot in the hand in the process. He was subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions. A Confederate detachment from the 8th LA under the command of Lieutenant Nicholas Sandlin was able to extinguish the flames. The North Fork was so shallow here that the Rebels could easily ford it on both sides of the bridge. The Federals quickly headed north on the Front Royal-Winchester Pike.

The boat landing at Riverton Park is the location of the bridge over the North Fork of the Shenandoah River.

Kenly with a total force of about 850 men including infantry, artillery and cavalry had a head start on the Confederates. His plan was to reach the Cedarville crossroads two miles to the north. There he would head west on the Chapel Road (modern day Reliance Road- Route 627) to Middletown six miles north of Strasburg. Jackson’s only hope of catching the Federals was seven companies of the 6th VA Cavalry under Lieutenant Colonel Flournoy. Companies A, B, E, K crossed first and Jackson ordered them to pursue. Jackson, Ewell and their staffs followed to the rear. They would be followed by Companies D, F, and I. One mile north they passed a part of the 8th LA on foot. The Louisianans stopped at this point. When Kenly reached the Cedarville crossroads Flournoy’s four companies of cavalry riding in the fields west of the pike blocked his path to Middletown. Unable to head toward Middletown, Kenly continued on the pike north toward Winchester for about a mile and a half. With the Confederates closing in Kenly halted the column near Fairview, Thomas McKay’s house, and made a stand. He ordered his two cavalry companies to charge the Rebels while he deployed his men across the turnpike. Major Philip Vought’s NY Cavalry was quickly repulsed and fled back through the lines that Kenly was attempting to form and fled the field. Flournoy charged with Company B’s 35 horse soldiers in the lead under Captain Daniel Grimsley, as shown in the map below.

The Yankees on the plateau aimed their rifles at Company B’s flag bearer 18-year-old James “Dallas” Brown riding near the front and unleashed a volley. Nine Virginians were killed and fourteen wounded. Dallas Brown was shot 21 times. The three Federal company commanders all fled toward Winchester. Kenly was severely wounded and placed in an ambulance headed north to Winchester. Companies A, F, and K of the 6th VA charged into the panicked Yankees. Confederate Lieutenant George Means and Captain George Baxter were killed. Despite their advantage in numbers the Northerners were devoid of leadership at the company level and their weapons were unloaded after firing volleys. Their only defense was to use their muskets as a club and the bayonet. Around 7:00 PM Lieutenant Colonel Dushane, the only remaining regimental commander on the field, surrendered. A few miles north of Nineveh Flournoy’s men overtook Colonel Kenly’s ambulance and took him prisoner. Companies D, F and I of the 6th VA Cavalry arrived on the field to help deal with the captured soldiers. A total of 600 Federals were captured near Fairview, with an additional 150 captured in Front Royal. The Confederate Cavalry killed and wounded 50 others. A total of 26 members of the Confederate 6th VA Cavalry were casualties. Jackson returned to Front Royal and headquartered at Riverside that evening. After completing business there including writing a brief thank you note to Belle Boyd he returned to his staff at Cedarville. He slept on the ground in front of the McKay home.

Kenly had hoped that reinforcements from Banks would reach him in time to save his small force. However, the first courier Charles Greenleaf from the 5th NY Cavalry did not reach General Banks at the Hupp house until 5:45 PM. Because of the piecemeal way Jackson deployed his forces Greenleaf could not provide Banks with any information on the size of the Confederate force or numbers of reinforcements needed. Banks wrote out a quick note for Kenly that a regiment of infantry and section of artillery were on their way and provided him with a fresh horse to deliver it. It was too late, by this time Kenly was at the Cedarville crossroads.

Jackson was now on the flank and rear of Banks’ Department of the Shenandoah with a significant manpower advantage. However, he had lost too much time during the day adjusting the order of his column, with Taylor’s prolonged absence from the battlefield, and the slow deployment of his artillery. As a result, it had taken far too long to subdue a force a fraction of his size. These delays meant that the Confederates would need to camp at Front Royal for the night. Jackson had done many things right in the Page Valley and at Front Royal. His plan to cross through New Market Gap and avoid detection by Banks was an excellent example of the use of terrain. His battleplan was outstanding but its implementation left something to be desired. Although I understand the reasoning for moving the 1st MD to the front of the column it resulted in a substantial delay. Concluding that his artillery commander’s performance was lackluster is an insult to the work lackluster. The piecemeal arrival of his troops on the battlefield prolonged the battle by several more hours. How that would affect his ability to cut off Banks and capture the rest of his Department of the Shenandoah would play out over the next two days.

Next- Banks’ Decision

Sources

The Luray Valley Campaign of 1862 by Gary Ecelbarger Blue and
Gray Magazine Volume XXVI Issue 5

Stonewall Johnson’s 1862 Valley Campaign- War Comes to the Homefront by Jonathan A. Noyalas

Guidebook for the Battle of Front Royal by the Town of Front Royal

Stonewall Jackson’s Valley Campaign Shenandoah 1862 by Peter Cozzens