Banks’ Decision

General Banks first became aware of the problems in Front Royal when a messenger from the 5th NY Cavalry, Charles Greenleaf, found him at the Hupp House in Strasburg sometime between 4:00 and 5:30 PM. He had ridden 17 miles in under an hour. Greenleaf, however, because of the piecemeal way Jackson deployed his men could not tell Banks the size of the Confederate force there. The Hupp House is shown below- 38.9949226, -78.3555168.

An hour and a half later a messenger from Colonel Parham arrived but like Greenleaf he could not provide specific details on the size and origin of the Confederate forces. Banks ordered Colonel George Gordon to detach infantry (3rd WI) and artillery from his brigade to aid Colonel Kenly in Front Royal. By this time Kenly had already evacuated the town and was at Cedarville crossroads. Greenfield’s report was confirmed by a civilian fleeing Front Royal at 6:30 PM. At 7:15 PM a telegram came over the wire from Winchester.

The wire was from Lieutenant Thomas Saville commander of Company D of the 1st MD, one of the officers who abandoned his regiment and fled the field at Fairview to Winchester. Saville stated that the detachment at Front Royal including his regiment, and the 1st MI Cavalry (this unit was not at Front Royal) were cut to pieces by a Confederate army of 15,000-20,000 men that were now on the march to Strasburg, and that Colonel Kenly had been killed (the Colonel was wounded but not dead). Banks showed the telegram to Brigadier General Samuel Crawford. Both were concerned about the ominous implications of the content but confused by the errors within it. Banks ordered Crawford to ride to Winchester and interview Saville in person.

Fifteen minutes later Captain David Hunter Strother, a topographer on Banks’ staff, received a message from Captain Hubbard regarding the Rebel attack at Buckton Station and requesting reinforcements. Buckton Station was on the Strasburg-Front Royal Road, further raising the level of anxiety at Banks headquarters. Strother placed little credibility in Saville’s telegram from Winchester given his cowardly actions on the battlefield (he had fled the field). After General Crawford left for Winchester Colonel George Henry Gordon arrived at headquarters. Probably no one in the Union Army knew “Stonewall” Jackson better than Colonel Gordon who had been Jackson’s roommate at West Point. On seeing the telegram Gordon believed that Jackson had moved undetected onto Banks left rear with a superior force and pleaded with Banks to withdraw the army immediately to Winchester. Banks listened to Gordon but refused to evacuate Strasburg. Banks’ mission was to protect the Manassas Gap Railroad, and he was not going to abandon Strasburg until the threat was confirmed.

**The railroad on the right side of the image. Massanutten Mountain can be seen in the distance. Signal Knob is the far left point at the top of the mountain.**

**Closer view of Massanutten Mountain and Signal Knob**

Banks sent two detachments to cover the road from Front Royal. The 3rd WI under Colonel Thomas Ruger was sent to Buckton Station. A smaller reconnaissance force under Captain Charles Collis was also sent down the same road to reconnoiter closer to Front Royal at 10:00 PM. The War Department had become aware of a battle at Front Royal from a series of three telegrams sent between 9:30 and 10:00 PM from Brigadier General John Geary east of the Blue Ridge at Rectortown. Geary wired that one of his cavalry pickets had heard and seen evidence of a five-hour long battle there and requested that reinforcements be sent to Banks. Unfortunately, Secretary of War Stanton and President Lincoln were not in town. Banks telegraphed Colonel Dixon Miles at Harper’s Ferry to send all his available force to Winchester. Colonel Gordon returned to headquarters once again at 10:30 PM to try and persuade Banks to pull back to Winchester. Banks replied “By God, sir, I will not retreat! We have more to fear, sir, from the opinions of our friends than the bayonets of the enemies.”

Banks at this point thought he was facing a Confederate force of about 5,000 men advancing along the Chapel Road (modern day Reliance Road- Route 627) to Middletown north of him and wired that information to Assistant Secretary of War Peter Watson. At midnight still with no definitive information on the size of the Rebel force Banks ordered General Alpheus Wiliams to send a reconnaissance force to scout the Chapel Road. He ordered his wagon trains to start for Winchester, regiments south of town were ordered back to Strasburg and the regimental baggage trains were prepared to get on the road and the troops ready to move with 2 days rations north to Winchester. Three companies of the 1st MI Cavalry and the 29th PA were sent to Middletown to scout down the Chapel Road. Banks also ordered the force at Buckton Station to return to Strasburg by 7:00 AM. At 2:00 AM General Crawford having completed his questioning of Saville telegraphed Banks that he had found Saville reliable. Banks also received a dispatch from Major Philip Vought of the 5th NY Cavalry who was also involved in the fighting at Front Royal, but was now in Winchester, stating that they had faced a force of about 6,000 men. While hiding in the woods he overheard Rebel Cavalry stating that they would be camping overnight in Front Royal. At this point Banks decided to pull his force back to Winchester in the morning and went to bed.

At 7:00 AM Charles Collis returned from his reconnaissance to Front Royal. Collis had spoken with two company captains of the 29th PA who fought in the battle. They stated that Kenly’s entire force was cut to pieces by a Confederate army of at least 10,000 men and their plan was to cut Banks off by beating him to Winchester. Colonel Murphy’s 29th PA who were to scout the Chapel Road only went part way down the road where local Unionists told him the Rebels were headed to Winchester. Murphy returned to Middletown but waited to get there before sending a dispatch to Banks resulting in a 2-hour delay in the message being relayed to headquarters, not ideal in a situation where time was of the essence. Murphy also failed to secure the Chapel Road, which was an important connecting road between the Front Royal-Winchester Road and the Valley Pike, see map below. Banks ordered another reconnaissance of the Chapel Road led by Lieutenant Colonel Calvin Douty involving 5 companies of his 1st ME Cavalry and a squadron of the 1st VT Cavalry commanded by Major William Collins.

Banks had his supply trains on the road several hours before dawn. He and his men would move out around 9:00 AM. A depot guard of about 300 men would hold the town as long as possible before burning the rest of the supplies. Brigadier General John Hatch would command the rear guard which consisted of the 1st VT and 5th NY cavalry, five companies each of the 1st ME and 1st MD cavalry, Battery F from the PA Light Artillery and a howitzer from the 4th US Artillery. Since Strasburg was an army supply depot Banks had more than 500 wagons which would stretch out for more than 7 miles on the Valley Pike. In addition, he would have to transport the sick and wounded via ambulance and hundreds of civilian wagons as well. The route was vulnerable to attack via two crossroads shown in the map above. The Chapel Road that crossed to Middletown and the Millwood-Newtown Road that crossed to Newtown (modern day Stephens City). Banks penned a quick letter to his wife and started for Winchester. Lincoln and Stanton would return to the War Department that morning from Falmouth near Fredericksburg where they were reviewing McDowell’s troops. They sent a telegram to General John Dix ordering him to send Banks reinforcements from Baltimore. Their telegram to Banks went unanswered, he was on the road.

Signs and images from Strasburg are shown below.