At the end of the first day of the battle Robert E. Lee had used the advantages of the Wilderness to hold the Army of the Potomac in place as he continued the process of attempting to get his entire force in place for an attack planned for the next day. Ewell’s Second Corps was astride the Orange Turnpike, while two of A.P. Hill’s divisions were along the Orange Plank Road with the third under Major General Richard Anderson on the way. Hill’s Corps was in complete disarray and in no condition to serve as a front line attack force. Longstreet’s Corps was marching from Gordonsville along the Catharpin Road and after crossing over to the Orange Plank Road would arrive by the following morning. They would replace Hill’s division in line, who would then serve as a reserve. The general outline of forces on the battlefield at sunrise on the 6th is shown below on a map from Blue and Gray magazine.

On the opposite side of the battlefield Grant was meeting with Major Generals Meade, Warren, Hancock, Sedgwick and Burnside devising his own plan of attack. Grant wanted to take advantage of his superior numbers and launch an all out attack along the entire line with the VI (Sedgwick), V (Warren) and II (Hancock) Corps. Burnside (IX Corps) would move south and support Hancock. This particular arrangement was likely due to the command structure. Since Burnside was senior to Meade, Grant placed him under his own command while Meade commanded the other three Corps which would do the front line fighting. The attack was to begin at 4:30 AM but was postponed to 5:00 AM since none of Meade’s staff believed Burnside could be ready by then. This delay, however, shifted the initiative to Lee on the north side of the battlefield when Ewell launched his attack at 4:45 AM, 15 minutes before the planned Union assault, see map below, leading Major General John Sedgwick on the far Union right to joke that Ewell’s watch must be 15 minutes faster than his. When the Federals counterattacked, V Corps commander Major General Gouverneur Warren feeling that Ewell’s earthworks were too strong and that the Confederates were trying to turn his left flank didn’t move his men forward even though he had been ordered to do so. This would leave Sedgwick’s VI Corps to do most of the fighting on their own. Neither side would make any progress on this side of the field this day.

The first of Burnside’s divisions commanded by Robert Potter arrived and took position on Warren’s left near Jones’ Field. A combination of Ramseur’s brigade and artillery on the ridge drove them back, see map below. Once again the Union manpower advantage would be mitigated on the north side of the battlefield. This time not because of the terrain but because of a lack of aggressiveness by one of its Corps commanders (Warren), and the slow arrival on the field of another (Burnside).

Jones’ Field is shown in the images below. It is at 38.3045375, -77.7474325 on Hill Ewell Drive between auto tour stops #5 (Higgerson Farm) and auto tour stop #6 (Chewning Farm). These pictures were taken with my back to the road facing west.

Longstreet’s men were not yet up and just before 5:00 AM Winfield Scott Hancock’s II Corps launched an all out attack on Hill’s Third Corps. Hill, expecting his men to play a reserve role in the battle on the 6th let his men rest during the night. As a result, he did not have them further entrench, close the gaps in their lines, or reorganize their commands. One of his division commanders Henry Heth was so disturbed by the condition of his force that he stated that they could be overrun by a skirmish line! He protested to Hill during the night but his commanding officer remained firm, Longstreet would be up soon and the men needed rest. Longstreet arrived at Confederate headquarters in the early morning ahead of his Corps and was speaking with a member of Hill’s staff when the Federals attacked, see the maps below.

Hancock drove Hill’s tired and disorganized men back more than a mile toward the Tapp Field. Lieutenant Colonel William Poague had positioned 12-16 cannons on the western end of Tapp Field to the north of the Orange Plank Road and used his guns to hold back the ongoing rout. With shot and shell he kept the Federals from advancing through the open field north of the turnpike and fired into the wooded area south of the turnpike. Longstreet realized that Poague was keeping the Yankees at bay north of the road and focused his initial efforts south of the turnpike where Poague’s fire was less effective. Longstreet directed Kershaw’s division into the woods south of the Orange Plank Turnpike along with one of Field’s brigades. The remainder of Field’s division was sent to the north. His second brigade marched to the area of Poague’s guns where Lee was located. The two images below are from behind the guns looking east on Tapp Field.

Longstreet’s First Corps had been absent from the Army of Northern Virginia during the winter having been in Tennessee. As a result, Lee did not recognize their commander Brigadier General John Gregg as he approached. When Lee asked who they were he learned that they were the Texas brigade. When Lee attempted to lead the Texas Brigade across the field many of the men refused to move forward until he moved to the rear calling out “Lee to the rear.” Fortunately for Lee he did move to the rear, as the Texans would suffer more than a 50% casualty rate in the coming charge. Longstreet’s counterattack drove the Federals back to the earthworks Hill’s men had evacuated regaining their morning losses.

Brigadier General William Wofford on the far Confederate right sent scouts out to determine if he could outflank the left side of the Union line. At the same time Martin Luther Smith, Lee’s chief engineer and Lieutenant Colonel Moxley Sorrel, Longstreet’s chief of staff, were investigating the same area and discovered an unfinished railroad bed that was about three quarters of a mile south and ran parallel to the Orange Plank Road. Longstreet planned to send four brigades down the railroad bed to attack the Federal’s left flank while launching a simultaneous frontal assault. The brigades would be commanded by Brigadier General William Mahone, Colonel John Stone, Brigadier General George Anderson and Brigadier General Wofford. The attack was launched around 11:00 AM, shown on the map below. The left end of Union line was commanded by Colonel Robert McAllister and on reconnaissance he noted the Confederate flanking force in the woods and refused part of his line to protect his flank. Despite this the Rebels were able to get around the Federal’s left flank and the line broke as the Confederates launched their frontal assault. Union Brigadier General Wadsworth attempted to rally his division when his horse bolted and ran toward the Confederate line. Wadsworth was shot in the head and killed. The Union line fell back to the Brock Road.

The frontal assault of Field’s and Kershaw’s division had the Federals on the run. Longstreet would now lead General Micah Jenkins fresh brigade forward to supplement the frontal assault and attempt to drive Hancock’s line back to the Rapidan River. Longstreet was on the verge of winning the battle as he rode with Jenkins and his men in their brand new almost black colored uniforms. However, one of the four Confederate flanking brigades under William Mahomes, which were the furthest to the right, got separated from the other three brigades when they veered to avoid a forest fire. The Virginians had to cross to the other side of the Orange Plank Road (north side) and turned left to realign parallel to the road. As they were moving south back toward the road they could see a column heading east in dark uniforms, mistaking them for retreating Federals they fired into the column changing completely the tide of the battle. One shot struck General Jenkins in the head killing him. Another seriously wounded Longstreet in the neck and shoulder forcing him to be urgently removed from the battlefield. At this crucial moment the Confederates were now without their commanding field officer. We’ll discuss the exact nature of Longstreet’s wound in a subsequent post. Command would fall to Major General Charles Field who now had to realign and reorganize his troops. This delay gave Union Major General Hancock and his men several hours to further prepare three lines of earthworks and reorganize their units in time for the next assault which began at 4:15 PM, shown in the map below.

Jenkins’ brigade commanded by Colonel John Bratton did manage to breach the Union line for a short period but were quickly repulsed by Colonel Roy Stone’s brigade. Sergeant Patrick DeLacy of the 143rd PA was awarded the Medal of Honor for charging and killing the Confederate color bearer at the earthwork. Burnside’s IX Corps attacked the Rebel’s left flank routing Colonel William Perry’s men. Major General Richard Anderson’s division refused their line to face Burnside’s Corps stymying his advance. Fighting ended on the south side of the battlefield. On the north side Confederate Brigadier General John B. Gordon was trying to convince his commanding officer Major General Jubal Early to allow him to attack the Union right flank, shown on the map below.

General Gordon had personally scouted the far Union right. He found that his own lines extended beyond the Union right flank and that there were no reserves behind the Federal right. He also found a good area, Roach’s Field, to assemble his troops. However, Early wasn’t buying Gordon’s plan. He thought there were reserves nearby (there were not) and that it was too risky. Ewell was asked to intervene and Early eventually agreed to the assault as long as it was launched late in the day. Gordon would take his brigade and Brigadier General Robert D. Johnson’s brigade on a flanking maneuver. The rest of Early’s division would create a diversion to hold the Union line in place. The 65th NY was on the far Union right and did not notice Gordon’s advance until it was too late and fled in panic followed by the 67th NY. The two brigades on the right commanded by Generals Truman Seymour and Alexander Shaler broke and both generals were captured. The Federals attempted to reform on the Culpepper Mine Road. The Confederate attack was hampered by the wounding of Major Daniel and Colonel Hoffman had two horses shot out from under him, two key officers guiding the advance. In addition, Johnston’s brigade got lost and veered off to the left. The darkness hindered Confederate coordination and the attack sputtered out. Fighting on the second day was over.

Union Medical Director Surgeon Thomas McParlin reported 15,004 casualties: 2,009 killed; 9,102 wounded; and 3,893 missing. Confederate casualties were estimated at 11,000. As the morning of the 7th dawned Lee needed to find a replacement for Longstreet, who was headed toward Orange Court House in the back of an ambulance. He chose Major General Richard Anderson. Anticipating a possible move down the Brock Road toward Spotsylvania Court House Lee ordered his artillery chief William Pendleton to cut a trail through the woods in that direction. Grant began moving his wounded toward Fredericksburg. After darkness the Federals moved out with many of the soldiers anticipating a move back across the Rapidan. As the column moved toward the Brock Road and Orange Plank Road intersection they expected to turn left toward Chancellorsville and Ely’s Ford back across the Rapidan. Instead they would continue south toward Spotsylvania Court House. The men erupted in cheers as officers tried to quiet them. For them and General Grant there would be no turning back.

Next- The Wilderness Driving Tour Stops 1-6

Sources

No Turning Back Part 2 The Battle of the Wilderness by Gregory A. Mertz. May 6, 1864, Volume XII, Issue 5, June 1995.

Hell Itself The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-7, 1864 by Chris Mackowski.