After a trying and difficult 40-mile march the entire Union Army was across the Pamunkey River. On the 29th Meade set about putting the finishing touches on organizing them into a continuous north south line. Wright and Hancock’s Corps were in position the day before. Wright’s VI Corps had entrenched with its right on the Pamunkey River and extended to Pollard’s Farm. Hancock’s II Corps extended the line along a ridge that ran alongside the road from Pollard’s farm to Haw’s Shop. Now Meade would need to arrange Warren’s and Burnside’s Corps. Burnside would be held in reserve and Warren’s right would link up with Hancock near Haw’s Shop and extend behind Mill Creek to its junction with Totopotomoy Creek, as shown by the light blue dotted line in the map below.

The Federals had been unable to penetrate the Confederate Cavalry shield the day before at Haw’s Shop and Grant did not have a clear picture of where the Army of Northern Virginia was located and deployed. At this point he and Meade made a peculiar and risky decision. Rather than have the cavalry operate along the flanks of their line to reconnoiter Lee’s position they elected to have the reconnaissance done by infantry. The cavalry were allowed to rest from their battle at Haw’s shop the day before, a battle Wilson’s division did not participate in. Wright, Hancock and Warren were to each send one of their divisions in three different directions. This would certainly give them the man power to determine who was in front of them but in the process they would each be isolated from the main body of the army. As shown in the map above, Wright was to send Russell’s division northwest along Hanover River Road toward Hanover Court House. Hancock was to order Barlow’s division to move west along Atlee Station Road toward Totopotomoy Creek. Finally, Warren was to move Griffin’s division south across Totopotomoy Creek to Shady Grove Road and then reconnoiter west toward Polegreen Church. For the time being this would make Griffin’s division the only part of the Army of the Potomac on the south side of Totopotomoy Creek. Burnside was to remain ready to support Hancock or Warren as needed.

Lee had once again taken up a superb defensive position, this time with all of his force on the south bank of Totopotomoy Creek. He had positioned his forces so that they blocked each of the main roads south to Richmond. In addition, they were positioned in an arc so that troops could easily be moved along interior lines, as shown in the map above. Breckinridge was entrenched across Atlee Station Road on a ridge overlooking the crossing at Totopotomoy Creek. Hill’s Third Corps faced north covering the road from Hanover Court House and the Virginia Central Railroad. Early’s Second Corps was placed so that its left was near Polegreen Church blocking the Shady Grove Road, while its right extended to the Old Church Road. Anderson’s First Corps was positioned so that it could support Breckinridge, Hill or Early as needed. Confederate cavalry patrolled the flanks with Butler’s men on the right flank and Gilbert Wright’s and Lomax’s on the left near Hanover Court House.

Each of the three Federal divisions started out around noon. Russell’s men marched northwest on the Hanover River Road. They would be supported by artillery from Captain Charles White’s 4th ME Battery. They were easily able to brush aside Wright’s Cavalry brigade in route. Around 3:00 PM the 15th NJ at the head of Russell’s column reached Mechump’s Creek just south of Hanover Court House. Confederate cavalry were waiting for them on the north bank. The 15th NJ charged across the creek and drove off the Rebel horsemen. Russell went into camp south of town near the creek. The men set about ripping up the railroad, destroying two bridges and burning the train station. Barlow’s division moved out from Haw’s Shop headed west on the Atlee Station Road. They were joined by Captain Frederick Edgell’s 1st NH Battery. Nelson Miles’s brigade was at the head of the column. Barlow deployed his men in a one mile long battle-ready formation with the center on the road.

They passed Enon Church, and then Polly Hundley Corner (shown below), here Atlee Station Road intersected with the road from Hanover Court House which ran south to Polegreen Church. Near there Barlow learned from a local woman that Breckinridge’s division was entrenched a mile ahead behind Totopotomoy Creek. At the intersection to protect his rear he sent the 125th NY south out Polegreen Church Road and Colonel John Brooke’s brigade north on Hanover Court House Road. The rest of his division continued west with Major Nathan Church’s 26th MI as skirmishers followed by Miles’s brigade.

Today Polly Hundley’s Corner is no longer an intersection but is a roundabout, as shown in the two pictures below.

As they approached the Shelton house about 3:00 PM the 26th MI came under increasingly heavier fire. From here Barlow could see Confederates on both sides of the creek. Upon moving closer with one of Hancock’s aides they came under cannon fire from a well-entrenched position on the ridge on the opposite side of the creek. Barlow realizing that he could proceed no further without support and that he faced a sizeable force of infantry formed his line on the Shelton’s property perpendicular to the road, recalled Brooke’s brigade, and sent Hancock’s aid back to headquarters asking for reinforcements.

Finally, the southernmost part of the Federal reconnaissance, Griffin’s division of Warren’s Corps, was crossing Totopotomoy Creek around 3:00 PM onto the fields of the Via property. Scouts from Matthew Butler’s SC Cavalry brigade observed the activity and quickly rode back to inform Early. Soon skirmishers from Pegram’s Brigade of Ramseur’s division opened fire on the Yankees. Brigadier General Joseph Bartlett’s and Colonel Jacob Sweitzer’s brigades began entrenching while Brigadier General Romeyn Ayres’ men continued onto Shady Grove Road. Early rushed the rest of Pegram’s Brigade east and sharp fighting erupted. At 3:30 PM, Warren advised Meade that he was headed to the front to examine the situation for himself.

It was about this time that intelligence came flooding back to Lee’s headquarters involving all three of the Federals forays: Union infantry and cavalry had passed through Hanover Court House toward the Virginia Central Railroad; from Breckinridge that a sizeable force was now in front of him on the Atlee Station Road at Shelton’s property; and finally from Early that a large Federal force had crossed the Totopotomoy River headed for the Shady Grove Road and Old Church Road. Grant wasn’t coming down just one road south and west toward Richmond he was coming down them all. Lee placed Anderson on alert to be ready to support wherever needed, as Early sent Rodes south toward Old Church Road, and Ramseur west on Shady Grove Road.

By 5:00 PM Meade had approved Hancock’s request to reinforce Barlow. Wright was concerned about Russell. He had no idea the size of the force he was facing and was out of rations. As a result, Wright ordered Brigadier General Frank Wheaton’s brigade and Colonel Oliver Edwards’ brigade, from Neill’s division, to support Russell. They reached there after dark. Birney’s division arrived and aligned on Barlow’s right. Additional artillery came up in the form of Captain John Burton’s 11th NY Battery, and the 1st RI Light Artillery, Battery B. To the south Ayres, pressed by Pegram’s Confederates, fell back from Shady Grove Road to the Via farm where Griffin’s other two brigades (Sweitzer and Bartlett) were located. They were supported by three batteries of artillery (Lieutenant Benjamin Rittenhouse’s 5th US, Battery D, Lieutenant Lester Richardson’s 1st NY Light Artillery, Battery D, and Captain Charles Mink’s 1st NY Light Artillery, Battery H). Warren sent Brigadier General Henry Lockwood’s division there to support Griffin. It was Warren’s understanding that Sheridan was to guard his left flank but he hadn’t seen any cavalry. In order to prevent being flanked he sent Colonel Peter Lyle’s brigade to Linney’s Corner, two miles east on the Shady Grove Road. Lyle’s men reached there near dark and began entrenching.

By this time Grant and Meade had a clear picture of Lee’s position. They were on the south side of Totopotomoy Creek from Atlee Station to Polegreen Church. In the morning, Hancock would advance the rest of his corps to the Shelton house holding Breckinridge in place in the center of the Confederate line. Wright was to shift the VI Corps south linking with Hancock’s right. Warren was to test the Confederate right flank on Shady Grove Road with his entire corps. Burnside was to move between Hancock’s left and Warren’s right to fill the gap between them. The simultaneous attack all along the line would prevent Lee from reinforcing any weaknesses and mitigate his advantage of interior lines. Lee on the other hand liked his position on the high ground on the south side of Totopotomoy Creek. Hill on the left facing north was positioned to block an attack from Hanover Court House. Breckinridge in the center across Atlee Station Road was supported by batteries on his left and right. Colonel Henry C. Cabell’s and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Huger’s battalions from Anderson’s division were positioned on Breckinridge’s right. Jubal Early was placed on the far right to block a Union advance on both Polegreen Church Road and Shady Grove Road. The majority of Anderson’s corps would serve as reserves.

Significant reinforcements were on their way to the Army of the Potomac. Benjamin Butler’s Army of the James was bottled up on Bermuda Hundred south of Richmond. Given that Butler was not using the majority of his troops they would be removed to reinforce Grant. Major General William “Baldy” Smith would command the two divisions of XVIII Corps under Brigadier Generals William Brooks and John Martindale, and a X Corps division under Brigadier General Charles Devens Jr., as well as an artillery brigade commanded by Captain Samuel Elder. Smith and his 17,000 men would travel by water to the White House and march to join Grant. They started moving from Bermuda Hundred on May 27th. Grant remained determined to probe all along the line for any sign of weakness while Lee would look for any chance to go on the offensive. The next day would hold opportunities for both.

Next- Totopotomoy Creek and the Battles of Bethesda Church and Matadequin Creek- May 30, 1864